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SEVERED MINERALS AS A DETERRENT
TO LAND DEVELOPMENT
By

WILLIS V. CARPENTER*
INTRODUCTION

The reader who is involved with today's real estate transactions in the rural areas of our western states has undoubtedly
encountered one or more of the following scenarios, or perhaps
variations thereof:
Scene one. The prospective purchaser of a lot in a mountain
subdivision looks up from the HUD property report he has been
asked to read and asks the hovering salesman, "What does it
mean here where it says that all the minerals were reserved by
the United States in the original patent to the land?"
Scene two. The managing partner of an investment group,
reviewing the documentation on a proposed acquisition of ranch
acreage, makes this request of the group's lawyer: "Write a short
note that I can forward to the other partners explaining that
plenty of subdivisions have been built on lands where the state
owned the minerals-and it's nothing to worry about!"
Scene three. A local banker is arguing by telephone with an
officer of the title insurance company: "I don't care how safe you
think we are. I only know I can't sell this loan to our eastern
investors with a mortgagee's policy that does not protect the
lender if the railroad mines the coal. If you won't take out that
exception, I'll find another company that will!"
And so it goes. As urbanization pushes ever outward from the
established towns and cities of the Rocky Mountain region, encompassing lands that have traditionally been agricultural in
utilization, the origins of title are ever more frequently post-1872
patents from the United States. And though the property may
*Attorney at Law, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1951, Princeton University; LL.B., 1954,
Harvard Law School.
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have been in private ownership for over 100 years (an ancient
title, by western standards), careful examination of the original
patent and all intervening conveyances has never been more
important.
This article is intended to provide the real estate practitioner
with some current responses to, as well as warnings of, the vexatious problems created by the severance of mineral estate from
surface estate. Particular emphasis will be placed upon federally
owned minerals, since this aspect is one of common interest. The
area of privately held minerals has been explored by others and
will receive less attention here.' In addition, with the excuse that
this writer's experience for the most part has been confined to
Colorado lands, some discussion of the situation in which the
minerals are owned by the State of Colorado will also be ventured, but the equally intriguing problems related to the statecontrolled minerals of our neighboring states will not be covered
specifically.
Finally, certain solutions that have been proposed and some
that have actually been applied to the problems created by severed minerals will be examined-in particular Colorado's mineral
leasing approach, which combines continued ownership of all
mineral resources with protection to the surface owner.
I. A SEVERANCE OF MINERALS-WILL You RECOGNIZE IT?
Even for the veteran title examiner, establishing that a severance of minerals has in fact occurred presents some hazards. A
severance may of course occur during any conveyance or transfer
of real property. Each instrument in the chain of title must therefore be examined to determine whether it contains a grant or
reservation of one or more or all of the minerals, or some fraction
thereof, perhaps at different depths beneath the surface. But such
an examination is not always accomplished with ease. Consider
the various methods.
Examination of Public Records and Abstracts Thereof
A federal or state patent, usually the origin of record title, is
the instrument most likely to contain a mineral reservation
A.

'See, e.g., Graham, The Oil and Gas Profit A Prendre: What Effect on California
Land?, 2 Loy. U.L. REV. 136 (1969); Hardy, Public Policy and Terminability of Mineral
Rights in Louisiana, 26 LA. L. REV. 731 (1966); Manning, Mineral Rights Versus Surface
Rights, 2 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 329 (1969); Marberry, Construction of MineralExceptions and Reservations, 14 OKLA. L. REV. 457 (1961).
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(speaking of course of those lands most recently settledprimarily in this century). Nevertheless, many early day
abstractors were apparently unaware of the significance of the
varying reservation clauses contained in most patents, and they
often either failed to note the reservation in the abstract or else
incorrectly noted it.
Even if the abstractor correctly picked up and disclosed the
language of the patent, as revealed in the county records, not even
a Las Vegas gambler would bet on its accuracy. In the days when
every recorded document had to be copied by hand into the public records, it was easy to omit all or portions of the "boilerplate"
printed material by which mineral reservations are inserted in
government patents.
The advent of preprinted blank pages for the recorder's
books, while reducing the workload, substantially increased the
odds for error. All too frequently the recorder did not have the
correct preprinted page for the patent being recorded, or perhaps
the wrong blank was taken from the drawer by mistake. Whatever
the reason, county records are notoriously unreliable when one is
attempting to establish the exact terms of a mineral reservation
in a patent or whether the patent contained any reservation at all.
By the time photographic reproduction processes had gained
widespread acceptance in the recorders' offices, the bulk of the
patents had already been transcribed into the public records,
with all errors therein preserved for posterity. For these reasons,
the careful examiner will not rely on the absence of a stated
mineral reservation in the abstract or title insurance commitment
under scrutiny, but will examine a true copy of the patent itself
(normally obtained from the Bureau of Land Management or the
State Board of Land Commissioners). 2
B.

Examination of Title Insurance Commitments
Even if one has a title insurance commitment rather than an
abstract of title, it is unwise to place total reliance upon its representation as to whether minerals were or were not reserved in the
original patent. The examiner who prepared the commitment for
2The foregoing discussion of public records is drawn directly from the author's experi
ence with the Colorado recording system and may not be accurate with respect to other
states.
For information on the nature and accessibility of federal land records, see Meek,
Federal Land Office Records, 43 CoLO. L. REv. 177 (1971).
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the title insurance company may be copying an erroneously transcribed county record or an abstract which does not show the
reservation. And although a person believes that he has title insurance to cover such an omission, the fine print in the policy
form will normally exclude from coverage all mineral reservations
contained in federal and state patents.'
One additional caution should be expressed in connection
with title insurance commitments. Because of their very nature
as a binder for insurance, they frequently do not get the thorough
examination they deserve by the buyer's attorney. Unfortunately
a severance of minerals will not always be expressed in a title
commitment with words that attract attention.'
C.

Examination of the OriginalPatent
Even a United States patent which contains no stated mineral reservation cannot be relied upon if issued pursuant to a law
requiring a reservation of minerals to the United States, since the
law, not the patent, controls.5
In Colorado one faces the additional annoyance of not being
able to obtain a copy of the older original patents conveying former state lands; i.e., those patents bearing numbers one to 1,027.6
So far as is known, however, the "lost" patents do not reserve
minerals to the state, since the systematic reservation of minerals
was not commenced by Colorado until about 1911. The practice
3

The policy form currently in use by most title insurors was promulgated in 1970 by
the American Land Title Association. As might be expected, its language protects the
issuing company by an express disclaimer of coverage for "reservations or exceptions in
patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof." Despite this exclusion, it is the
practice of many title insurance issuers not to rely thereon and to disclose all known
mineral reservations.
'A title commitment examined by this writer on lands in Jefferson County, Colorado,
proposed to be purchased for the construction of a dwelling, stated an exception in the
following words: "Reservations contained in warranty deed, dated October 24, 1916, and
recorded October 25, 1916, in Book 186 at Page 527." When a photocopy of the deed
referred to was obtained from the clerk's office and examined, it disclosed a reservation
of "all clay, clay banks and clay deposits of every kind .... ." Further investigation
revealed that the reserved deposits were in fact owned by a local brick company which
intended to mine them within the next few years!
'Swendig v. Washington Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322 (1924); Proctor v. Painter,
15 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1926). A title insurance policy that contains the typical policy
disclaimer quoted in note 3 supra will not insure against loss occasioned by the complete
omission of reservation language in the original patent.
'Patent No. 1 was issued September 28, 1878. Patent No. 1,027 was issued July 28,
1891. Beginning with Patent No. 1,028, copies of all patents are available from the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners.
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was confirmed by enabling legislation in 1919.1
By the Act of January 25, 1927, the federal government
granted to the states those numbered school sections which had
previously been classified as mineral in character.' The grant was,
however, conditioned upon the grantee state thereafter reserving
to itself "all the coal and other minerals" in those lands should
such sections thereafter be sold or conveyed. Disposition of minerals by the state in contravention of the federal statute constitutes grounds for the forfeiture thereof to the United States As
a matter of policy, the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners has declined to sell state minerals in all lands granted by
the United States, whether school lands or not. However, where
lands were acquired by the state from sources other than the
federal government the minerals have on occasion been conveyed
with the surface."
D.

Examination of Deeds and Other Instruments Affecting
Title

Not only patents, but any instrument conveying title to real
property may be the source of a severance, and whenever a deed
from a railroad company is encountered, it should be assumed
that there was at least an attempt to reserve the minerals even if
the abstract does not so indicate.
A typical abstract for rural land in Colorado begins with
entries made in short abstractor's paragraphs, handwritten in the
early days and later typewritten, setting forth the salient characteristics of the documents affecting title. In the 1940's or 1950's,
the abstract generally switches to a photographic reproduction of
the entire instrument. With such photocopies, it is easy for the
harried examiner to overlook an inserted reservation of minerals,
7

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112-3-26 (1963). Although pre-1919 attempted mineral
reservations in Colorado patents, lacking statutory authority, were initially voided by
decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, the 1919 statute sought to validate them retroactively. The statute was held to be constitutional and consequently the state owns the
reserved minerals, regardless of the date of patent issuance. Miller v. Limon Nat'l Bank,
88 Colo. 373, 296 P. 796 (1931).
'43 U.S.C. §§ 870-71 (1970).
'43 U.S.C. § 870(b) (1970).
'"Cf. STATE BD. OF LAND COMM'RS, SALE OF STATE SCHOOL LAND (1971). If requested to

render a title opinion on a mineral interest conveyed by the State of Colorado, the title
examiner will need to determine the state's source of title, since an administrative error
by the state in disposing of the interest could result in the forefeiture thereof to the United
States. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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especially if it is blurred or only partially discernible. Nevertheless, that fuzzy image may hide a valid reservation, which in
Colorado in some cases has been held to be as valid when set forth
in the habendum as in the granting clause."
II. THE LANGUAGE OF SEVERANCE-RESERVATIONS
Although severance of the mineral estate from the surface
estate may occur as the result of either a grant or a reservation
of minerals, the reservationof minerals (or a portion of the minerals) in a conveyance of the surface is encountered far more frequently than the outright grant of minerals apart from the
surface.
Reservations have been stated in numerous ways. But in
government patents the language has been standardized to conform with the statute requiring the reservation. No attempt will
be made here to provide a complete catalogue of every such form,
but the most common types will be stated and briefly discussed. 2
A.

Reservation of Minerals by the United States
1. Protection of Mining Rights
For practical purposes, insofar as lands in the Western
United States are concerned, the Lode Mining Law of May 10,
1872, was the first federal law affecting minerals that required a
related protective clause in a United States patent.'3 The Act
grants to any miner on the public domain the right to follow his
mineral vein, provided the top or apex of the vein lies inside the
surface lines of his mining claim, even though the vein goes beyond the vertical sidelines (but not the end lines) of his location.
However, the law specifically disclaims the right of a miner to
enter upon the surface of a claim owned or possessed by another.
Thus, the so-called "extra-lateral rights" protected by this law
"Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952). In addition to reservations
in fee of minerals in place, the evidence of title may disclose one or more unreleased
mineral leases. Although such a lease does not create a severance, and thus is not within
the scope of this discussion, the title examiner must, of course, consider the effect thereof
upon his developer client's intended use of the property. Caution should be exercised in
ignoring what appear to be expired mineral leases. If production has occurred and is
continuing, this fact most likely will not be evident from the record, yet the lease, by its
terms, probably remains in force so long as there is production.
"A comprehensive discussion will be found in Bate, Mineral Exceptions and Reservations in Federal Public Land Patents, 17 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 325 (1971). See also
Cox, Exceptions and Reservations in United States Patents to Public Lands, TITLE NEWS,
Mar. 1956.
'330 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). Unlike later acts, this law did not reserve any minerals to
the government, but only assured recognition of the described mining "respects."
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include subsurface but not surface privileges."
To assure the recognition of these extra-lateral rights, in
those areas of the West where the Land Office was aware of mining activity, federal patents issued for nonmineral entries subsequent to May 10, 1872, contain the following provision:
IAInd also subject to the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to
extract and remove his ore therefrom, should the same be found to
penetrate or intersect the premises hereby granted, as provided by
law.

2. Reservation of All Coal
When the United States finally realized the value of coal
deposits on the public domain, vast areas of known coal lands
were temporarily withdrawn from all forms of entry by the Acting
Secretary of the Interior at the request of President Theodore
Roosevelt.' The policy of withdrawal of coal lands was continued
by President Taft and enlarged to include petroleum lands by
presidential proclamation in 1909.11 The Pickett Act, passed on
June 25, 1910,'

7

although specifically not confirming the legality

of the previous withdrawals, 6 did authorize the President in the
future to withdraw lands temporarily from disposition under the
public land laws for certain stated purposes."
The Pickett Act was not, however, without its counterpart.
The withdrawals had created extensive congressional agitation
because of the desirable agricultural lands that were thereby removed from homestead entry. Thus even prior to passage of the
Pickett Act, the Act of March 3, 1909, was enacted not to void
the withdrawal of coal lands, but to allow an agricultural entry
to be made thereon, provided that the entryman agreed to accept
a patent containing a reservation of all coal to the United States.2 '
The 1909 Act provides relief in the case wherein an entry in
'2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 6.19, 6.39 (1960); Neff, The Law of the Apex-a
Continuing Enigma, 18 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 387 (1972).
1'41 CONG. REC. 2614 (1907). These withdrawals in 1906 covered approximately 66
million acres.

"For a detailed discussion of the history of presidential withdrawals of coal lands on

the public domain, see P.
(1968); E.

GATES

& R. SWENSON,

HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW

PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

723-30

69 (1972).

743 U.S.C. §§ 141-43 (1970).
'1"[Tlhis section ... shall not be construed as a recognition, abridgement, or enlargement of any asserted rights or claims initiated upon any oil- or gas-bearing lands after
43 U.S.C. § 142 (1970).
any withdrawal of such lands made prior to June 25, 1910 .

943 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
2"30 U.S.C. § 81 (1970).
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good faith is made and thereafter the lands are classified as being
valuable for coal; in such event the entryman is entitled to a
patent reserving coal to the United States.
The later Act of June 22, 1910, covers the reverse situation
and provides that agricultural entries can be made on lands previously classified as coal lands, again with the stipulation that the
patent reserve the coal to the government.2 The 1910 Act also
confirms the right of the entryman to contest the coal classification "with a view of disproving such classification and securing a
patent without reservation." 2
Four years later, the Act of April 14, 1914, authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to issue a new or supplemental patent
without reservation of coal whenever lands previously patented
under the 1909 and 1910 Acts were subsequently reclassified as
noncoal in character.2 3 Occasionally, a tenacious homesteader
would obtain such a supplemental patent, thereby acquiring ownership of the coal under his lands which theoretically was nonexistent. The issuance of such supplemental patents is virtually unknown today, however.
A reservation of coal under either the 1909 or 1910 Act will
be set forth in the patent in the following words:
[Rieserving, also, to the United States all coal in the lands so
granted, and to it, or persons authorized by it, the right to prospect
for, mine, and remove coal from the same ....

3. Reservation of Oil and Gas
Following an earlier law that pertained only to the reservation of oil and gas in Utah,24 Congress passed the Agricultural
Entry Act of July 17, 1914, which authorized the homesteading
of lands withdrawn or classified as valuable for phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas, or asphaltic minerals, provided that such
minerals were reserved to the United States in the patent.25 As
with the prior coal acts, this Act also permits the patentee to
contest the mineral classification of the lands and secure a patent
U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (1970).
U.S.C. § 85 (1970). This amendment also contained the initial step in government legislation designed to afford some protection to the surface owner from damages
caused by the extraction of coal, as discussed in section IV. D. infra.
2130
2230

:30 U.S.C. § 82 (1970).

"Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 367, §§ 1-3, 37 Stat. 496, repealed by Act of Dec. 16, 1930,
ch. 14, § 1, 46 Stat. 1028.
2530 U.S.C. §§ 121-23 (1970).

SEVERED MINERALS

1974

without reservation if the nonmineral character thereof can be
proved."" Such privilege applies regardless of whether the lands
were classified as valuable for minerals before or after the agricultural entry. However, the Agricultural Entry Act does not provide
for the issuance of a supplementary patent upon a subsequent
showing of nonmineral character.
An amendment to the Agricultural Entry Act, adopted
March 4, 1933, added sodium and sulphur to the list of reserved
minerals." This amendment also contained a provision to protect
the rights of lessees of minerals under the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act of February 25, 1920,8 by removing from agricultural entry
those lands (1) lying within the geologic structure of a field, or
withdrawn, classified, or reported as valuable for such minerals,
or (2) upon which leases or prospecting permits had been applied
for or granted. Having thus eliminated an agricultural entry on
"withdrawn" lands, the 1933 amendment placed matters in the
hands of the Secretary of the Interior by authorizing him in his
discretion to permit an agricultural entry if such would not "unreasonably interfere" with the operations of the mineral lessee.2"
A patent reservation under the Agricultural Entry Act will
be stated as follows:
[Aind excepting and reserving, also, to the United States all the
oil and gas [or other stated nonmetallic minerals] in the lands so
patented and to it, and persons authorized by it, the right to prospect for, mine, and remove such deposits from the same upon compliance with the conditions, and subject to the provisions and limitations of the Act of July 17, 1914 (38 Stat. 509).

4. Reservation of All Minerals
By the Act of December 29, 1916, 30 Congress not only adopted
a new homestead law which allowed stockraising homestead entries of 640 acres, but also simultaneously created a blanket reservation to the United States of all the minerals in the lands patented thereunder, whether or not such lands were then classified
as valuable for minerals. It was under this Stock-Raising Homestead Act that vast areas of Colorado and the other western states
2630 U.S.C. § 122 (1970). Some surface protection is granted by this section, as dis-

cussed in section IV. D. infra.
"30 U.S.C. § 124 (1970).
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
"30 U.S.C. § 124 (1970).
1143 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1970).
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were opened to grazing and private ownership.' It is principally
the surface owners of these lands, now being rapidly settled in the
residential sense, who require protection from the disruptive
though essential operations of the miner.
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act provides that prior to
entry the Secretary of the Interior must designate the lands as
"stockraising lands." It also provides that lands withdrawn and
reserved solely as valuable for oil and gas should still be subject
to surface entry. An amendment to the Act limits the foregoing
rights of entry by providing that stockraising lands within the
geological structure of a producing oil or gas field can only be
entered for surface patenting in the discretion of the Secretary of
the Interior, in the absence of objection by the mineral lessee or
permittee after due notice thereto.32
As discussed below, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act contains some protection for the present surface owner. In considering the extent of such protection, however, it is important again
to note that Congress directed the Secretary to designate as
"stockraising lands" only those lands "the surface of which is, in
his opinion, chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops,
[which] do not contain merchantable timber, [and] are not
susceptible of irrigation from any known source of water supply
":1:
This legislative qualification has led to the argument

...

presently advanced in some quarters that lands patented under
the Stock-Raising Homestead Act were granted for the limited
rights of grazing, as set forth in the Act, with all other (i.e.,
nongrazing) rights, surface and mineral, reserved to the
government.14
A reservation of minerals under this Act will be set forth in
the patent in the following language:
[Ejxcepting and reserving, however, to the United States all the
coal and other minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same
"Through 1971, 70.4 million acres of federal lands were patented in 19 states under
the 1916 Act. In Colorado, of 42.7 million privately owned acres, 8.4 million were patented
under the 1916 Act. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS Table 29, at 58 (1972).
:243 U.S.C. § 291 (1970), amending 43 U.S.C. § 291 (1933).
U.S.C. § 292 (1970).
:"At the present time, this is not the official posture of the Department of the Interior
:1:43

regarding stockraising homestead lands.
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pursuant to the provisions and limitations of the Act of December
29, 1916 (39 Stat. 862).

5. Reservation of Fissionable Materials
The Atomic Energy Act of August 1, 1946, 5 superimposed a
reservation of uranium, thorium, and other minerals upon lands
subsequently patented under prior acts. Numerous patents in
Colorado contain such a reservation. However, the Atomic Energy Act of August 30, 1954, as amended, terminated the practice
of making such reservations and released and quitclaimed the
reserved fissionable materials to the current owner, except where
rights pursuant thereto had been granted by the United States in
the interim." Abstracts and title policies may, of course, still
show the reservation.
B.

Reservations by the State of Colorado
In Colorado, grants of public lands for the support of the
public schools comprise about 82 percent of all lands conveyed to
the state by the federal government. 7 As noted earlier, the states
are required to reserve all of the minerals in school lands sold or
otherwise disposed of subsequent to January 25, 1927.38
The form of reservation in Colorado patents reads as follows:
[Rieserving, however, to the State of Colorado all rights to any and
all minerals, ores and metals of any kind and character and all coal,
asphaltum, oil, gas or other like substance in or under said land, the
right of ingress and egress for the purpose of mining, together with
enough of the surface of the same as may be necessary for the proper
and convenient working of such minerals and substances.

C.

Railroad Grants-in-Aid and Subsequent Reservations
Patents from the United States to the railroads conveying
western lands as "grants-in-aid" customarily contained one of the
following exceptions:
"Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
:"42 U.S.C. § 2098 (1970).
3

Grants Authorized

Acres (1971)

Public Schools
Other Schools (Univ. and A & M)
Penitentiary
Misc. Improvements
Other Purposes

4,471,604

Total Authorized
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,

3,685,618
138,040
32,000
500,000
115,946

supra note 31, Table 4, at 7-8.

"See text accompanying notes 8 and 9 supra.
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(1) Excluding and excepting all mineral lands should
any be found in the tract aforesaid; or
(2) Yet excluding and excepting from the transfer of
these presents all mineral lands should any such be
found to exist in the tract described in this patent, this
exception, as required by statute, not extending to coal
or iron lands.
In the landmark case of Burke v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co. ,3 the United States Supreme Court held that the issuance of
the patent to the railroad constituted a conclusive determination
that the lands granted were nonmineral in character and that
those minerals which in fact did exist passed to the railroad. 0 One
cannot help wondering how today's Supreme Court would decide
the question if it were presented ab initio. Despite the Burke case,
some title companies continue to include the quoted statutory
language as an exception in the policy.
In Colorado, so far as railroad lands are concerned, we are
involved only with patents to the Union Pacific Railroad Company or its predecessors in title, and more importantly with deeds
from the Union Pacific which purport to convey only the surface
estate to various grantees.' Although there is no consistency in
the choice of words used in these deeds, normally they recite a
reservation of (1) all coal, or all the coal and other minerals, or
oil, coal and other minerals, (2) the right to prospect for, mine,
"-234 U.S. 669 (1914).
'"In the Burke case, the mineral rights of the railroad were under collateral attack by
parties who had no interest therein at the time the patent was issued. The Court stated
that upon a direct attack by the United States or by a pre-patent mineral locator, the
patent would afford only presumptive evidence that the lands granted were nonmineral
in character. 234 U.S. at 691-92. A different conclusion was reached in United States v.
Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112 (1957), with respect to the nonpatented right-of-way lands
received by the railroad. The rights-of-way were deemed to be conveyed to the railroad
by the filing of a map showing the location of the line. No administrative determination
was made by the Land Office as to the mineral or nonmineral character of the right-ofway lands, in contrast to the pre-patent administrative determination made on the alternate section grants-in-aid.
"The railroad grants in Colorado were:
Union Pacific
665,998.34 acres
Denver Pacific
1,129,300.17 acres
Kansas Pacific
2,375,885.30 acres
Total

4,171,183.81 acres

S. Doc. No. 189, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905). More
recent government statistics place the total of railroad lands granted in Colorado at
3,757,673.39 acres. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 31, Table 6, at 9.
REPORT OF THE PUBLIc LANDS COMM'N,
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and remove the same, and (3) the right of ingress and egress, plus
use of the surface for mining purposes.
D.

Other Severances-By Grant or Reservation
In addition to Union Pacific deeds, all other deeds and conveyances in the chain of title must be examined. Many forms of
private mineral reservations have been attempted in Colorado.
Some have been held invalid.4" Some have been tested and validated.4" Undoubtedly, many others are waiting patiently in the
public records for their day in court.
III. "ALL THE MINERALS"-ALL THE WHAT?
An interesting question is presented under the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act, or other acts containing similar mineral reservation language, as to just what substances are to be classified as
"minerals" under a reservation of "all the coal and other minerals."
It appears to be settled law that those words are adequate to
reserve oil, gas, and related hydrocarbons." There is no such
settled law, however, with respect to sand and gravel, deposits
of clay, and similar nonmetallic materials which, being neither
animal nor vegetable, in layman's terms can only be classified as
"mineral" in character.
The "sand and gravel" question has been considered in the
treatises primarily as a discussion of the varying decisions of state
courts and often from the point of view of private rather than
governmental reservations.4 5 The conclusions can only be characterized as diverse. Indeed, the subject is worthy of a separate
study.
Surface owners may have been heartened by section three of
the Act of July 23, 1955, wherein it is stated that certain "common varieties" of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, and cinders are not be to deemed "a valuable mineral deposit within the
mining laws of the United States so as to give effective validity
to any mining claim hereafter located .. . ."" In final analysis,
"First Nat'l Bank v. Allard, 513 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1973); Bell Petroleum Co. v. Cross
V. Cattle Co., 492 P.2d 80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Radke v. Union Pac. R.R., 138 Colo.
189, 334 P.2d 1077 (1958).
"Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325, 333 P.2d 619 (1959); Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo.
267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952).
"Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 633 (1931).
'"See, e.g., IA THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 156-58 (1964).
630 U.S.C. §§ 611-15 (1970). The Act is considered in detail by Lonergan, The Ma-
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however, the Common Varieties Act merely assists the legal argument that sand and gravel are not "minerals" and does not legislatively end the controversy, since "locatable minerals" are not
necessarily the same as "reserved minerals" under the StockRaising Homestead Act and similar laws. 7
Interior Department regulations issued under the Common
Varieties Act give further warning of the economic tests increasingly in vogue as a means of interpreting what is or is not a
"mineral." The regulations state that "common varieties," i.e.,
nonlocatable minerals, are those deposits which do not possess a
distinct and special economic value. If a particular deposit has
properties making it especially valuable for use in manufacturing,
industrial, or processing operations, then it is not a "common
variety," even though it consists of a mineral material which
occurs "commonly." Factors to be considered, say the regulations, are the quality and quantity of the deposit, geographic
location, proximity to market or point of utilization, accessibility
to transportation, requirements for reasonable reserves consistent
with usual industry practices to serve existing or proposed manufacturing, industrial or processing facilities, and feasible methods
for mining and removal of the material."
Thus it would appear that a gravel pit located adjacent to the
right-of-way of a proposed interstate highway might be deemed
a "valuable mineral deposit," whereas one remotely located
might not. Similarly, gravel easily minable by surface stripping
would presumably receive a different classification than one
under considerable overburden. Obviously, the same or similar
reasoning could be applied to decide whether a reservation of "all
minerals" includes sand and gravel, stone, pumice, pumicite, and
cinders.
In 1971, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "material" that is removed "from the land in its exposed state, without
refining, and is used (as gravel) as an aggregate for coarse and
surfacing materials for highway construction" is not reserved to
the United States under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. As a
terials Act as a Solution to the Common Varieties Problem, 15 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.

51 (1969).
'"For an explanation of the terms "locatable minerals" and "reserved minerals" see 1
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 2.4, 3.23 (1960). For a recent case which makes this distinction see United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
'143 C.F.R. § 3711.1 (1972).
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result, it seemed that patentees under that Act, and their successors and assigns, could rest secure in their proprietary rights to
the sand and gravel and like substances." But later in the same
year, without mention of the New Mexico case, the Board of Land
Appeals of the Department of the Interior in United States v.
Isbell Construction Co. 50 held in favor of government ownership
of sand and gravel in Arizona when a construction company made
patent applications for two placer mining claims.
In the Isbell case, the patent was issued pursuant to the
exchange provision of the Taylor Grazing Act which requires a
reservation "of all minerals to the United States."' As a precedent for the proposition that sand and gravel are reserved to the
government under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, the case is
subject to numerous infirmities. (1) "All the coal and other minerals" (Stock-Raising Homestead Act) is not necessarily the same
as "all minerals" (Taylor Grazing Act), considering particularly
the different dates of enactment (1916 as opposed to 1934) of the
two laws and their dissimilar legislative history and purposes. (2)
Citing the opinion of its own solicitor as authority, a questionable
procedure at best, the Board in Isbell reversed the decision of the
Director of the Bureau of Land Management who had held in
favor of the patentee's ownership of the sand and gravel. (3) The
Board cited Farrellv. Sayre as the case "most in point," and then
declined to follow that case.5 2 (4) The Board reached the conclusion that deposits of sand and gravel were reserved to the United
States "conditioned only upon a finding that the said deposits are
valuable." It then proceeded to hold that this particular deposit
was "valuable" and therefore was reserved, but was not "of such
value that it could have been mined, removed and disposed of at
a profit," thus voiding Isbell's placer claim and its right to a
5
mineral patent thereon. 1
"State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122, 123 (1971).
: 178 Interior Dec. 385 (1971).
5 43 U.S.C. § 315g (1970). The opinion purports to quote the reservation language in
the patent as follows: "Reserving, also, to the United States, all mineral in the lands so
" 78 Interior Dec. at 388 (emphasis added). This is probably a misprint in
granted ....
the opinion and, if not, is not controlling since the Taylor Grazing Act calls for a reservation of "all minerals" and not "all mineral."
-'2129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954). This case construed a private and not a patent
mineral reservation but held that the mineral owner did not own the sand and gravel. The
language used in that reservation was ". . . and excepting and reserving all mineral and
mineral rights .... ." Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963), was
another most persuasive case which was cited and then shunned by the Board in Isbell.
1178 Interior Dec. at 396.
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Based upon the Isbell decision, the Bureau of Land Management has now taken the position that the United States under the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act as well as the Taylor Grazing Act
reserved all of the sand and gravel, whether the sand and gravel
compose the entire surface of the land or not.
However, given the wide variance in state and federal decisions, and the doubtful authority represented by Isbell, it now
appears that ownership of the so-called "common varieties,"
where the surface was patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, is far from settled.

IV.

ADVISING THE CLIENT

With the foregoing guide to the recognition of a severance of
mineral and surface estates, it is clear that in each of the three
opening scenarios the retail or wholesale purchaser or the mortgage financier is about to put his money on a parcel of land
wherein the minerals are separately owned by the federal or state
government, the railroad, or some other private owner. What advice can safely be given to those purchasers and mortgagees regarding the hazards and safeguards of surface development under
present and prospective law?
It should be understood by the reader that the answers presented below represent only a current survey of the law and title
insurance practices, both of which are in a state of flux. New
practices, new decisions, and new statutory enactments may
occur at any time. A reexamination of title insurance practices
plus a review of current law must be undertaken periodically by
those who venture an opinion in this area.
With that caveat, an analysis of the protections that may be
afforded can commence. These protections will be divided into
the following categories: zoning; economics; case and statutory
law; purchase or lease of the minerals; and finally (and perhaps
most importantly) title insurance.
A.

Zoning as Protection
In Colorado and other western states we have recently experienced the extension of zoning classifications to rural areas
formerly devoid of planning practices or zoning limitations. In
addition to county-enacted and county-enforced zoning, many
state governments are presently engaged in widespread, though
varying, planning functions which will have lasting impact upon
the ability of rural property owners to do with their lands as they
will.
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The typical zoning classification attached to rural land will
normally permit all types of agricultural practices, mining, and
other extractive processes. Such zoning will afford no protection
to the surface owner when the mineral owner moves in.
However, with the frequent acquisition of farm and ranch
properties by investors and subdividers and the subsequent
breaking up of the land into tracts that are typically five acres or
smaller in size, new zoning classifications are often applied, the
county zoning map is amended, and the lots then become limited
in use to residential and specified commercial purposes even
though the property remains outside an incorporated
municipality.54
In addition to such mining exceptions as already exist in the
zoning laws, particularly in the rural or recently urbanized areas,
initial steps have been taken to preserve the miner's access to
certain "commercial mineral deposits." Legislation has recently
been adopted in Colorado that prohibits counties and municipalities alike, in counties with a population of 65,000 or more, from
adopting nonmining zoning for areas where there are known commercial deposits of limestone used for construction purposes,
coal, sand, gravel, and quarry aggregate."5 In effect, this law assures a patchwork of industrial mining "parks," advocated as a
compromise solution to preserve the value of lands likely to be
mined at some future date. A study of the "commercial mineral
deposits" in the populous counties of the state must be completed
by the Colorado Geologic Survey by July 1, 1974. Using these
studies, each Board of County Commissioners must adopt a
"Master Plan for Extraction of Commercial Mineral Deposits" on
or before July 1, 1975. After adoption of the county "Master
Plan" no city or county governing body may take any action or
allow any inaction to interfere with the present or future extrac56
tion of such "commercial minerals.
But assume that examination of the applicable zoning code
indicates that mining is not allowed on the lands in question.
May an attorney safely advise his client that the surface will be
inviolate from the "depredations" of the mineral owner? There
"'Such, of course, is not always the case. In some areas, property may be subdivided
for residential purposes without the necessity of a change in zoning classification.
"'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 96-36-1 to -5 (I COLO. INFO. LEG. SERV. FOR 1973, at 71215).
"Id. § 92-36-5(2).
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are at least three reasons why the answer must be only a qualified
affirmative at best.
First, one must remember that zoning is legislatively imposed and administratively enforced. In short, "protective" zoning classifications may be modified, varied, or removed entirely.
It is thought by some, including this writer, that the surface
owner or mortgagee ought to be able to rely upon the stability of
zoning, so as to preclude a subsequent change of the zoning ordinance or an administrative variance to allow mining.5 7 Nevertheless, protection that ultimately relies upon the successful prosecution of a lawsuit may be small consolation to the clientparticularly the banker client.
A second reason to doubt the permanency of protection by
zoning arises from the clash of competing sovereigns. While conceding that zoning, so long as it exists and is enforced by competent authority, will effectively forestall the exploitation of privately owned minerals, one must also consider whether the zoning
ordinance of a county or municipality can prevent the largest
mineral owners in the West, the federal and state governments,
from developing their reserved mineral estates.
With respect to state-owned minerals, it could be argued that
a zoning ordinance which has been adopted by a city or a county
pursuant to a state delegation of power by statute ought to apply
with equal force to private citizen and state government. However, such does not appear to be the law, the state generally being
held immune from regulation by local ordinance.58
When the United States or its lessee prepares to remove federally owned minerals, an attempted outright denial of access
thereto by local zoning law is likely doomed by similar precedent. 9 Whether the federal government-and specifically the
Bureau of Land Management-would attempt to circumv6nt or
vitiate a local zoning code is of course a political question which
7
It should be noted that the provisions of the Colorado law preserving commercial
mineral deposits indicate that, at least until July 1, 1974, when the Colorado Geological
Survey completes its study, reliance on the stability of zoning will be perilous at best.
Even after that study is completed, any commercial deposit discovered subsequent to July
1, 1974, may be included in such study. Id. § 92-36-3. Therefore, in the populous counties,
zoning as protection will be suspect until July 1, 1975, when the "Master Plans for Extraction" will be adopted by the various governing bodies.
"See cases cited in 1 E. YOCKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2-26 (1965); 2 R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.06 (1968).
11E. YOCKLEY, supra note 58, § 2-25; R. ANDERSON, supra note 58, § 9.07.
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may shift with each new mineral shortage.
The third apparent weakness of zoning as protection arises
from the ever-present possibility of a successful attack on the
validity of the zoning ordinance itself. Although zoning laws have
proved to be a hearty breed and are successfully challenged in the
courts only on rare occasions, an argument can be constructed to
the effect that the ordinance is invalid if it does not properly
concern itself with the competing interests of the mineral and
surface owners. 0
In addition to weighing the temporary nature of extraction
against permanent loss of the mineral estate, the mineral owner
would undoubtedly ask the court to consider the comparative
values of the two estates, and where the mineral's value is many
times the value of the surface, his chances of success are increased. He will try to show that it would be arbitrary to prohibit
mining in an area where such activity would not unreasonably
interfere with public rights. In a mountain subdivision of 10-acre
tracts with intervening hills and valleys and heavy timber screening, he may have an excellent case.6" And as an oil and gas lessee,
he may try to show that his property is being drained by neighboring wells.6"
In summary, we learn from the reported cases that it is
nearly impossible to overturn a zoning ordinance. The discretion
of local officials is rarely disturbed by the courts. A zoning ordinance is presumably valid and its opponent faces a heavy burden
of proof. Doubtful cases invariably result in confirmation of the
zoning law and there is no discernible trend to the contrary.
Therefore, though the banker may be hard to convince, the prospective owner may take some comfort in zoning as a protection
against damage to his surface estate by the extraction of minerals, provided that the restrictive zoning has in fact been enacted
and is in force prior to the commencement of mining operations. 3
Whether the United States and its mineral lessees will acquiesce
"This argument is more fully developed in Sherwood, Zoning Against Mining, COLO.
§ 11.64.
"For other factors considered by courts in deciding the validity of local zoning against
mining, see Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 1 11. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953);
Kane v. Kreiter, 195 N.E.2d (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1963). See'also Note, Local Zoning of Strip
Mining, 57 Ky. L.J. 738, 750-51 (1969).
11R. ANDERSON, supra note 58, § 11.63.
3
See Western Paving Constr. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 506 P.2d 1230 (Colo.
1973). A similar conclusion is reached by Sherwood, supra note 60, at 32.
LAW., July 1973, at 27. See also R. ANDERSON, supra note 58,
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in the applicability of local zoning ordinances remains a primary
64
area of uncertainty.
Economic Reality as Protection
Akin to zoning protection is the salient question of the balancing of values between mineral and surface rights. Once the
surface has been subdivided and improved with buildings,
streets, and other improvements, its value will likely preclude
strip mining, assuming that the strip miner is liable for surface
damages. However, this argument fails (1) whenever underground mining with minimum surface use is proposed, (2) whenever extremely valuable deposits or wartime essential minerals
are involved, or (3) with regard to the ever-present possibility of
harassment by mineral locators seeking a payoff. Although the
banker with his first lien may be primarily interested in a guarantee that damage to surface improvements will be compensated,
it will be small comfort to a prospective homeowner to assure him
that he will receive fair market value for his residence on the eve
of its destruction.
Economic reality also comes into play where the mineral
estate is owned by more than one party. In some states, the owners of less than one-half of the minerals are prohibited from mining. In Colorado, however, there is no absolute protection against
mining in such cases, and any fractional owner has the right to
mine and account to his cotenants for profits therefrom.65 Although it can be argued that as a practical matter the division of
the mineral estate into fractional interests may lessen the possibility of mining activity, it can also be argued that the presence
of many fractional interests may indicate that a valuable mineral
is indeed present. Thus, although the surface owner may try to
acquire these fractional interests by purchase or lease, he has no
absolute protection, at least in Colorado, until he has garnered
them all.
B.

Nonstatutory Law as Protection
Thus far in our history, common law decisions have affirmed
the dominance of the mineral estate over the surface estate. This
dominance carries with it the right of the owner of the minerals
C.

'"[Elxploration for and development of reserved minerals should not be permitted
if such activities would be inconsistent with local zoning." PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 138 (1970).
"5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-23-1 to -9 (1963).
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to use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to produce the minerals, without compensation to the surface owner."
But there is evidence of changing judicial views, particularly
where the value of the surface has increased in comparison with
the value of the minerals. Given the advances that are occurring
in the technology of strip mining, a greater number of damage
cases are likely to reach appellate level. There it can be anticipated that the courts will hold a mere reservation of minerals does
not carry with it the right to destroy the surface by strip mining
absent an express provision to that effect. 7 Undoubtedly we will
see exceptions to and variations on this theme: e.g., where (1) the
minerals which were known to exist on the property at the date
of the reservation can only be extracted economically by strip
mining; (2) strip mining was in progress on neighboring lands at
the time of the severance; and (3) the surface is valuable only for
grazing or other "primitive" uses, and the minerals cannot be
commercially extracted by underground mining methods.
D.

Statutory Law as Protection
Statutory law does afford some protection to the surface
owner, both as to government owned and privately owned minerals. As of the end of 1972, however, it could be stated that statutory law did not absolutely prohibit the development of the min961AMERICAN

LAW OF MINING § 3.50 (1960).

"7 See, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970). In that case the
Colorado Supreme Court said:
[Wihen the surface and the mineral estates have been severed, the owner
of the mineral estate may remove the underlying minerals but must support
the surface and cannot destroy the surface by strip mining.
Id. at 443, 474 P.2d at 795. The court in Smith v. Moore referred to Barker v. Mintz, 73
Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923), as authority for that statement. In Barker v. Mintz the surface
owner had obtained a permanent injunction against the mineral owner, a grantee of Union
Pacific, restraining him from strip mining for his coal. The court dissolved the injunction,
holding that under the Colorado statute cited in note 89 infra, the posting of a bond would
provide the surface owner with an adequate remedy. In the court's words:
The land is wild and its present value, except for the coal, is only for
pasturage, a very little of it for cultivation. The stripping destroys these
values, but the fair and equitable way is so to treat the matter that each
party will get the greatest amount of good with the least possible harm, and
that is by allowing the defendant to take out his coal and pay the plaintiff
for the damage he thereby does to her estate. He will then get the full value
of his property and she will get the value of hers, Is that not equity?
Id. at 266, 215 P. at 535. Barker hardly seems like solid authority for Smith v. Moore;
however, Smith v. Moore is presently the law in Colorado and is perhaps the logical
continuance of the cases cited therein which consider the competing interests of the
surface and mineral owners from an equitable point of view.
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eral estate (except for the enactment of a limited number of "special favor" statutes)." The most that could be expected from the
older statutes was a promise of some measure of relief by way of
damages. However, current legislative proposals have taken a
new turn, as will be discussed.
1. Federal Statutes
Federal ownership of minerals occurs in the West on public
lands (where both the surface and minerals are owned by the
government) and on privately owned lands pursuant to mineral
reservations contained in surface patents issued under the authority of three principal homestead enactments: the Coal Lands
Acts of 1909-1912; the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914; and the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916. The minerals reserved
under these Acts were respectively coal, oil and gas and other
nonmetallic minerals, and finally all the coal and other minerals.
Each of these Acts offers to surface owners some measure of
relief from mineral development. The 1909 statute provides
merely that no person shall enter lands patented under that Act
for the purpose of prospecting for, mining, or removing coal without the previous consent of the surface owner "except upon such
conditions as to security for and payment of all damages to such
owner caused thereby as may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction." 9 The statute does not define "all damages."
The 1910 amendment to the Coal Lands Act guarantees the
right of entry upon the surface of patented lands for prospecting
purposes upon the filing of a bond or undertaking with the Secretary of the Interior as security for the payment of "all damages
to the crops and improvements on such lands by reason of such
prospecting." ' " Upon acquisition of the right to mine the coal
deposits (presumably following a successful prospecting venture)
the miner is granted the right to "reenter and occupy so much of
the surface thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably
incident to the mining and removal of the coal therefrom . . .
upon payment of the damages caused thereby" to the surface
owner, or upon "giving a good and sufficient bond or undertaking
in an action instituted in any competent court to ascertain and
fix said damages."'
'8See note 79 infra and accompanying text.

"930 U.S.C. § 81 (1970).
7130

7Id.

U.S.C. § 85 (1970).
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Obviously drawing upon the prior statutory language of 1909
and 1910, the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 contains a nearly
identical provision which permits prospecting upon the filing of
an approved bond with the Secretary of the Interior as security
for the payment of "all damages to the crops and improvements
on such lands by reason of such prospecting, the measure of any
such damage to be fixed by agreement of parties or by a court of
competent jurisdiction.''7 Similarly, reentry following discovery
is permitted, together with occupation of so much of the surface
as may be required "for all purposes reasonably incident to the
mining and removal of the minerals therefrom" upon payment of
damages or the posting of a bond in an action instituted in court
to fix damages.7" Again, "damages" are not defined.
The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as
amended in 1946,11 removed the minerals reserved under the 1909
and 1914 Acts from mineral entry and location. It also appears
to exclude such minerals from development through leasing when
situate in "incorporated cities, towns, and villages." 75 With respect to these leasing act minerals, therefore, incorporation of the
surface lands into a municipality-and not mere zoning-may be
the ultimate protection.
But such was not the state of the law when Michael F. Kieffer, a surface owner under the 1914 Act, apparently aware of
economic reality as protection, commenced selling residential lots
on his homestead tract. The lands concerned were in the Salt
Creek oil field in Natrona County, Wyoming, a producing area
leased to Kinney-Coastal Oil Company pursuant to the Act of
1920. By the time Kieffer had platted and sold 40 of the 80 acres
to purchasers who were erecting dwellings amongst the derricks
and bunkhouses, Kinney-Coastal saw the handwriting on the
wall. When Kieffer announced plans to subdivide the remaining
40 acres, Kinney-Coastal had had enough and enjoined Mr. Kieffer from continuing his real estate venture. When the action finally reached the United States Supreme Court in 1928, the
Court advised Mr. Kieffer that:
The acts of 1914 and 1920 are to be read together-each as the
complement of the other. So read they disclose an intention to div7230

7

U.S.C. § 122 (1970).

S1d.

730 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).

711d. § 181.
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ide oil and gas lands into two estates for the purposes of disposal-one including the underlying oil and gas deposits and the
other the surface-and to make the latter servient to the former,
which naturally would be suggested by their physical relation and
relative values . . In effect therefore a servitude is laid on the
surface estate for the benefit of the mineral estate to the end, as the
acts otherwise show, that the United States may realize, through the
separate leasing, a proper return from the extraction and removal
of the minerals.75

Then, the court proceeded to interpret the damages clause of
the 1914 Act in its narrowest sense to include only crops and
"agricultural" improvements. This interpretation, which stands
today as the law of the land, was accomplished with these words:
The only compensation which he [the surface owner] rightfully
may demand is, as the act of 1914 says, for "damages caused" by
the mining operations. The sentence next preceding that in which
these words occur makes it fairly plain that they refer to damages
to "crops and improvements," and the title to the act, coupled with
the reference to "crops" shows that "agricultural" improvements
are the kind intended. Certainly it is not intended to include improvements placed on the land, after the mining operations are
under way, for purposes plainly incompatible with the right to proceed with those operations until the oil and gas are exhausted.77

Thereupon the court sustained the injunction and Kieffer went
out of the subdivision business-at least at that location.
The 1916 Stock-Raising Homestead Act added only a paltry
measure of protection to the previously existing statutory scheme.
Following closely the format of the 1914 Act, the 1916 Act required a reservation in the patent of the right to enter the patented lands for prospecting purposes on condition that the prospector "shall not injure, damage, or destroy the permanent improvements of the entryman or patentee, and shall be liable to
and shall compensate the entryman or patentee for all damages
to the crops on such lands by reason of such prospecting.""8
Pausing for a moment, one can envisage an entire residential
subdivision on Stock-Raising Homestead Act lands. There are
many such developments today, and more are being built. In
come the prospectors, bearing not only their 1916 picks and shovels, but their modern day bulldozers and draglines. They may not
harm the permanent improvements; that much is clear. And they
7

Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 504 (1928).

"Id. at 505.
7-43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).

1974
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must make restitution for damages to "crops." So they set to
work in the lawn areas of the suburb, and perhaps also in the
parks, greenbelts, and other "unimproved" areas. On at least one
occasion such activity, or the threat of it, has prompted Congress
to take the unusual step of specific legislation withdrawing the
subject minerals from location and leasing."
But to continue consideration of the provisions of the Act of
1916, they, too, anticipate reentry by those who have acquired the
right to mine or remove the minerals, but the conditions under
which the miner may occupy as much of the surface as may be
required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining or
removal of the minerals have been expanded to three. These conditions are (1) securing the written consent or waiver of the homesteader, (2) payment of the "damages to crops or other tangible
improvements to the owner thereof" where agreement has been
reached as to the amount, or (3) execution of a bond for the
benefit of the surface owner to secure payment of "such damages
to the crops or tangible improvements" of the owner as may be
fixed by a court of competent jurisdiction. 0
In construing patents issued under both the 1914 and 1916
Acts, the Wyoming Supreme Court in 1955 chose to follow the
Kieffer case and limited the liability of an oil drilling company
to damage to "agricultural improvements or agricultural crops." 8'
The trial court's decision that the natural grass growing upon the
surface of the lands was not a "crop" within the meaning of those
Acts was affirmed. The court found that damages "to the land"
were not compensable.
With respect to damages to the land occasioned by strip
mining or open pit methods (as opposed, for instance, to drilling
for oil and gas), Congress has seen fit to enact the following law,
known as the Open Pit Mining Act of June 21, 1949:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any Act of Congress to the
contrary, any person who hereafter prospects for, mines, or removes
by strip or open pit mining methods, any minerals from any land
included in a stock raising or other homestead entry or patent, and
7

Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-754, 76 Stat. 750. This Act specifically describes
4,540.57 acres of land in Maricopa County, Arizona. With regard to these lands, at the
request of the developer, Congress declared that "the mineral interests of the United
States, which have been reserved in patents . . .are hereby withdrawn from all forms of
location and . . .entry . . .including the mining and mineral leasing laws ......

-043 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).
"Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955).
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who had been liable under such an existing Act only for damages
caused thereby to the crops or improvements of the entryman or
patentee, shall also be liable for any damage that may be caused to
the value of the land for grazing by such prospecting for, mining, or
removal of minerals. Nothing in this section shall be considered to
impair any vested right in existence on June 21, 1949.82

At the present time, there appear to be no reported cases
decided under the Open Pit Mining Act. Unaccountably, the legislative history of this Act does not reveal any awareness by Congress of the holding of the Supreme Court in the Kieffer case that
damages under the 1914 Act were limited to "agricultural" crops
and improvements. Senate and House reports claim only that
surface patentees under the 1909 and 1914 Acts are afforded compensation for "all damages" caused by the mining and removal
of minerals, whereas a surface owner under the 1916 Act is entitled to recover only for "damages to crops and injuries to permanent improvements"-an inaccurate assessment of the situation
to say the least. "It is to correct such an anomalous and inequitable situation and to place surface entrymen on all mineral lands
on an equal basis as to compensation for damages to the surface
that the committee has adopted this amendment." 3
It appears that some surface owners convinced their representatives in the Congress that the advent of strip mining methods jeopardized the entire surface of a stockraising homestead.
They seem to have foreseen the possibility that if only grazing
lands were involved, no compensation would be due.
This possibility is disclosed in the legislative report:
In many present-day mining operations, such as that employed
in the production of bentonite, for example, strip-mining methods
are prevalent which permanently destroy the entire surface value of
the land for grass-raising and stock-raising purposes. Thus, the
number of head of stock an entryman can raise on his homestead is
limited to some extent for both the present and future by the activities of the holder of the mineral rights on the land."

Unfortunately for the surface owner, there does not appear
to be any inclination on the part of Congress to extend the definition of damages under any of the Acts beyond agricultural improvements and agricultural crops in non-strip-mining situations. And where strip mining occurs, a limitation of damages to
N230

U.S.C. § 54 (1970).

"U.S. CODE CONG. SER.

"Id. at 1377, 1406.

1376-77, 1405-06 (1949).
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the value of the land for grazing is so clearly expressed in the 1949
Act as to be capable of no expanded interpretation.8 5 Fair market
value, with its implications of highest and best use, does not even
appear to be on the horizon, much less in the books.
As an aside, it can be observed that in 1949 and prior years
very little urban development had occurred on lands patented
subsequent to 1909 and subject to a severance of surface and
mineral estates. Now, however, we are experiencing that precise
occurrence and barring an unlikely modification of attitude by
the courts, assistance from Congress in the form of new legislation
is vital if permanent improvements, which require institutional
financing, are going to be erected on such severed surface estates.
In addition the federal government seems hardly aware of the
control over urbanization that it could exercise through its mineral ownership, should it decide to do so in connection with the
environmental revolution that is now apparent.
It appears likely that some significant new protection will be
enacted by Congress in the form of Senate Bill 425, the Surface
Mining Reclamation Act of 1973, although the final form of the
bill cannot be predicted as this is being written. The importance
thereof to the present discussion lies principally in the Act's proposed absolute prohibition (added by the so-called "Mansfield
Amendment") against surface mining of coal on privately owned
lands which overlie federally owned minerals." In effect, the Act
will withdraw such reserves from exploitation unless the coal can
be extracted by underground methods.
The beneficiaries of this amendment have been described by
Senator Mansfield as the "third or fourth generation rancher...
the farmer and even . . . the residents of a small town which
might find itself in the midst of a deep, rich vein of strippable coal
• . .the last of the rugged individualists of this Nation .... "8s
'For an interesting discussion of the subject, with somewhat different conclusions,
see Note, Surface Damages from Strip Mining under the Stock Raising Homestead Act,
50 DENVER L.J. 369 (1973). See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.48 (1960). The 1914
and 1916 statutes, and cases decided thereunder, are reviewed in Stocker, Protection for
Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REV. 171
(1973).
'IS. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 612(b) (1973). The Amendment provides:
All coal deposits, title to which is in the United States, in lands with respect
to which the United States is not the surface owner thereof are hereby withdrawn from all forms of surface mining operations and open pit mining,
except surface operations incident to an underground coal mine.
"119 CONG. REC. 18770-71 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973).
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Obviously the benefited group also includes the subdivider grantees of the "folk" portrayed by the amendment's distinguished
sponsor, thereby permitting development on lands otherwise encumbered by the threat of mining of the dominant mineral estate.
2. State Statutes
As with local zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to state
statute, the protection that is or can be made available to the
surface owner by means of state legislation is of doubtful force
with respect to federally owned minerals.
Colorado has two ancient statutes-elder statesmen, so to
speak, from the hard rock mining era, seldom called upon in
battle but perhaps still able to bear arms. One of these statutes
prohibits all mining under any building or other improvement,
absent security for damages "except by priority of right."" Exactly what is meant by "priority of right" is not disclosed by
subsequent case law, but it might be deemed to include a right,
reserved by patent or deed, to make reasonable use of (i.e., cause
reasonable damage to) the surface for the extraction of reserved
minerals where severance of the minerals has occurred before the
improvements were erected. If that is its meaning, the statute is
obviously too feeble to protect the surface owner. An interpretation of "except by priority of right" more commensurate with the
current need for protection would be "unless otherwise agreed by
surface and mineral owners."
The other aged Colorado statute provides for security by way
of bond to protect the surface owner before the miner can commence operations whenever the ownership of the surface is separate from the ownership of the minerals." Once again, however,
the security which the miner must offer could be severely limited
by an interpretation of the instrument creating the severance to
include the right to occupy or even destroy the surface as an
incident of the mineral grant or reservation.
As a general proposition, state legislation has been suggested, 0 and in a few instances enacted, primarily with respect
to privately owned minerals, along the following lines:
"CoLO. REV. STAT.
-Id. § 92-24-6.

ANN.

§ 92-24-2 (1963).

"'Cf.Manning, supra note 1; Note, Severed Mineral Interests, a Problem Without a
Solution?, 46 N.D.L. REV. 451 (1970); Cal. A.B. 2311, Reg. Sess. (1968). See also Grahm,
supra note 1, at 136, 147.
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(1) A law restricting the length of time that a
mineral owner can sit upon his rights and not develop,
upon expiration of which the surface owner automatically becomes vested with the mineral rights.' The proposal raises immediate constitutional questions. One
can imagine the opposition to such legislation that
could be expected from the large private mineral owners, such as the railroads. If the law were made applicable to state minerals (or federal minerals, if federal legislation were proposed) the cry of "giveaway" would
surely be heard;
(2) Legislation giving a regulatory agency, such as
the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, the right to
limit the number and location of drill and tunnel sites
92
so as to minimize surface interference;
(3) Enactment of a new form of action, somewhat
like a partition action, whereby the surface owner could
surrender some of his surface rights to the mineral
owner and in return obtain surface protection for the
balance of his lands.
E.

Purchase or Lease as Protection

1. Federal Minerals
A question often asked by the prospective purchaser or
lender is, "Can I buy up those minerals so that I don't have to
worry about them?" The anticipated answer is "yes" in our society where virtually everything is available for a price. However,
the correct answer is "no" where federal minerals are concerned.
They are simply not available at any price-unless, in addition
to the price, one happens to have the appropriate influence to
obtain special legislation.
It may come as a surprise to some to learn that in several
instances acts of Congress have been passed which authorized the
outright acquisition of federal reserved minerals by purchase.93
'LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 789, 3546 (West 1952, 1953); MICH. STATS. ANN.
(rev. vol. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-704 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN.

§ 26.1163(l)-(4)
§ 55-155 (1969).

"'Limited regulation of strip mining by a governing agency already exists in Colorado
pursuant to the Colorado Open Land Reclamation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-131 to -13 (Supp. 1969).
' 3See, e.g., Priv. L. No. 92-144 (Oct. 21, 1972). The Act directs the Secretary of the
Interior "to convey, sell, and quitclaim all mineral interests of the United States in and
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Obviously, this method of reuniting the surface and mineral estates is not available to everyone, nor does it flow from any systematic policy.
Undoubtedly there are millions of acres of patented surface
lands overlying federally reserved minerals wherein no commercially valuable mineral deposits are located. In such cases it can
be argued that the mineral and surface estates ought to be joined
by a planned program of (1) investigation by the geological survey
to establish the absence of valuable minerals, perhaps with a test
drilling program at the expense of the surface owner, followed by
(2) appraisal or other method of establishing the purchase price.
Direct sale to the surface owner, with the proceeds going to the
federal treasury, would be the final step. Given the increasing
pressures on our western lands for recreational ventures as well
as commercial, industrial, and residential uses, such an outright
purchase program might create substantial public revenue while
solving the severance problem on vast acreages.
True, Congress has previously enacted general statutes that
authorize the purchase of government lands. Yet anyone who has
ever tried to acquire federal real estate pursuant thereto is well
aware of the interminable delays and bureaucratic entanglements
to be encountered, not to mention limitations on the size of purchases. Furthermore, mineral lands are expressly excluded from
those statutes."
to the property situated in the State of Georgia. . . to Thomas A. Buiso, the record owner
of the surface thereof." The purchaser is required to pay "the fair market value of the
interest to be conveyed," plus the administrative costs of conducting exploratory programs
deemed necessary by the Secretary to determine the character of the mineral deposits in
the land, evaluating the exploratory data and preparing and issuing the instrument of
conveyance. Many such bills are introduced at each session of Congress. Few become law.
But see note 94 infra.
"The various United States statutes are examined in Moran, Sales and Exchanges
of Public Lands, 15 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 25 (1969). It is interesting to note that the
Department of the Interior does not oppose the disposition of federally owned mineral
interests into private hands as a matter of "official policy," as indicated by the following
statement:
The [Department of the Interior's] position has been that we will not
abject [sic) to a conveyance of a reserved mineral interest in the United
States when such reservation is found to interfere with intensive development of the land or if the mineral interest is of no value. The sale should be
made in return for the fair market value of the reserved mineral interest if
it is prospectively valuable plus the cost of making the conveyance and,
where necessary, the cost of determining the mineral value.
Letter from Harrison Loesch, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. Wayne N. Aspinall, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Mar.
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Proposed Senate Bill 2401, which died without passage in
1972 upon expiration of the 92d Congress, contained provisions
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to sell certain government lands upon a finding that to do so would "serve important
public objectives which cannot be achieved prudently and feasibly" without such sale. 5
A similar bill, though substantially redrafted, has now been
introduced in the 93d Congress as Senate Bill 424. It contains the
idential language quoted above from the previous bill, but with
the proviso that the important public objectives to be served by
the sale of lands must "outweigh all public objectives and values,
including recreation and scenic values, which would be served by
maintaining such tract in Federal ownership." 9 This test has
obviously been inserted to strengthen bureaucratic discretion regarding the disposition of public lands.
A novel feature of Senate Bill 424 is the provision that, despite a general stipulation requiring the reservation of all minerals to the United States, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in the alternative, to enter into surface covenants which
forbid prospecting, mining, or removal of minerals for a specified
period if such activities "would interfere with or preclude the
appropriate use or development of such land. . . or, where necessary, [to] convey minerals in the conveyance of title."97
In the same section of the bill, the Secretary is directed to
make only such sales as will be in conformity with state and local
land use plans, programs, zoning, and regulations. Furthermore,
local authorities are to be informed of proposed sales 90 days in
advance, "in order to afford the appropriate body the opportunity
of zoning or otherwise regulating . . . the use of such land prior
to such sale."
It appears extremely doubtful to this observer, however, that
9, 1972, in S. Doc. No. 92-1286, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972).
'"S.2401, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8-9 (1971), introduced August 3, 1971, by Senators
Jackson and Allott. If enacted, this bill would have repealed the surface protection provisions of the Stock-Raising Homestead Act-a step backwards, to say the least.
"S. 424, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1973), introduced January 18, 1973, by Senators
Jackson, Bennett, Church, Gurney, Haskell, Humphrey, Inouye, Metcalf, Moss, Pastore,
and Tunney.
'"Id. § 8. However, this section might be interpreted to preclude a sale of previously
reserved minerals or even a covenant to protect the surface, since it fails to mention
reserved minerals specifically and appears to anticipate a sale of minerals only in connection with a concurrent sale of the surface.
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any act of Congress will ever serve the purpose of allowing a
reasonably priced sale of the federal mineral estate to the owner"
of the surface, though the minerals be declared valueless, when
such surface owner is a confessed land developer. This could only
be done if such act in very specific terms provides for exactly that
type of sale, with express directions as to the manner of determining the nonmineral character of the lands, their appraisal and
disposition.
Legislation recently introduced at the instance of the Bureau
of Land Management seems to be at least a "half-step" in this
direction.9" It goes directly to the point, specifically authorizing
the sale and conveyance of reserved minerals under controlled
conditions. These conditions are:
(1) the surface is in nonfederal ownership;
(2) either the lands have no mineral value, or government ownership of the minerals is interfering with or
precluding appropriate development;
(3) the proposed development is a more beneficial use
of the land than mineral development;
(4) sale will be made only to the surface owner;
(5) surface owner pays the fair market value of the
mineral interests being conveyed; and
(6) surface owner also pays all administrative costs of
conducting and evaluating an exploratory program to
determine the value of such mineral deposits, and preparing and issuing the documents of conveyance. 9
Looking at the other side of the coin, we should nevertheless
consider whether federal mineral lands ought to be sold under any
circumstances. Is it logical to assume that today's nonmineral
classification will prove correct 50 or 100 years hence? The history
of the disposition of our public lands is replete with erroneous
determinations of the presence or value of mineral resources, not
to mention other resources. The potential for federal environmental control which arises from ownership of the mineral estate
could be a contributing factor to the government's "land use
'IS. 1041, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill was also introduced in the House of
Representatives as H.R. 5441.
'"Id. §§ 205-06. These conditions are virtually identical with those contained in prior
special acts, as discussed at note 93 supra.
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plan" required by Senate Bill 424100 if that bill is ultimately
passed.
2. Colorado Minerals
Of the 66.7 million acres in the State of Colorado, 4.47 million acres (6.7 percent of the state's land area) were granted to
the state government by the United States, 0 ' and the state has
retained and still owns 4.3 million mineral acres. 02
In lieu of the sale of minerals, Colorado has adopted a very
active mineral leasing program designed not only to produce income but also to protect the surface owner in nonmineralized
areas. The scheme has much to recommend it and should be
carefully considered by the drafters of federal legislation as well
as by the large private owners of severed mineral estates.
The typical State of Colorado mineral lease is for 50 years or
less. A uniform rate of 1 dollar-per-acre annual rental is charged,
to be paid in advance for the entire term of the lease unless the
State Board of Land Commissioners agrees to 5-year advance
installments. The only other charge is a 10 cents-per-acre filing
fee, with a minimum fee of 10 dollars. Absent an actual showing
of valuable minerals in place, leases will be issued only to the
surface owner or the developer, thereby offering protection
against any other party acquiring the mineral rights and disturbing the surface use.
The lease covers all minerals, unless an active drilling or
mining program is underway on neighboring lands. Speculation
in leases is not allowed, and a warning contained in the lease
application hints at the Board's policy of disapproving assignments of leases if they appear to be used for financial gain by the
assignor. Absent speculation, the leases may be assigned in whole
or in part with the Board's approval upon payment of a 10-dollar
fee. If requested, leases will be issued in the name of a title insurance company, and it is the custom of such companies in Colorado to cooperate with each other in the assignment of leases
whenever the lands change hands and the new title insurance
policy is issued by a different company.
In the event of a subsequent discovery of minerals, a protec'IS. 424, 93d Cong., ist Sess. § 5 (1973).
""BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 31, Tables 1, 4, at 3, 7.
" 2According to statistics furnished to the author by the Colorado State Board of Land
Commissioners.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

tive clause in the lease requires the lessee to drill and produce
such wells as may be necessary to protect the leased premises
from drainage or, in lieu of such drilling and production, to compensate the state for the estimated loss of royalties. It is thought,
however, that the Board would not activate this clause unless
considerable financial gain to the state were involved. In such a
case, the lessee would hardly be the object of pity, being then the
0
owner of a valuable mineral lease. 3
Thus in Colorado, as an example, the surface owner of a 5acre tract and his mortgagee can obtain complete protection
against any possible development of the state's fee minerals for a
period of 50 years by an advance payment of $260.00; the state
preserves its entire mineral ownership and the right to require
production thereon should circumstances make it profitable; and
the interests of both surface and mineral estate are balanced,
with benefit to the public treasury and no undue hardship on
either owner.
3. Private Minerals
Colorado's largest private mineral owner, Union Pacific Railroad, appears to have formulated a policy that includes outright
relinquishment of minerals in some areas, an agreement for surface protection with a reservation of specific drill and tunnel sites
and easements for access thereto in other areas, and no protection
in regions of known coal and other mineral deposits. A case-bycase approach is used, and the most accurate generality that can
be applied is that each individual application for relief will have
to be advanced with the company on its own merits. Considerable
delay may ensue if the geology of the area in question is not
already well known to the company.
The purchase of minerals from other private owners may
prove quite costly. The writer is aware of a case in which the
owner of one-half of the coal underlying a prospective subdivision
sold his interest to the developer for $500.00, but the owner of the
other one-half interest held out for $30,000.00, causing several
'"Where the developer or title company continues to hold the lease in its own name
after sale of a residential lot, production under the lease would certainly cause some
concern as to who is the true owner of the lease. Since the lot owner is the one sought to
be protected by the acquisition of the lease, it would seem logical that the title company
or developer holds title to the lease solely for the lot owner's benefit, as upon a resulting
trust.
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years' delay. Counsel for some land developers have been able to
obtain relatively inexpensive mineral leases for the term of the
primary financing or, alternatively, surface protection agreements with reserved drill sites.
It is also possible, at least in Colorado, to acquire long forgotten mineral interests created by an ancient deed and never assessed for taxes. Frequently such interests are fractional interests
whose owners are unknown or cannot be located. At the request
of the surface owner the county assessor will assess such severed
minerals. If the taxes go unpaid, which is usually the case, the
official policy of most county treasurers, now recognized by statute, is to grant the surface owner a right of first refusal to acquire
the minerals at the tax sale.'"4 From then on the process is like
any other tax sale and in 3 years the surface owner becomes the
mineral owner, too, by virtue of a treasurer's deed. Should the
mineral owner appear and pay the taxes or redeem, the surface
owner at least has a chance to negotiate an outright purchase of
the subject minerals.
F.

Title Insurance as Protection
Changing attitudes toward title insurance protection are now
apparent in Colorado. Competition for the title insurance dollar
has increased to such a point that one hesitates to speculate as
to what can or cannot be done, or is being done, with regard to
outstanding mineral interests. It is safe to predict that within the
next few years far more title protection will be written in this area
than is presently the case.
Whether or not title insurance protection against severed
minerals is obtainable may depend upon the type of mineral interest (federal, state, or private) that poses a threat to the surface.
It will also depend upon the kind of protection (owner's or mortgagee's) requested. These various classifications will be considered separately.
In general it appears that if the property is located within a
municipality, and particularly if the zoning classification prohibits mining, coverage will be easier to obtain. Similarly, title insurance protection against mining disturbances in an unincorporated but "nearby" subdivision is more apt to be written than in
the "uncharted" outback. Some companies refuse to grant such
'"'CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-11-50 (II COLO. INFO. LEG. SERV. FOR 1973, at 760).
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insurance to any mountain subdivision. Others are not so discriminating.
1. Federal Minerals
Nearly all companies will grant surface protection against
the incursions of the "proprietor of a vein or lode" under the Lode
Mining Law of 1872, provided that the property is not situated
in a region of known lode mining activity (e.g., Aspen or Leadville).
However, with respect to the specific reservation of federal
minerals, no consensus is available. Coverage has been writtenthat much is certain-but usually upon "special" conditions.
Protection would probably be made contingent upon the owner
taking timely action to require a bond from the miner (pursuant
to Colorado statute or the various federal acts), and the insurance coverage would apply only to those damages in excess of
the amount of the bond. One might speculate as to whether the
"home office" is aware of the likely limitations on the bond to
"agricultural crops and agricultural improvements" and "the
' 5
value of the land for grazing.' 1
2. Colorado Minerals
Turning again to the situation in which state minerals are
involved, most of the problems appear to be under control because of the state's policy of granting an "all minerals" lease. The
title company will condition protection upon a state mineral lease
being obtained. Though the lease expires in 50 years and the title
coverage may continue, the title company is willing to assume the
risk that the area will be sufficiently urbanized by that time to
discourage mining activity. On the other hand, the chance of
mining activity in 50 years may be far greater than at present, as
we become more desperate for minerals and go to greater efforts
with advanced technology to extract them.
3. Private Minerals
Title insurance has not been noticeably successful in affording protection against privately owned and severed minerals.
Some title companies will grant absolute protection to one lot in
a subdivision (but not the entire subdivision) whenever the mineral owner is Union Pacific. Examples of across-the-board coverage exist, but again they seem to be the result of "special facts."
"'See text accompanying notes 77 and 82 supra.
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Generally no title insurance protection is available in the case of
other private minerals, even with a favorable geologist's report,
unless a satisfactory surface agreement or lease from the mineral
owners can be obtained.
4. Owner's versus Mortgagee's Coverage
Most title insurance company officers believe that adequate
protection to the owner is contingent upon future legislation, particularly federal. For the mortgagee, however, protection in certain situations is currently available from some title companies.
Most of the affirmative examples previously cited relate to mortgagee's and not owner's policies. The risks are obviously less with
mortgage title insurance. A definite term of years is involved and
the amount of insurance in force is decreasing at all times as the
debt is amortized and paid. Of course the insurors are faced with
the possibility that the mortgagee may foreclose and the former
mortgagee policy thereupon by its own terms may ripen into an
owner's policy. Although chance is part of the insurance game
plan, it must be noted that those older insurance companies that
have already been scarred by subsidence cases in our eastern
states are less inclined to write this form of insurance in the
Rocky Mountain region than are the newcomers.
For the owner, as contrasted to the mortgagee, there appears
to be very little title insurance protection currently available,
although with Colorado-owned minerals, protection limited to
the term of the state mineral lease can be procured. In addition
to the differences already discussed, the reason for the absence of
owner's coverage appears to be twofold. First, most owners are not
cognizant of the problem and do not demand it nor have the
influence to obtain it, as do the institutional mortgage lenders.
Secondly, insurance companies cannot calculate the risk as they
have no casualty experience to rely upon. In time, however, the
pressure of competition may cause owner's as well as mortgagee's
title insurance to be written.
The policy provisions that have been observed to date (almost exclusively in mortgage policies) are carefully composed by
the title company's legal staff. Following a recitation of the particular mineral reservation, they read something like this:
The company hereby insures the above-named mortgagee
against loss which the said insured shall sustain by reason of damage
to improvements resulting from the exercise of any right to use the
surface of the land for the extraction or development of said minerals.
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It should be observed that this language does not cover damages
that arise from (1) loss of aesthetic value, (2) subsidence, (3)
diminution in value of the property by reason of mining, either
to the area mined, or an adjacent area affected thereby, or (4) loss
of the actual value of the surface (as opposed to damage to improvements situated on the surface).
From what we have already seen of protection currently afforded under federal and state statutes, zoning laws, and other
factors discussed above, with one exception it does not appear
that the risk encompassed in protective title policy provisions is
beyond the pale of normal insurance liabilities, provided its use
is also coupled with some intelligent consideration of the geological features of the area, its known mining activity at the present
time, and historical mining activity. If we conclude that title
insurance ought to be the more or less universal means of "ultimate" risk sharing, then our attention must be directed to that
one exception-the vast expanse of federal mineral acreage.
Owned by the "sovereign of sovereigns," federal minerals reserved under the various homestead patents defy zoning prohibitions upon their development and promise only token damages
under outdated laws that envisage no more than rural agricultural usage and improvement.
CONCLUSION

Despite the increasing pressures of land use legislation, environmental protection laws, and the legitimate concern of conservationists, thousands of acres of western lands will continue to be
wholly or partially urbanized in the immediate future. Much of
this development will occur on lands where the mineral estate has
been severed and is currently owned by the United States.1°s The
situation pleads for legislation that, in addition to affirming the
primacy of local control through zoning and accomplishing desirable restrictions on development in the public interest, adopts a
federal program which will achieve these three objectives:
(1) continue the public ownership of all minerals
for present and future revenues from mineral production where commercially valuable deposits occur, and
for interim revenues in the form of reasonable rents for
""According to the Public Land Law Review Commission, the federal government
owns the reserved minerals under more than 62 million acres of lands wherein the surface
has been patented. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 64, at 137.
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surface protection against mineral development in
those areas adaptable to urbanization where valuable
deposits are now unknown or nonexistent;
(2) protect the average landowner from the economic ravages that could ensue from legitimate mineral
exploitation, without hindrance to the development of
those vitally needed minerals, both of the energy producing hydrocarbon type and those that are essential
for industry, space exploration, construction, and other
essential uses; and
(3) offer a workable format for making the necessary administrative decisions which, because of the
requirements of lenders, developers, and prospective
owners, require an application-response time schedule
measured in terms of days and not years.107
It is submitted that a mineral leasing approach patterned
after the State of Colorado's program is an appropriate and practical solution which should be satisfactory to all competing
groups. Furthermore it would be adaptable to title insurance protection, the sine qua non of mortgage investment.
An appropriate amendment to legislation currently pending
before Congress could be made, the program to be administered
by the Department of the Interior through the Bureau of Land
Management for the benefit of the state and federal governments
alike, with an attendant curtailment of those private interest bills
which are not available to all citizens.
'"'The recommendations of the Public Land Law Review Commission were simply to
(1) sell the reserved minerals to the surface owner if it is determined that the land has no
mineral value, (2) if required to permit surface development, sell the minerals even if
valuable-at appraised market value, and (3) grant the Secretary of the Interior authority
to prohibit all prospecting or mining activity. Id. at 137-38. It is submitted that the first
two proposals are unworkable because of the imprecise nature of mineral assessment and
appraisal, the costs and delays occasioned thereby, and the political trend away from a
final disposal of federal real estate.

OBSCENITY: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

By ARTHUR L. BURNETT*
INTRODUCTION

The recent Supreme Court decisions on obscenity will undoubtedly precipitate a great deal of discussion among legal
scholars, practitioners, and within the judiciary as to the wisdom,
effect, and scope of the law in this highly controversial area.
Much attention will be devoted to the impact of these recent
decisions on the first amendment, but equally important is the
interaction between the first and fourth amendments. This article will examine the current state of the law on obscenity as a
prelude to an analysis of the myriad issues that must be dealt
with when the attempts of the federal or state governments to
suppress allegedly obscene material conflict with an individual's
wishes to retain freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
I.

THE STATE OF THE LAW OF OBSCENITY

In June 1973 the Supreme Court handed down eight related
decisions which dealt with various aspects of the law of obscenity.
Although the decisions themselves do not represent the definitive
statement which many judges, lawyers, and scholars had hoped
for, they do represent an effort by the Court to offer some concrete
standards in this most confused area of the law. An attempt is
made here to announce the current state of the law of obscenity
and to isolate related issues which remain unresolved.
A.

From Roth to Miller: The Current Doctrine

Any meaningful discussion of a test of obscenity must commence with Roth v. United States,I in which the Supreme Court
observed:
[Ilmplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of

obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This
rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that
obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 states,
*

United States Magistrate, United States District Court, Washington, D.C.; B.A.,

1957, Howard University; LL.B., 1958, New York University School of Law.
1354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to
1956.2

In Roth the Supreme Court established the test of obscenity as
being "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest."3
Elaboration of the Roth test occurred in 1964 in Jacobellisv.
Ohio,4 a case involving a motion picture film. In an opinion by
Justice Brennan, joined in only by Justice Goldberg, emphasis
was placed on the concept of "utterly without redeeming social
value." Finally, in 1966, the Roth test was restated and amplified
in another plurality opinion in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,' in which
Justice Brennan stated that in determining the obscenity of any
publication or film three elements must coalesce. First, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal to a
prurient interest in sex; second, the material must be patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and third, the material must be utterly without redeeming social
value.' It was further pointed out that in evaluating the alleged
obscenity vel non, judges and juries must be careful not to weigh
a work's social importance against its prurient appeal, for these
elements must be considered individually and not balanced one
against the other.7
During the years following Memoirs, the inability of a major"2d.at 484-85.
:'Id. at 489. It has been stated that this was the only test in which a majority of five
Justices of the Supreme Court agreed. Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 255
Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Grove Press,
Inc. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971).
'378 U.S. 184 (1964).
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
"Id. at 418. This test as enunciated by Justice Brennan received only the approval of
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas. In a dissenting opinion Justice Clark observed
that the social value test was "novel" and that only three members of the Supreme Court
held to it. He further pointed out that, in his opinion, such a test rejects the Roth test to
which a majority of the Court did agree.
Even in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), the per curiam opinion was careful
to state that the necessity of meeting the 3-point test was a view held only by certain
Justices in Memoirs and did not cite the 3-point test as the test of the Court. However, it
is noted that in Roth the majority spoke of obscenity "as utterly without redeeming social
importance." 354 U.S. at 484-85.
7383 U.S. at 419.

OBSCENITY: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

ity of the Court to agree on a definitive formulation of a test for
obscenity resulted in the repeated use of the approach developed
in Redrup v. New York in 1967.8 Justice Brennan notes that
"[n]o fewer than 31 cases" 9 were disposed of by these "per
curiam reversals of convictions for the dissemination of materials
that at least five members of the Court, applying their separate
tests, deemed not to be obscene."'"
On June 21, 1973, the Supreme Court handed down the decision of Miller v. California," in which a majority of the Court-for
the first time since Roth-agreed on "concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the
First Amendment."' 2 First, the Court reaffirmed the basic tenet
of Roth that obscene material is not entitled to the protection of
the first amendment, but rejected the 3-part Memoirs test as a
constitutional standard.
Secondly, in acknowledging the power of the states to regulate obscenity, the Court delineated the following guidelines:
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works
which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be
specifically defined by the applicable state law ....
A state offense
must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the
prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.14

Thirdly, the Court provided a sample instruction for the trier
of fact which incorporates the new standard as set forth above,
but noted that the state legislatures, not the Court, are to draft
'386 U.S. 767 (1967). See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
!Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2647 n.8 (1973).
"'Id. at 2647.
"93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
'Id. at 2617. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and White.
1:1Id. at 2614. Note that the "utterly without redeeming social value" test is not
included in the new standard. Id. at 2615.
"Id. at 2614-15.
'1d. at 2615:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [citations omitted]
* . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
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their own regulatory schemes.
Finally, the determination by the jury of what is obscene
under the new test is to be made not by the application of national standards, but rather by applying contemporary community standards as they exist in the forum community.' 7
One may question the clarity of the Miller decision and, even
in a moment of cynical hindsight, wonder whether the Court is
abdicating its responsibility of defining clearly the scope of the
first amendment. However, it seems certain that as a matter of
law the Miller test will remain constitutionally valid for some
time, and that the scope of protection to be afforded to allegedly
obscene material by the first amendment will be determined by
where the material is found.
B.

The Average Person versus a Limited Class
The Miller decision, despite the formulation of a new test,
apparently has not altered the attitude of the Court toward the
appeal of obscene material to a limited class of people. In 1962,
the contention was advanced that the prurient interest element
could be evaluated on the basis of appeal to a particular class of
people, such as sexual deviates, and need not be determined on
the issue of appeal to the average person. However, in announcing
the judgment of the Court in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,'"
Justice Harlan-joined by Justice Stewart-concluded that the
Court did not have to consider the issue of the proper audience
by which the prurient interest appeal should be judged, and the
case was decided instead on the issue of "patent offensiveness"
in connection with determining whether the offending material
exceeded contemporary community standards. 9
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided the issue raised in
Manual Enterprises,Inc. v. Day of whether prurient appeal could
be assessed on the basis of a limited audience, even though such
material might not appeal to the prurient interest of the average
"Id. at 2615.
17Id. at 2618-20. See text accompanying note 162 infra.
"370 U.S. 478 (1962).
"Id. at 486-91. Justice Harlan, elaborating upon this concept of "patent offensiveness" in connection with contemporary community standards, indicated that this test was
to be applied so as to determine whether the material goes substantially beyond the
customary limits of candor and decency which the community will tolerate in connection
with the representation or depiction of sexual matters, and that this evaluation must be
based on a national standard of decency, at least in connection with federal statute. Id.

1974
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person. In Mishkin v. New York,2 a case involving publication of
books most of which depicted such deviations as sadomasochism, fetishism, homosexuality, and drawings of scantilyclad women being whipped, beaten, tortured, and abused, the
Court held:
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated
to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at
large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied
if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group."

Although Miller has changed the thrust of the legal standard
for obscenity, it is clear that Mishkin, modified accordingly, will
still be constitutionally valid and will control with materials appealing to a limited audience.2 2
Distributionof Obscene Materials:From Redrup to Paris
Adult Theatre I
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided the case of Redrup v.
New York, 2" the application of which caused much confusion
within the lower state and federal judiciaries, and among law
enforcement officials and prosecuting attorneys. In Redrup the
Court overturned the convictions of three distributors of allegedly
obscene books and magazines. The per curiam opinion noted that
C.

2"383 U.S. 502 (1966).
2Ild.
at 508.
2In Miller Chief Justice Burger, addressing himself to the issue of whether a national
community standard was required, stated:
People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. As the
Court made clear in Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09. . .(1966),
the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of "the
average person, applying community standards" is to be certain that, so far
as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact
on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive
person-or indeed a totally insensitive one.
93 S. Ct. at 2620.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. at 2634 n.6, the majority noted in dealing
with the need for expert testimony that:
We reserve judgment, however, on the extreme case, not presented here,
where contested materials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that
the experience of the trier-of-fact would be plainly inadequate to judge
whether the material appeals to the prurient interests.
Here, the Court cited Mishkin and United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167-68 (2d Cir.
1965). However, the Court held that in routine obscenity cases, expert testimony is not
required.
386 U.S. 767 (1967). The decision actually dealt with three cases involving similar
issues.
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in none of the cases was there a claim that the statute in question
reflected a specific and limited concern for juveniles; in none was
there any suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by
publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it; and in none was
there evidence of the sort of "pandering" which the court found
significant in Ginzburg v. United States." However, the Court
further noted that it had originally limited review in these three
cases to certain particularized questions upon the hypothesis that
the material involved in each case was of a character described
as "obscene in the constitutional sense" in Memoirs, but had
concluded that this hypothesis was invalid." After noting the
various views of the individual justices as to what constituted
obscenity, the Court concluded, "Whichever of these constitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear
that the judgments cannot stand."2 It is apparent that the Supreme Court did not reach the issues posed by its reference to the
concern for juveniles, intrusion upon the sensibilities of nonconsenting adults, and pandering.
Redrup was interpreted by some courts as meaning that the
fact that a given publication is " 'obscene' no longer justifies suppression or criminal prosecution unless it is pandered, obtrusively
advertised, or disseminated to unconsenting adults, or placed in
an environment in which it is likely to fall into the hands of
children. '27 Other courts took the position that the reference in
383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg the Court indicated that a defendant's manner of
advertising sexually-oriented material could be considered in assessing prurient appeal
and redeeming social value. The Court also commented extensively about the defendant's
conduct in foisting these materials on an unwilling public.
-3 8 6 U.S. at 769-70. Review had been granted on the issue of scienter in two of the
cases and on the issue of "vagueness" and "prior restraint" of a comprehensive antiobscenity statute in the third case.
""Id. at 771.
"lHayse v. Van Hoomissen, 321 F. Supp. 642, 644 (D. Ore. 1970), vacated and remanded on juris. grounds, 403 U.S. 927 (1971).
In State v. Carlson, 202 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1972), the Minnesota Supreme Court,
after reviewing and analyzing some 29 obscenity convictions reversed by the United States
Supreme Court on the authority of Redrup, noted: "If any pattern has developed from
the decisions, it appears that hard-core pornography is outside of the scope of Redrup,
whatever its application is claimed to be." Id. at 646. Under this approach, Redrup has
significance only where the alleged obscenity does not rise to the level of hardcore pornography. Then the supplemental standards of pandering, obtrusiveness, and exposure to
juveniles added by Redrup should be considered. State v. Lebewitz, 202 N.W.2d 648, 651
(Minn. 1972).
Another commentator has noted approximately 34 per curiam reversals of convictions
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Redrup to the concern for juveniles, intrusion upon the privacy
or sensibilities of nonconsenting adults, and pandering had no
significance and declined to interpret Redrup as a pronouncement that all or any of these three matters must be shown before
an obscenity conviction can be sustained.25
In 1969 the Court held in Stanley v. Georgia9 that an individual could not be prosecuted for the mere possession of obscene
matter in the privacy of his own home. Redrup and Stanley were
subsequently combined by distributors of questionable material
to create the argument that if an adult may possess obscene matter for his personal use in the privacy of his home, he has the right
to receive such material, and therefore someone has the corresponding right to distribute or sell it to him as long as he is a
consenting adult and there is no intrusion upon nonconsenting
adults, no distribution to juveniles, and no pandering. Based
upon this approach, it was quite routine for the argument to be
advanced that there is a right in a seller or distributor to make
obscene matter available commercially as long as the recipient is
a consenting adult. 0 It was also contended that obscene movies
may be shown in a commercial theater as long as juveniles are
excluded and only consenting adults patronize the exhibition."
On June 21, 1973, the Supreme Court held in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton32 that the exhibition of obscene material (here,
films) in places of public accommodation may be regulated by the
by the Supreme Court since 1967 that cited Redrup as the ground for reversal. Reno,
Obscenit'
Revisited-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 736-37 (1972).
2
'Johnson v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 893, 894-95 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
-"394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"Some courts accepted this argument. See, e.g., Hayse v. Van Hoomissen, 321 F.
Supp. 642 (D. Ore. 1970); United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Cal. 1970);
Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and remanded on juris.
grounds, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
"In Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (1971), cert. granted,
408 U.S. 921 (1972), the theater exhibitors argued that they could commercially exhibit
obscene movies as long as minors were excluded and there was no obtrusive and indiscriminate exhibition to nonconsenting adults. In People v. Kaplan, 23 Cal. App. 3d 9, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1972), cert. granted, 408 U.S. 921 (1972), the bookseller
claimed a derivative right of his customer, as a consenting adult, to purchase and read
what he chose and a corresponding right to make it available to him as long as there were
n( sales to minors nor any intrusions on the sensibilities of adults. Reference is also made
to the Redrup-Stanley issues in the briefs in Heller v. New York, 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973),
involving the conviction of a theater exhibitor for the exhibition of a motion picture film,
Blue Movie. See People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319, 277 N.E.2d 651, 327 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1971),
cert. granted, 406 U.S. 916 (1972).
:193 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
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states regardless of whether there is any pandering, obtrusive
advertising, or exposure to juveniles or nonconsenting adults. The
Court stated that the states have a legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all
places of accommodations because the interest involved includes
not only juveniles and nonconsenting adults, but also "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment . . . . ",31 Since the constitutional right of privacy
inherent in Stanley does not extend to places of public accommodation such as a movie theater, the exhibition of the obscene
34
material is not entitled to protection under the first amendment.
D.

The Zone of Constitutionally-ProtectedPrivacy: Stanley
Restricted
The Court's decision in Stanley v. Georgia35 established the
doctrine that the individual's home and his actions within it-as
far as the possession of obscene materials is concerned-are
within the zone of privacy protected by the first amendment.
However, a series of decisions during the past 2 years have restricted the range of this zone and certain alleged rights emanating therefrom.
In United States v. Reidel,6 the Court held that the right to
possess obscene materials did not imply the right to publish and
commercially distribute allegedly obscene matter through the
mails even to consenting adults, and reversed the district court's
dismissal of an indictment on the ground that Stanley required
the concomitant right to receive obscene materials for one's own
use and the right of another person to furnish obscene material
to such a recipient. 7
In United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs,31 the Court
held that the United States could regulate the possession and
importation of obscene materials through a port of entry into the
United States under its power to control foreign commerce, even
where the possession would be for one's own use, although Luros,
: Id. at 2635.

"Id. at 2639-40.
:"r394 U.S. 557 (1969).
:"-402 U.S. 351 (1971). This opinion appears to reflect the views of six Justices.
:'Id. at 355. See People v. Luros, 4 Cal. 3d 84, 480 P.2d 633, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1972), in which the California Supreme Court, in a very
thorough opinion, arrived at the same conclusion as the United States Supreme Court had
in rejecting similar contentions in Reidel.
:"-402 U.S. 363 (1971).

OBSCENITY: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

the possessor, had stipulated with the Government that the materials were imported for commercial purposes." Before the district
court, on the authority of Stanley, Luros had urged the trial court
to construe the first amendment as forbidding any restraints on
obscenity except where necessary to protect children or where
there was an actual intrusion into the privacy of an unwilling
adult. Without rejecting this position, the trial court read Stanley
as protecting, at the very least, the right to read obscene material
in the privacy of one's own home and to receive it for that purpose, and thus concluded that the statute 0 which barred the
importation of obscenity for private use as well as for commercial
distribution was overbroad and hence unconstitutional.4 '
In Thirty-seven Photographs,Mr. Justice White commented
specifically:
The trial court erred in reading Stanley as immunizing from seizure
obscene materials possessed at a port of entry for the purpose of
importation for private use. 2

This limitation by the plurality opinion of the four Justices led
Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent (joined by Justice Douglas), to
respond:
Since the plurality opinion offers no plausible reason to distinguish private possession of "obscenity" from importation for private
use, I can only conclude that at least four members of the Court
would overrule Stanley. Or perhaps in the future that case will be
recognized as good law only when a man writes salacious books in
his attic, prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living
room."

These two decisions clearly indicated that the future of
Stanley was uncertain in that stricter views toward permitting
the sale and distribution of allegedly obscene matter would constrict even more the Stanley zone of privacy. Two recent Court
decisions have confined permissible possession "within the
home" to such an extent that in retrospect Justice Black's dissent
in Thirty-seven Photographswas accurate as well as prophetic.
:'lid. at 376-77. The plurality opinion reflected the views of four members of the Court:
Chief .Justice Burger; Mr. Justice White; Mr. Justice Brennan; and Mr. Justice Blackmun. Justices Harlan and Stewart, relying on the stipulation of commercial use, concurred in the result and indicated that they would not.reach the issue of purely private
use.
'19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970),
"United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
' 402 U.S. at 376.
"Id. at 382.
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In United States v. Orito," the Court reaffirmed that the
zone of privacy that Stanley protects does not extend beyond the
home15 and held that under the commerce clause Congress can
regulate interstate transportation of obscene material by a passenger on a common carrier even though such material is intended for the passenger's private use." In United States v.
Twelve 200-foot Reels,47 the statute which was held unconstitutional by a district court in United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs" was upheld as constitutional. The Court stated
that Congress can regulate the importation of obscene matter,
notwithstanding the fact that the matter is intended solely for the
importer's private use and possession in his own home.4 9
These two decisions dispel any doubt that the Stanley zone
of privacy with regard to possession will ever extend beyond the
four walls of a private dwelling. The Supreme Court has restricted the distribution of obscene materials in an indirect but
highly effective manner by narrowly limiting the holding in
Stanley to its facts and has thus provided both federal and state
governments with a great deal of freedom-within the confines of
Miller-to regulate the dissemination of allegedly obscene material.
E. Speech versus Conduct: A Dilemma in the Law of Obscenity
In approaching the subject of whether given material is obscene vel non, one must consider the medium utilized and
whether that medium partakes more of the expression and communication of ideas and thoughts, or whether it presents conduct,
although that conduct ostensibly is meant to communicate an
idea or thought which is claimed to have first amendment protection. Thus the printed novel which depicts prostitution, adultery,
fornication, or other similar forms of conduct might be entitled
to constitutional protection, ° while the depiction or representation of that identical conduct on a stage or in a motion picture
might not be so protected.
'93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973).

"Id. at 2677.
'"Id. at 2678.
S. Ct. 2665 (1973).
'"See notes 40-41 supra.
"93 S. Ct. at 2668-69.
"A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). But see Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
3793
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In California v. LaRue,' 51 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the Court, observed:
[Als the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the
commission of public acts which may themselves violate valid penal
statutes, the scope of permissible state regulations significantly increases. 2

Thus, it would appear that the performance of sexual intercourse
in public, whether real or simulated, whether live or on film,
whether thespian or not, should be held obscene,53 while a description of the same events in a novel or in story form, if not in
violation of the Miller test, should not be so held. However, the
recent decision of Kaplan v. California4 held:
Obscenity can . . . manifest itself in conduct, in the pictoral [sic]
representation of conduct, or in the written and oral description of
conduct."

The Court in Kaplan went on to hold that obscene material in
book form is not necessarily entitled to first amendment protection merely because it contains no pictures or diagrams.5 The
Kaplan decision obscures somewhat the delineation between
speech and conduct noted by Justice Rehnquist in LaRue and at
the same time offers no alternative method for distinguishing the
two concepts. 57
One of the more perplexing problems in this area is whether
motion pictures are to be evaluated with reference to portrayals
of sexual activities on the basis of expression of ideas and
thoughts, or whether they should be evaluated on the basis that
such activity constitutes "conduct." One of the most analytical
'1409 U.S. 109 (1972).

"Id. at 117.
See. e.g.. Bowling v. California, 12 CRm. L. Rem. 4027 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d App. Dist.,
filed Mar. 7, 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972), in which the Supreme Court denied
review of a California Court of Appeals ruling which had held that a " 'live sex show'
including an act of intercourse is not a 'theatrical performance' excluded from the ambit
ol'the California Penal Code's prohibition against soliciting or engaging in lewd or dissolute conduct in lal place open to the public."
193 S. Ct. 268t1 (197:3).
M'Id. at 2684.
l"id.

It is clear, however, that, textual or printed material cannot be used as a "mere
vehicle" for presentation of sexually explicit illustrations and pictures, thus removing the
material from statutes regulating obscenity. See, e.g., State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 512
P'.2d 1049, 10t78 (Wash. 1973). "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not

constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication .
U.S. 229, 231 (1972).

Kois v. Wisconsin, 408
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cases on this distinction is Trans-Lux DistributingCorp. v. Board
of Regents,5" in which the majority of the Court of Appeals for
New York, after a lengthy analysis of the distinction between
"speech" and "conduct," 59 concluded:
[A] filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or simulated, is just as subject to state prohibition as similar conduct if
engaged in on the street. . . . [T]he nature of films is sufficiently
different from books to justify the conclusion that the critical difference between advocacy and actual performance of the forbidden act
is reached when simulated sexual intercourse is portrayed on the
screen."
_ 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 243, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964).
"'Id.at 91-92, 198 N.E.2d at 244-45, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60 (citations omitted):
While typically applicable to "speech" and "press" in the forms known
to the framers, the guarantee of the First Amendment has been read to
include anything that is asserted to be someone's way of saying something.
The most familiar instances of this application are physical conduct and
motion pictures. . . .Cases involving conduct as a form of expression have
been frequent in labor law and provide a useful illustration of the transition
from a somewhat doctrinaire application of the First Amendment to a realization that, while conduct may be speech, it still remains conduct and does
not cease to present its unique problems of social control. It is now the law
that even peaceful picketing may be forbidden where it violates State labor
laws that are not themselves designed as restrictions on freedom of speech.
Conduct that is proscribed for valid public purposes is not immune merely
because engaged in with a view to expression. For example, in People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 191 N.E.2d 272, supra, app. dsmd.
for want of a substantial Federal question 375 U.S. 42, 84 S. Ct. 147, 11
L.Ed.2d 107, this court upheld an "Aesthetic" ordinance prohibiting the
display of soiled laundry on a clothesline in the defendants' front yard,
despite the fact that the display was an expression of social protest.
Films, by their nature, may lie on either side of the division between
speech and conduct. The opinions of the Supreme Court reversing this court
in the cases of advocacy of adultery and thematic sacrilege make that plain.
But it also follows that if "picketing may include conduct other than speech,
conduct which can be made the subject of restrictive legislation" then so may
films. In this regard, it will be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet
expressed its opinion in a case involving allegedly obscene behavior on the
screen. In such a case, the First Amendment must be applied to films according to their special nature, just as it has been applied to conduct. This much
has, of course, been explicitly recognized in the leading case on films and the
First Amendment: "Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily
subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems." (Joseph
Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781, 96 L.Ed. 1098,
supra.)
See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959), where the Court
"repeatedly distinguishes between the right to communicate any idea, however deviant
from orthodoxy, and the manner of its portrayal."
"'14 N.Y.2d at 92, 198 N.E.2d at 245, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 860. In connection with the
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If such portrayals of sexual intercourse, oral copulation, or
anal-genital contact have no relevance to a social value theme
which the film is endeavoring to communicate, and if they are
solely reproductions of sexual conduct aimed at titillating the
audience and arousing the viewers' sexual interests and desires,
it is difficult to conceive why the "conduct" rationale should not
be applied." In this context, it is significant to note that even
Justice Douglas has acknowledged that obscene conduct may be
prohibited. In his Roth dissent he stated:
I assume there is nothing in the Constitution which forbids
Congress from using its power over the mails to proscribe conduct
on the grounds of good morals. No one would suggest that the First
Amendment permits nudity in public places, adultery, and other
phases of sexual misconduct."

In ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,63 the Court confined its
holding not to thoughts or speech, but to:
depiction and description of specifically defined sexual conduct that
States may regulate within limits designed to prevent infringement
of First Amendment rights."

However, in his dissent Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that the
mere formulation of the Miller physical conduct test does not
resolve the difficulty of applying it to either pictorial or textual
material. 5 Indeed, the Court has yet to draw a clear line on what
type of conduct depicted in films is protected versus that which
is not protected. Mr. Justice Brennan's despair is apparent from
his statement:
Ultimately, the [Miller] reformulation must fail because it
still leaves in this Court the responsibility of determining in each
case whether the materials are protected by the First Amendment."
distinction between hooks and films, see United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled
1 Am Curious-Yellow", 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968); McGrew v. City of Jackson, 307 F.
Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966), a/f'd, 388 U.S. 456 (1967); Wagonheim v. State Bd. of Censors, 255
Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 401 U.S. 480 (1971).
"'See, e.g., State v. Lebewitz, 202 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1972), in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of two theater owners for exhibiting an obscene
motion picture entitled The Art of Marriage, which the exhibitors claimed had the
effect of a cinematic marriage manual. The film explicitly portrayed heterosexual intercourse, frequently of prolonged duration. The Court held that the guise of educational
value was a mere pretense to commercially exploit its prurient appeal.
"2354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957).
"193S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
"Id. at 2641-42.
"'Id. at 2655-56.
"Id. at 2656.
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Prior to the recent decisions in Miller and its companion
cases, the Court refused to find obscenity in films involving mere
suggestion of sexual activity6 7 or in those with sexual episodes
which, though explicit, were "so fragmentary and fleeting that
only a censor's alert would make an audience conscious that
something 'questionable' is being portrayed." 8 On the other
hand, a conviction was left standing where the film portrayed
explicit "sexual activity" which included deviant conduct or oral
copulation and sodomy as well as fantasies of sexual intercourse. 9
In connection with still photographs and photographic publications and magazines, the Supreme Court has refused to upset
findings of obscenity where the photographs depicted overt sexual
activity, parties engaged in sexual intercourse, and unnatural and
deviant sexual practices."
Since the case was remanded in Paris Adult Theatre I, it is
difficult to predict how a jury will apply the Miller and Paristests
to any given film. It is possible that the film Deep Throat may
very well not withstand the new obscenity test,7 but there are still
lacking some definitive and precise guidelines as to exactly what
types of portrayals of sexual matters in motion pictures, as well
as in books and other types of publications, should be prohibited.
11.

FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT PROBLEMS

As if the perplexing and vexatious problems associated with
defining obscenity were not enough, the law of obscenity as it
developed during the past decade brought forth other and even
more frustrating problems for the lower level judiciary in both
federal and state courts. These problems centered around certain
procedural issues, such as whether a prior adversary hearing to
determine the obscenity of the questioned material was constitutionally required before a judicial officer could issue a search
warrant in connection with an alleged obscenity criminal offense,
"Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, revg 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
"Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
"Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967), afJ'g 245 Cal. App. 2d 280, 54 Cal. Rptr.
177 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
7
1Mishkin
v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (publications depicting sadomasochism,
fetishism, homosexuality, and drawings of scantily-clad women being whipped, beaten,
tortured, or abused); Levin v. State, 1 Md. App. 139, 228 A.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); Phelper v. State, 396 S.W.2d 396 (Crim. App. Tex. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965).
'7SeeJudge Tyler's opinion in People v. Mature Enterprises, 41 U.S.L.W. 2498 (N.Y.
City Crim. Ct., filed Mar. 1, 1973). See also United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d
207 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding Deep Throat obscene under 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)).
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or before there could be an arrest by a law enforcement official,
with or without a warrant or, in the case of a warrantless arrest,
prior to the incidental seizure of allegedly obscene materials. In
addition, the first amendment ramifications of obscenity cases
required the development of different standards for determining
probable cause in the issuance of warrants for a search or arrest.
The response to these problems was a plethora of conflicting decisions demonstrating an overriding need for the Supreme Court to
provide some definitive and meaningful guidance.
Just 4 days after the decisions in Miller and its companion
cases were announced, the Supreme Court handed down two
opinions involving the issue of a prior adversary hearing and the
requirement for a search warrant to be issued prior to the seizure
of allegedly obscene materials." The following sections examine
the extent to which the procedural aspects of obscenity prosecutions have been settled and raise questions about those situations
which remain unresolved.
A.

The Adversary Hearing Priorto Seizure
The genesis of the prior adversary hearing seems to have been
in Marcus v. Search Warrant,7 3 and the concept was further developed in the plurality opinion of four Justices in A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas.74 In Marcus the discussion of the idea of an
adversary hearing prior to the issuance of a search warrant was
actually dictum, for the Court, in the final analysis, stated:
Putting to one side the fact that no opportunity was afforded the
appellants to elicit and contest the reasons for the officer's belief,
or otherwise to argue against the propriety of the seizure to the
issuing judge, still the warrants [were] issued on the strength of the
conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny
by the judge of any materials considered by the complainant to be
obscene."

It thus appears that the decision in Marcus was in reality
based on traditional fourth amendment grounds, i.e., the failure
of the affidavit to set forth sufficiently detailed factual information for the judge to make an independent judgment of probable
76
cause.
7'Heller v. New York, 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 2796
(1973).
7367 U.S. 717 (1961).
;'378 U.S. 205 (1964).
7 367 U.S. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
"For a similar analysis of the Marcus opinion, see State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 264
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A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, involving the seizure of some
1,715 copies of 31 titles of various publications for purposes of
destruction in a civil proceeding upon a search warrant, became
the judicial vehicle which brought the concept of a prior adversary hearing firmly into the law." The Court's opinion caused so
much confusion as to the occasions which require an adversary
hearing that state and lower federal court decisions which dealt
with this case produced conflicting applications of the rule. One
state court interpreted the holding in Quantity of Books in this
manner:
This opinion of four members of the Supreme Court, two of
whom no longer sit, is authority only for the proposition that total
suppression of any expression of speech or press as obscenity cannot
be had except after an adversary hearing. The repeated mention of
the mass seizure of all copies of all titles clearly points to the alternative the majority felt was available in the control of obscenity-that
is, the seizure of one copy of each title for evidence to determine
whether all copies may be suppressed as obscene."
So. 2d 615 (La. 1972).
Marcus involved the seizure of 11,000 copies of some 280 different publications pursuant to a search warrant for purposes of destroying or burning them to suppress their
contents in a civil proceeding. In the course of the opinion, the Court noted that the
regulation of obscenity must conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity by
"a dim and uncertain line," citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
The Court also noted that the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for
"sensitive tools," citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958), and that the Constitution requires a procedure "designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity."
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1961).
See also Note, The Prior Adversary Hearing: Solution to Procedural Due Process
Problems in Obscenity Seizures?, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 80 (1971).
71'he
plurality opinion was by Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justices White and Goldberg.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, noted, "If this case involved hard-core
pornography, I think the procedures which were followed would be constitutionally valid,
at least with respect to the material which the judge 'scrutinized.' " 378 U.S. at 214. The
opinion discloses that the judge who issued the search warrant had conducted a 45-minute
ex parte inquiry during which he "scrutinized" several books prior to issuing the warrant

{or 59 novels by title, and concluded that those scrutinized and others published by the
same publisher (the latter based on their titles) gave him reason to believe that all were
obscene. Upon execution of the warrant on the same day, only 31 of the titles were actually
seized.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred on the grounds that the first amendment
precluded state regulation of obscene matter and indicated that Roth should be overruled.
Justices Harlan and Clark indicated that they would affirm the procedures utilized and
the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court.
"State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 264 So. 2d 615, 618 (La. 1972). See Heller v. New York,
93 S. Ct. 2789, 2794 (1973), in which the Supreme Court approved this interpretation.
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A number of federal courts have held, however, that Quantity of
Books dictates that a pre-seizure adversary hearing is required
before a search warrant can ever be issued and executed. The
leading cases, both of which involved films, are Tyrone, Inc. v.
0
Wilkinson" and Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn."
One of the most analytical opinions holding that no preseizure adversary hearing is required is Bazzell v. Gibbens.5 1 In
Bazzell the court commenced its analysis with the observation
that whether a pre-seizure adversary hearing is required "must
depend upon the nature and purpose of the seizure."8 2 The court
held that a single copy seizure of a motion picture film for the sole
purpose of preserving it as evidence was valid without a preseizure adversary hearing prior to the issuance of the search warrant, albeit a side effect coincidentally prevents that copy from
being further disseminated pending the outcome of the criminal
prosecution." The court further noted:
To deprive the District Attorney . . . of the right to seize evidence
pursuant to a search warrant issued on the basis of probable cause,
and to preserve that evidence intact for use during future criminal
proceedings, would be to effectively deny the State the right in a
case such as this to prosecute at all under a statute already declared
to be constitutional. . . . Surely such a procedure would not have
offended. . . freedom of expression. It would merely have prevented
the possible destruction or disappearance of the evidence. .....1

The Louisiana Supreme Court, when faced with the identical
issue in State v. Eros Cinema, Inc.,"5 stated:
[To hold to the contrary would be ridiculous. . . . [for] the best
evidence . . . is the allegedly obscene material. Unless such material can be purchased . . . the only lawful means in cases such as
this for producing and preserving this evidence is under search and
7"410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). See also United States
v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1970); Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293
(2d Cir. 1970); Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tex. 1969), appeal dismissed,
399 U.S. 521 (1970). For an illustrative state case taking the same position, see State ex.
rel. McDevitt v. Harvey, 491 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1971).
'"306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969).
I"Id. at 1059.
1d.
"Id. at 1060. Accord, Scott v. Frey, 330 F. Supp. 365, 368 (E.D. La. 1971), observing
that to order return of the films seized while state criminal prosecutions are pending would
be almost unwarranted interference with the orderly procedure and operation of the state
criminal process. Compare Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 339 F. Supp. 43 (C.D. Cal.
1972).
'264 So. 2d 615 (La. 1972).
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seizure which comply with the Fourth Amendment requirements for
a valid search warrant."

In People v. Heller,"7 the Court of Appeals for New York
stated that the decisions of the Second Circuit in Astro Cinema
Corp., Inc. v. Mackell" and Bethuiew Amusement Corp. v.
5 requiring
Cahn,8
adversary hearings before search warrants can
issue for the seizure of a single copy of an allegedly obscene motion picture film, went beyond any requirement imposed on state
courts by the United States Supreme Court and that New York
was not required to follow them."' On appeal, in Heller v. New
York," the Supreme Court upheld this position and therefore
rejected the requirement of a prior adversary hearing before the
"I'd. at 619.
729 N.Y.2d 319, 277 N.E.2d 651, 327 N.Y.S.2d
628 (1971).
'1422 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970). For a more recent case dealing with the procedures in
the Second Circuit, see Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973),
decided .June 1,1973, which also explicitly upholds the power and authority of the United
States Magistrate to conduct the adversary hearing.
"416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969).
"'See People v. DeRenzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 382, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777, 778 (Ct. App.
1969). In referring to DeRenzy's reliance on Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir.
1968), the court noted that "Jolf course, although such a decision of a United States
Court olf
Appeals is entitled to great respect, we are not bound thereby, even on questions
relating to the federal Constitution." For other cases dealing with this issue, see United
States v. Gower, 116 F. Supp. 1390 (D.D.C. 1970); United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp.
466 (D.l).C. 1970); People v. Steinberg, 60 Misc. 2d 1041, 304 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Westchester
County Ct. 1969).
The Pryba case involved allegedly obscene stag films and other materials being
shipped in interstate commerce observed by an airline employee during the course of
shipment. Based on information obtained from that employee, a search warrant was
issued. Because of the furtive manner in which the package was being shipped, the court
held that no pre-seizure adversary hearing was required. The court noted that law enforcement officials should not he required to make futile gestures in attempting to set up an
adversary hearing and to have the prospective defendant produce the offending material.
The court further observed that to believe the same films would be proffered to the court
in the same condition as when first viewed by the airline employee would be to blink at
reality. Contra, United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1970).
See also Kaplan v. United States, 277 A.2d 477 (D.C. App. 1971), holding that no
adversary hearing was required prior to the issuance of a search warrant to seize a 12minute film in a peepshow machine: "Law enforcement officials have no right to require
the operator to bring the machine to court and the court has no reason to go to the
machine." Id. at 480. In Vali Books, Inc. v. Murphy, 343 F. Supp. 841, 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), involving the seizures of peepshow films both incident to arrests without warrants
and pursuant to a search warrant without a prior adversary hearing, the court held that
the seizure of a few samples to be used as evidence does not become illegal absent a prior
adversary hearing, but that the indiscriminate seizure of such film without regard to the
charge on which the arrests were made or unrelated to the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant is illegal.
"'9:3 S. Ct. 2789 (1973).
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seizure under a warrant of a single copy of a film for evidentiary
use in the exhibitor's obscenity trial. However, the Court reaffirmed the holdings in Marcus and A Quantity of Books requiring
an adversary hearing prior to the seizure of a large quantity of
books for the sole purpose of their destruction, '2 and also reaffirmed the rule announced in United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs3 and Freedman v. Maryland94 requiring an adversary hearing prior to imposing a "final restraint" on any obscene
materials."' The rationale of the Marcus and Quantity of Books
doctrine was based on the "danger of abridgment of the right of
the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of nonobscene books."" For that reason the Court also dictated that in
the case of the seizure of a single copy of a film, as in Heller,
copying of the seized film shall be permitted if necessary to ensure its continued exhibition during the legal proceedings."
The holding in Heller must be limited to its facts. The case
involved the seizure of a single evidentiary copy of an allegedly
obscene film based on a warrant issued after a neutral magistrate's determination of probable obscenity. Additionally, the
Heller opinion requires a prompt judicial determination of obscenity following a "fully adversary" trial. 8 Nevertheless, Heller
appears to be the definitive decision on this single copy issue, for
one may presume that Heller will also apply where allegedly obscene books and/or photographs are involved.
B.

The Adversary Hearing Prior to Arrest
The interpretation and application of the Quantity of Books
rule has resulted in mass confusion and chaos in law enforcement
procedures for initiating criminal prosecutions of obscenity violations. Cases can be found supporting almost any proposition
"'Id. at 2794.
'"'402 U.S. 363 (1971).
"'380 U.S. 51 (1965).
' 93 S. Ct. at 2793.
"A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964).
'93 S. Ct. at 2795. See also Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515, 523 n.9
(2d Cir. 1973).
'The determination in Heller took 48 days due to the failure of petitioner to request
expeditious judicial consideration of the obscenity issue. Heller v. New York, 93 S. Ct.
2789, 2793-94 (1973).
'"'The action of federal district courts in considering and granting injunctions against
state criminal prosecutions because no pre-seizure adversary hearing was conducted belore the seizure of alleged obscene materials, and in some cases ordering the suppression
of the material, may have in some instances resulted in exacerbating the relations between
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which might be advanced. For instance, in Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich'"" a 2-judge majority of a 3-judge district
court held that an adversary hearing was necessary prior to an
arrest, even where the allegedly obscene material had been purchased by law enforcement officials. The court noted:
Since prior restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights can be exerted through seizure (with or without a warrant) of
the allegedly offensive materials, arrest (with or without a warrant)
of the alleged offender or through the threat of either or both seizure
and arrest, the conclusion is irresistible in logic and in law that none
of these may be constitutionally undertaken prior to an adversary
judicial determination of obscenity.'"'

The majority also suggested that distributors and exhibitors
should be given immunity from prosecution for conduct engaged
in prior to the determination of obscenity at an adversary hearing
and that they could be subjected to criminal prosecution only for
subsequent dissemination which occurs after the finding of obscenity at such a hearing." 2 To this, Judge Rubin responded in
dissent:
It is no longer an acceptable proposition in tort law that a dog
is entitled to one free bite; there should be no rule in criminal
law-even by virtue of the protection accorded to freedom of
speech-that every peddler of pornography is entitled to one free
essay at scatology."

3 '

It would appear that two recent decisions by the Supreme
local lederal district and state courts. In some cases, however, in ordering the return of
the seized materials minus samples, the federal courts have not enjoined the state criminal
prosecution. In other cases, e.g., Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969), while requiring a sample to be furnished to the prosecution, the court has expressly declined to comment on the admissability of the evidence in
the state criminal prosecution.
"'304 F. Supp. 662 (M.D. La. 1969), rev'd in part on juris. groundssub nor. Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). See also City News Center, Inc. v. Carson, 298 F. Supp. 706
(N.D. Fla. 1969).
""304 F. Supp. at 667.
""0This immunity theory was also espoused in Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.
Ga. 1969). The court there stated that any criminal prosecution prior to an adversary
hearing and without the distributor's having a subsequent opportunity to refrain from
selling the materials determined to be obscene would be a violation of his first amendment
rights. Id. at 216.
Such a procedure would be equivalent to giving distributors and film exhibitors
advisory opinions, since if they declined to sell the offending materials or exhibit the
motion picture film in question thereafter, no criminal prosecution would result. This is
not the normal role of the judiciary. See State v. Shackman, 29 Ohio Misc. 56, 278 N.E.2d
61 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1971).
"'304 F. Supp. at 674.
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Court should have laid to rest the notion that a prospective defendant is entitled to an adversary hearing even prior to an arrest
for an obscenity violation, even where there is no seizure incidental to the arrest. In Milky Way Productions,Inc. v. Leary"" it had
been argued that an arrest could be as effective a chilling influence or restraint as a seizure of obscene material."' On appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the district court decision
which had held that an adversary hearing was not required before
an arrest made pursuant to a constitutional state obscenity stat7
6
ute not involving a seizure of material."" In Gable v. Jenkins, 1
it was contended that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional
in that it did not provide for a prior judicial hearing before an
arrest."" The Supreme Court affirmed the disposition by the district court which rejected this contention.""'
C.

Adversary Hearing Prior to a Seizure Incident to Arrest
A much more substantial argument has been made that distributors and exhibitors have a right to a pre-seizure adversary
hearing in those cases involving the seizure of allegedly obscene
materials, publications, and motion picture films incident to a
warrantless arrest. A substantial number of courts have accepted
this argument. In Bongiovanni v. Hogan,"" the court stated that
it was difficult to perceive why seizure in a civil instead of a
criminal case, or by the federal rather than a state government,
or incidental to an arrest rather than by use of a warrant, would
alter the impermissible "chilling effect" of first amendment freedoms which results from seizure without a prior adversary hearing.I ' The court further noted that the government "cannot make
a 'chilling' seizure permissible by removing the label of a search
warrant and pasting on that of seizure incidental to a lawful
arrest." 12 In Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer,13 the court
observed that to permit a warrantless seizure would make an
'"305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"Id. at 290.
'""New York Feed Co., Inc. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970). See also United States v.
Fragus, 428 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
'"7309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
""Id. at 1001.
'""Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970).
""309 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"Id. at 1366.
"'d.
":306 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
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officer rather than a judge the arbiter of what is obscene."4
Perhaps the best reply to this line of reasoning is that set
forth in Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary.""' The court there observed
that no adversary hearing is required when law enforcement officials are engaged in the normal function of effecting an arrest,
and when the seizure is of a sample of the evidence necessary for
the prosecution of the suspected crime being committed in the
officer's presence." ' The court further observed that in such circumstances such a seizure is not tantamount to a prior restraint,
since the restraint is essentially the restraint of the obscenity law
itself."7' Thus, the existence of the criminal statute proscribing
the distribution of the obscene matter, and not the incidental
seizure of evidence in connection with an arrest for a violation of
that statute, was viewed as the restraint.
In Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan,"8 the district court indicated that a "motion picture film itself is perhaps the best evidence, or at least indispensable evidence, on the question as to
its nature . ... "'I The court further noted that films are often
cut or altered for showing at different theaters. Observing that it
is important (for the prosecution) to establish the exact content
of the film as exhibited on the occasion giving rise to the prosecution, the court concluded that it was thus necessary that law
enforcement officials be allowed to seize a single copy at the time
"'Id. at 809. Based on a similar approach and reasoning, the California Supreme
Court has required that absent an emergency involving a high probability that the evidence may be lost, destroyed, or spirited away, all seizures must be pursuant to a search
warrant and not incident to a warrantless arrest. Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d
981, 429 P.2d 192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1967).
Note also the views of Justice Brown of the Ohio Supreme Court, in dissent, in State
v. Albini, 31 Ohio St. 2d 27, 34, 285 N.E.2d 327, 332 (1972):
The holding of the majority today constitutes an unlawful delegation to
the police of the plenary duty of the courts to so determine whether there is
probable cause to believe the films obscene after all parties have had an
opportunity to express and present [their arguments]. ...
Although the seizure of the films in question was incident to an arrest,
the arrest itself-and hence the seizure-is invalid. In the absence of a prior
judicial hearing to determine probable cause to believe the films obscene, the
arrest is the product of the unlawful delegation of authority.
See also Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1969) and Metzger v.
Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968), both requiring a pre-seizure adversary hearing prior
to a seizure incident to a warrantless arrest.
",301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"'Id. at 549.
1

7

Id.

"'298 F. Supp. 1148 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
"'Id. at 1152 n.4.
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of the arrest without a prior adversary hearing.2 " Notwithstanding these cogent observations, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court.' 2 '
To require that a motion picture film be brought into court
for a showing at an adversary hearing prior to seizure provides no
guarantee against cutting, alteration, or substitution between the
time of the notice and actual production, or the prehearing shipment of the film out of the jurisdiction of the court.'2 2 Testimonial
evidence as to the content of a motion picture may well not suffice
since it is the factfinder who must apply the Miller test. The
judge or the jury must determine if the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, depicts or
describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law, and, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'23 Arguably,
no factfinder could adequately make such a judgment without
viewing the entire motion picture film-oral statements of witnesses describing segments are not sufficient. It could also be
contended that without the material before the judge it would be
impossible to know whether the Miller test had been correctly
applied,' although the test at the initial adversary hearing is
'1d.
121420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1969).
' 22See Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527, 534-35 (S.D. Miss. 1970), where
the court speaks not only of alteration of motion picture films, but also of shipping such
films to another theater or location while an attempt is being made to set up an adversary
hearing.
It is further noted that theater exhibitors frequently lease their films from a distributor with a firm return date in the contract, and they could assert, after receiving notice of
an adversary hearing to be held at some future date, that they have returned the film to
the distributor pursuant to their contract obligation.
See also Crecilius v. Commonwealth, 14 CRiM. L. RPrR. 2133 (Ky. Ct. App., filed Oct.
10, 1973), where it was held that a court could not order an exhibitor to reclaim and submit
an allegedly obscene motion picture, and that forcing a potential defendant to be an agent
for the police in securing a copy of the evidence that may be used to convict him raised
grave constitutional issues concerning the fifth amendment. See also Perial Amusement
Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973).
3
"W
Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614-15 (1973). However, see Perial Amusement
Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973), for determination of obscenity at adversary
hearing without considering the motion picture film itself.
"'2 n Bryers v. State, 480 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Crim. App. Tex. 1972), the court reversed
an obscenity conviction based upon testimonial evidence and stated:
In conclusion, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to sustain an obscenity conviction unless (1) the alleged obscene matter, in this case a film, is
introduced into evidence or (2) the defendant expressly and affirmatively
stipulates or admits that the material is obscene. . ..
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probable obscenity and not proof of obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt.'2 5
It has also been asserted that police officers not only have the
right but also the duty to seize evidence which was the very
means or vehicle of the commission of a crime committed in the
officer's presence, and that to prohibit the seizure of such evidence under these circumstances would completely frustrate
criminal prosecution and necessarily the arrest for a crime witnessed by the arresting officers.' 26 To require a pre-seizure adversary hearing before there can be a seizure of publications or of a
motion picture film incident to an arrest would be to carve out a
unique exception to the traditional law of arrest, for it would
require the courts to engage in the executive function of deciding
when an arrest or an arrest and incidental seizure should be
made, thus in effect rendering advisory opinions to both the
prosecutor and the prospective defendant.
A canvass and review of the reported decisions discloses that
while a substantial number of federal courts required an adversary hearing prior to a seizure of allegedly obscene materials incident to an arrest, the majority of state courts did not.'2
In Longoria v. State, 479 S.W.2d 689 (Crim. App. Tex. 1972), the court reversed a jury
conviction for obscenity on the grounds that the testimony of two officers describing the
contents of the motion picture films was insufficient evidence for the jury, or the appellate
court, independently, to determine obscenity.
However, in People v. Goulet, 21 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Super. Ct.
App. Dep't 1971), the appellate court reversed the dismissal of charges by a municipal
court judge on the ground that the prosecutor did not have the actual films to exhibit to
the jury. While the appellate court indicated that secondary evidence could be received,
it did acknowledge that "there may be cases where it is difficult to establish the contents
of a film or book by oral secondary showings, particularly where its obscenity may be
borderline in character." Id. at 4, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
The nature of appellate review required in obscenity cases further fortifies the conclusion that the actual allegedly obscene material is indispensable evidence in a criminal
prosecution. In State v. Carlsonthe Minnesota Supreme Court felt obliged to reverse some
of the convictions because the allegedly obscene material involved was missing from the
appellate record and the court could not fulfill its obligation under Jacobellis v. Ohio to
make its own independent review of the facts. 202 N.W.2d 640, 647 (Minn. 1972).
"'See Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973).
"'Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527, 534 n.9 (S.D. Miss. 1970), vacated and
remanded on juris. grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
'27See also Note, PriorAdversary Hearings on the Question of Obscenity, 70 COLUM.
L. REV. 1403, 1416 n.79 (1970), and cases cited therein.
Some federal courts have also declined to require a pre-seizure adversary hearing in
cases not involving the seizure of motion picture films. In United States v. Cangiano, 464
F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1972), the court took the position that samples of allegedly obscene
reels of 8-millimeter film, playing cards, books, magazines, and photographs could properly be seized incident to an arrest without a pre-seizure adversary hearing. In United
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On June 23, 1973, the Supreme Court removed the seizure of
allegedly obscene materials from the "incident to arrest" exception. In Roaden v. Kentucky, 128 the Court held that books and
films could not be seized without the authority of a constitutionally valid warrant "because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by books or film, calls for a higher hurdle in the
evaluation of reasonableness. ' 1 29 The clear implication of Roaden
is that there should be no seizure of allegedly obscene material
without the benefit of a search warrant based on an affidavit
which affords a judge an ample opportunity to focus searchingly
on the issue of obscenity. The rationale of Roaden is that seizures
incident to a warrantless arrest would afford less protection to
first amendment rights than seizures based on conclusory affidavits and would be made solely on the individual evaluation of the
seizing law enforcement officer or of the prosecutor who advises
him. The majority in Roaden made it unmistakably clear that
even the limited prior restraint involved in such seizures based
on the personal predilections and value judgments of individual
law enforcement officials, often overzealous in their efforts
against alleged pornography, imposed too great a burden on first
amendment freedoms, and that the impartiality, objectivity, and
independence of judges are a sine qua non to a valid seizure.
Predicated upon a higher standard of "reasonableness" because
of such considerations under the fourth amendment, such a requirement will impose a much more substantial demand upon
judges in the issuance of search warrants in this area of the law.
Law enforcement officials in a situation such as that in
Roaden-the showing of an allegedly obscene motion picture film
at an outdoor theater-will have to proceed according to one of
two alternatives. They must obtain a search warrant prior to
States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971), the
court stated that a prior adversary hearing was not required where, after a lawful arrest,
a few samples of allegedly obscene color slides, photographs, some reels of stag-type films,
and other materials were seized as evidence for a subsequent prosecution, where such
seizure did not substantially restrain distribution of the material involved. The court
specifically stated that A Quantity of Books and Marcus were "inapposite since they
involved massive seizures of books under state statutes which authorized warrants for the
seizure of obscene materials as a first step in civil proceedings seeking their destruction."
The court also distinguished its earlier decision of Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn,
416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), involving a motion picture
film exhibited in a public theatre, as it had equated the seizure of such a film, which could
be viewed by as many as 4,000 people in a week, with a massive seizure of books.
'293 S. Ct. 2796 (1973).
"Id. at 2801.
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making an arrest, either with or without an arrest warrant, or
after making a warrantless arrest they must refrain from seizing
the offending material until a search warrant has been obtained. 3 " Whether Roaden will permit any exception based on a
clear and convincing showing of necessity to make a seizure without benefit of a warrant-such as where a warrantless arrest is
made and any delay to obtain a search warrant would permit the
destruction of the allegedly obscene material or the removal of it
beyond the jurisdiction of the court-remains to be seen. It appears that courts faced with such a situation based on a strong
factual record showing such an emergency or exigent circumstances could distinguish Roaden and uphold a seizure incident to a
warrantless arrest in this very narrow and limited situation. Even
then the combination of Heller and Roaden would apparently
require a prompt post-seizure adversary hearing as soon as all
interested parties could be notified and the court could schedule
such a hearing.
D.

Application of Fourth Amendment Standards
Although the Supreme Court in Heller v. New York has held
that the seizure of a minimal number of copies of publications or
of a single copy of motion picture film can be accomplished without a pre-seizure adversary hearing, the requirement of a warrant
announced in Roaden v. Kentucky means that a magistrate or
judge must still be very careful to ensure that basic fourth
amendment requirements are met in the affidavit submitted in
support of the search warrant application. It appears to be universally accepted that since first amendment ramifications are
involved, a more stringent standard of probable cause is justified
in obscenity cases.' 3' An application to seize allegedly obscene
""See Crecelius v. Commonwealth, 14 CRIM. L. RPTE. 2133 (Ky. Ct. App., filed Oct.
26, 1973); Kansas City v. O'Conner, 14 CraM. L. Rrm. 2161 (Mo., filed Oct. 8, 1973).
Indeed, in Kansas City v. O'Conner,Justice Seiler, in dissent, raised the question of
whether, absent exigent circumstances which indicate that seizure of allegedly obscene
material for preservation as evidence is a "now or never" situation, seizure even pursuant
to a search warrant is only permissible after some type of hearing on the issue of obscenity.
He suggests that the hearing can be a prior adversary hearing to determine obscenity or
an ex parte hearing.
This view appears to impose more than required by Heller as long as there is a
sufficiently detailed factual affidavit, although a United States Magistrate or a state judge
could supplement the affidavit by taking ex parte testimony under oath from the affiant
and/or other witnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 424 F.2d 1047, 1048 (1st Cir. 1970), which
speaks in terms of a "particularly strong showing" being required to "justify a search for
matter prima facie entitled to the special protection of the First Amendment."
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books, magazines, or other publications, or stag or motion picture
films cannot be treated in the same manner as an application for
a warrant to search for narcotics, adulterated foods, gambling
paraphernalia, stolen goods, burglar tools, and other normal
types of contraband or evidence of a crime.'32
Judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and officials involved
in law enforcement must be more than merely knowledgeable
about the general theory of and the justification for the laws
regulating obscenity. They must come to grips with the problem
of applying the obscenity test enunciated in Miller v. California.
This task is especially complicated and demanding for those
judges who issue warrants and preside at adversary hearings and
trials. It has been stated:
There is perhaps no area of criminal law in such utter state of
confusion and frustration as that visited upon the publication and
dissemination of obscene material. "Confusion now hath made its
masterpiece." (Macbeth, Act II).'

The difficulty is further compounded by the fact that obscenity is considered a mixed question of law and fact, and thus a
jury's decision as to the obscenity of given material does not carry
the same weight as in the normal case in which a reviewing court
will not reverse if there is substantial evidence supporting the
verdict. 34 In the area of obscenity, reviewing judges have decided
that they must view the offending materials themselves since
obscenity is not solely a fact question. Yet each judge is a product
of his own particular environment with regard to upbringing,
moral and religious training, and educational and cultural influences. As Judge Pettine stated in United States v. Fifty
Magazines:1'5
"2A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 212 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730 (1961); Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 339 F. Supp. 43, 48-49
(C.D. Cal. 1972).
'=People v. Kirkpatrick, 64 Misc. 2d 1055, 316 N.Y.S.2d 37, 42 (Crim. Ct. 1970), aff'd,

329 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. T. 1971).
"'Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion in Roth noted that if "obscenity is to be sup-

pressed, the question whether a particular work is of that character involves not really an
issue of fact, but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate
kind." 354 U.S. at 497-98. See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1964).
For an application of this principle, see United States v. A Motion Picture Film
Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow", 404 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1968), setting aside a jury's
verdict that IAm Curious-Yellow was obscene. See Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of
Censors, 255 Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), which, in effect, upheld the barring of a license
to show I Am Curious- Yellow in Maryland.
'1323 F. Supp. 395 (D.R.I. 1971).
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It is not an overstatement to say that one's own tastes, values and
standards have been molded by a set of stimuli which are unique to
him and to his cultural milieu, and those standards inevitably influence one's particular judgment as to what constitutes hard-core pornography.'

Indeed, it is for this reason that appellate judges in the same case
may differ as to whether a given book, pamphlet, magazine, motion picture, or other medium of communication is obscene vel
non.3 7 For the same reasons, individual magistrates and judges,
in issuing warrants or in presiding at adversary hearings and
trials, may differ in making a factual-legal decision as to whether
given matter is obscene. Nevertheless, judicial officials must have
some concrete guidance and must not act solely on personal
predilection.
As with any normal search warrant application, a magistrate
or judge cannot rely on the conclusory assertions of the affiant,
but must be given sufficiently detailed factual information to
make an independent judgment as to whether or not the law
enforcement officials have sufficient cause to make a seizure consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment. This
requirement is even more demanding since the issuing magistrate
must be satisfied that the three elements of the Miller test are
met under a probable cause standard.'3 8 It would appear that
considerable detail in the affidavit would be required-much in
the form of a book report for an allegedly obscene novel or book
or a narrative time and motion explanation in connection with an
allegedly obscene stag or motion picture film-if the magistrate
is to be satisfied that the Miller test is met. 39 The more summary
"'Id.
at 402.
7
11 See United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow", 404
F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968) (compare the views of Circuit Judge Hays for the majority and
the views of Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting); Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of
Censors, 255 Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), a 4-to-3 decision upholding a local circuit court
ruling that l Am Curious-Yellow be banned from exhibition in Maryland as being obscene.
In reviewing the Maryland Court of Appeals action, the United States Supreme Court
divided four to four with Justice Douglas abstaining.
""The affidavit in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961), was condemned because it was based on conclusory assertions, as was the affidavit in Lee Art
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968). See also Hanby v. State, 479 P.2d 486, 493
(Alas. 1970).
'See Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970), where an undercover
policewoman's affidavit consisted of 32 paragraphs and described the material in graphic
detail according to the court; State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 264 So. 2d 615, 616 (La. 1972),
where the court observed that the officer who viewed the films gave numerous details of
what was pictorially depicted, fully descriptive, "reciting in detail the various sexual
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the presentation by the affiant, the more likely the facts may be
colored by the affiant's opinions and moral judgments.
Under the fourth amendment a warrant must describe with
particularity the items. or things to be seized. This specificity
requirement is even more stringent "where first amendment
rights are involved.""'4 The warrant must describe with "scrupulous exactitude" the things to be seized when the "things" are
books, magazines, newspapers, other forms of publications, or
stag or motion picture films."' For example, a warrant which
described the property to be seized as "reels of 8 millimeter film,
playing cards, books, magazines, photographs and other similar
material which are obscene, lewd, lascivious and filthy as defined
under Section 1465, Title 18, U.S. Code" was held invalid as
giving too broad discretion to the executing law enforcement officials as to what was to be seized, becoming in effect a general
warrant.'4 2 On the other hand it has been suggested that where a
warrant commands, for example, the seizure of films "depicting
natural and unnatural sexual acts," this would have restricted
significantly the discretion of the executing officials, and it is
intimated that such a warrant would be sufficient."'
activities performed in the film." See also Monica Theatre v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 16, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71, 82 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970), observing that one or more
affidavits submitted to a magistrate can be composed in a manner "to focus searchingly
on the question of obscenity . . . Detailed pictorial word description of the continuity
of the film plus the opinions of experts, whose qualifications are adequately given, can
serve this purpose initially." See Commonwealth v. State Amusement Corp., 356 Mass.
715. 248 N.E.2d 497 (1969); and the description of the affidavit involved in Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973).
""United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1972); Flack v. Municipal
Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 429 P.2d 192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1967). See also note 130 supra.
''Cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476. 485 (1965) (seizure of materials associated with
the Communist Party).
" 2United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320. 326 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717. 732 (1961); Gregory v. DiFlorio, 298 F. Supp. 1360
(W.D.N.Y. 1969).
Query whether a warrant which authorizes a search for and seizure of "the magazines
'Modern Girls' and 'Girls' as well as other magazines of a similar appearance and contents" is sufficient in describing with particularity what is to be seized. See Huffman v.
United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which involved such a warrant, but wherein
the court did not deal with this issue.
"'United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
947 (1971). However, in Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 339 F. Supp. 43, 46-48 (C.D. Cal.
1972), when faced with a warrant which described the items to be seized, in part, as "eight
millimeter color and/or black and white films which are sexually oriented and which
depict specific acts of oral copulation, sexual intercourse and masturbation." which the
court had characterized as being quite limited in the description of what could be seized
thereunder, and with the particularity issue, the court felt that it was involved in a gray
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In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia,'44 the Supreme Court
held that the admission into evidence of allegedly obscene motion
picture films seized under the authority of a warrant issued by a
justice of the peace on an affidavit giving the films' titles, and
stating that the affiant had determined from personal observation of the films and of the theater's billboard that they were
obscene, was erroneous. The affidavit did not set forth sufficient
factual bases for the officer's conclusions to allow the justice of
the peace to make an independent determination of probable
obscenity. The Court noted that it might not be as convenient for
a judge to see a movie in his chambers as it would be for him to
read a book, but the Court avoided further discussion on this
issue and decided the case on the grounds that the procedure
under which the warrant was issued was constitutionally defective in that it failed "to focus searchingly on the question of
45
obscenity."
A warrant should not issue to seize more than the number of
copies needed for evidentiary purposes. Thus, in Overstock Book
Co. v. Barry,"6 the court observed that instead of limiting the
seizure to a reasonable sample for evidentiary purposes, the officers seized over 17,500 books, magazines, and other materials.
The court held that "a seizure of materials obviously not needed
for evidence would, under the Fourth Amendment, be prima facie
unreasonable [and] would also result in the same immediate
suppressing effects" condemned by Marcus and A Quantity of
Books. 47 In Huffman v. United States,"I the court suggested that:
[i]f the Government's purpose in seizing such quantities [of a magazine] was to refute any claim [by prospective defendants] that
the magazines were not in their possession for purposes of sale, this
end could have been accomplished simply by a temporary seizure,
accompanied by an offer to release the magazines [to the prospective defendants] upon execution of a stipulation as to the'number
of copies of each edition in their store."'
area of the law in which there was no clear guidance from higher courts. The distributors
had contended that the warrant contained no specific identification of the items to be
seized, en masse, of material which might fall outside of the definition of obscenity, such
as visual representations of human sexual intercourse in settings which would not be
obscene as indicated in United States v. 35 MM. Motion Picture Film "Language of
Love", 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970). The court decided the case on other grounds.
"1392 U.S. 636 (1968).
"'Id.
at 637, citing Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1961).
"436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970).

"'Id. at 1296. See also Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1967).
"470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"'Id. at 392.
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Heller v. New York, as did Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, left
open the question of whether the issuing magistrate should view
an allegedly obscene motion picture prior to issuing a search warrant. The same question could be asked in connection with an
allegedly obscene book, magazine, or other publication. Frequently, law enforcement officials may be able to purchase a copy
of a book or magazine and submit it as an attachment to the
affidavit, but this is not possible with a motion picture print.
However, as the court observed in Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary,5 '
the "police are not constitutionally required to fill the coffers of
suspects,""'5 and it should be sufficient if the affidavit describes
the contents of a book, magazine, or other publication in descrip5
tive detail. 1
The problem of the issuing magistrate viewing a motion picture exhibition prior to issuance of a search warrant presents even
more complex issues. In Merritt v. Lewis' 3 the court observed
that the magistrate could "go to the theatre, view the film in
question, and determine if it was obscene," but he was not required to do so.'15 In People v. De Renzy 5 5 the court posed the
following question in connection with the magistrate's visiting the
theatre:
If so, should the visit be clandestine or open? The former would be
unfitting; a judge should not assume the role of an undercover investigator. If the magistrate makes his presence known, what reasonable assurance exists that the exhibitor will show the film, thus perhaps aiding in his own conviction? 5 '

As illustrated by the actual situation in Heller v. New York,
where the judge viewed the motion picture film clandestinely
before issuing the search warrant, he may become a government
witness at the trial concerning the film in order to identify it as
the one he saw at a given time, date, and place and to establish
1'1301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

"'Id. at

549.

'2See, e.g., Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970).

11'309 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
"'Id.at 1253.
'1275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Ct. App. 1969).
5
" 'Id. at 384, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 781. See also Milonas v. Schwalb, 65 Misc. 2d 1042, 319
N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City 1971), in which the court discussed the propriety of a
judge who had viewed a motion picture prior to issuance of a search warrant and who
subsequently conducted an adversary hearing concerning that film. The court noted the
built-in bias of a judge toward upholding his prior action, thus compromising his impartiality, and observed that in viewing the motion picture exhibition the judge becomes a
witness and a part of the accusatory process in issuing the warrant.
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the defendant's possession and exhibition of the same. A thoughtful appraisal of this situation raises questions of whether under
these circumstances the judge has become a functional law enforcement official participating in the executive function with a
possible encroachment upon the separation of powers and the
neutrality and detachment which the judiciary should maintain.
III.

THE

Miller-ParisAdult Theatre SEQUEL

Although the Supreme Court has endeavored to establish
some concrete, definitive standards on obscenity for the police,
prosecutors, and judges, the question remains whether "the intractible obscenity problem"' 5 7 will persist to the consternation of
all the officials who must grapple with it. It is predicted that the
problem will remain, though in a somewhat muted form, since
concepts such as "appeal to the prurient interest in sex" or "lack
of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" involve
subjective value judgments and not merely simplistic factual determinations.'5 Every judge, at least subconsciously, takes into
account his own moral, philosophical, and cultural background
every time he makes a decision on any matter before him, but this
is particularly so when obscenity is at issue. 15 In addition, it is
not a feasible alternative to the problem to leave the matter of
obscenity unregulated by law, for there must be some thread of
reason, tempered by a standard of decency imposed by society,
to govern this as well as other areas of the law. 6 "
It is therefore apparent that each judge or magistrate will
have to confront the difficult constitutional issues involved in
'' 7Mr. Justice Harlan's characterization in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
, ,The United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, in commenting on
the Roth-Memoirs standard, stated:
These vague and highly subjective aesthetic, psychological and moral tests
do not provide meaningful guidance for law enforcement officials, juries or
courts. As a result, law is inconsistently and sometimes erroneously applied
and the distinctions made by courts between prohibited and permissible
materials often appear indefensible. Errors in the application of the law and
uncertainty about its scope also cause interference with the communication
of constitutionally protected materials.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 59 (1970).
'"'See Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
93 S. Ct. at 2663: "Art and literature reflect tastes .... For matters of taste, like matters
of belief, turn on the idiosyncracies of individuals. They are too personal to define and
too emotional and vague to apply ....
'See Chief Justice Burger's statement in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct.
at 2636 n.10.
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each obscenity case. Undoubtedly, most conscientious judges attempt to set aside-to as great an extent as possible-personal
moral judgments and try to apply objectively the pertinent obscenity definitions and standards. It is in this area that the
change wrought by Miller may have its most profound impact, for
a finding of no obscenity under the old Roth-Memoirs test may
not be constitutionally permissible under the Miller standard.16 '
This is especially significant in view of the Supreme Court's determination that expert testimony is not necessary to support a
decision of obscenity and that the material can speak for itself."' 2
Perhaps of equal significance is the statement in Miller that
material need not be proven obscene under a hypothetical national standard but can be so established based on the prevailing
standards of the forum community. It appears that the courts will
have far greater difficulty in obscenity cases because of this
3
change.16
Although it might seem easier to obtain convictions or to
suppress allegedly obscene material as a result of the recent Supreme Court decisions, there is one statement in the Miller decision which imposes stricter requirements on the government:
[N]o one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of
obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed." 4

This pronouncement has resulted in a substantial number of attacks on state statutes which prohibit obscenity in such general
terms as "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent," on the
basis of overbreadth and vagueness. Thus far, most courts that
have dealt with this specificity requirement have been willing to
"'See, e.g., Jenkins v. State. 199 S.E.2d 18:3 (Ga. 1973), where the court in a 4-3
decision upheld an obscenity determination of the motion picture "Carnal Knowledge."
The dissenting justices indicated their amazement that what they considered to be an
anti-erotic movie could be considered obscene by anyone, particularly appellate judges.
Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court. Jenkins v. Georgia, 42 U.S.L.W. 3347
(Dec. 10, 1973). For an equally illustrative decision as to how the difference between the
Roth-Memoirs standards and the Miller test can be significant, see United States v.
Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the court reviewed the conviction of the
defendants based on the transportation of obscene material by common carrier in interstate commerce. The court found that all of the 12 allegedly obscene magazines failed the
Miller test, but that six were not obscene under the Roth-Memoirs test.
"'Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2634-35 (1973).
"'See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 199 S.E.2d 183 (Ga. 1973). See also Note, 51 DENVER L.J.

75 (1974).
"'93 S. Ct. at 2616.
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supply the necessary judicial construction to save even the broadest of obscenity statutes. 65
CONCLUSION

An analysis and perception of the progeny of Miller, Paris
Adult Theatre, and related cases demonstrate that "the intractible obscenity problem" still exists and that the factual, legal, and
constitutional issues in obscenity cases will continue to be among
the most difficult and perplexing of those facing judges on both
the state and federal levels. That this is so is not remarkable, for
in the areas of freedom of speech and the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure the courts must always be sensitive
to the rights of the individual. The line dividing obscenity and
constitutionally protected expression is dim and uncertain, and
each judge who is confronted with an issue in this area must be
careful to balance the competing interests of the individual and
society in such a way as to reflect accurately what the community
will tolerate as well as to prevent the dilution of the rights guaranteed by the first and fourth amendments.
"'E.g., the court in United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1155 (5th Cir. 1973),
rejected such an attack on 18 U.S.C. § 1462, noting that the Supreme Court itself in
United States v. Twelve 200-foot Reels, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973), indicated, with reference
to 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a), that it was prepared to construe such terms "as limiting regulated
material to patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific 'hard core'
sexual conduct given as examples in Miller....
A majority of state courts have adopted a similar approach: see, e.g., Rhodes v. State,
283 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1973); State v. J-R Distributors, 512 P.2d 1049 (Wash. 1973). But see
Stroud v. State, 300 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. 1973), where the Indiana Supreme Court struck
down a statute that failed to satisfy, on its face, the Miller specificity standard.

NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PORNOGRAPHY- Colorado Municipal Government Authority to Regulate Obscene Materials
NEW BALTIMORE, Mich. (UPI)-This town of 4,132 found itself
in an uproar Tuesday over an anti-pornography law that could make
even bare baby bottoms obscene.
"We made the law as strict as possible," said Mayor Herman
Staffhorst, "and we intend to enforce it fully."
The law, passed Oct. 23 by the City Council, lists buttocks as
offensive and Police Chief Edward A. Reim said if applied strictly,
it would mean banning all advertisements for baby powder.
"I believe some of these ads show bare baby bottoms," he said.
"That's silly," said Staffhorst. "What kind of mind would draw
something dirty from a baby's bare bottom?"'
INTRODUCTION

In June of 1973 the United States Supreme Court handed
down five decisions on obscenity which represent the Burger
Court's attempt to formulate new standards for the regulation of
pornographic materials.' In Miller v. California,3 the first of the
five decisions, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the frequently cited test of obscenity set forth in 1966 in Memoirs v.
4 and announced new
Massachusetts
criteria for regulating obscene materials. Under the new test the subject of prohibitory
legislation must be limited to:
[wiorks which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct
must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written
or authoritatively construed. A state offense must be limited to
works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'

One of the most significant aspects of the Miller decision is
'Rocky Mountain News, Nov. 7, 1973, at 44, col. 2.
'Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct.
2628 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-foot Reels, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973); United States
v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
393 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
'A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
'93 S. Ct. at 2615.
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the Court's express abrogation of the argument stressed in
Jacobellis v. Ohio' that "community standards" refers to a nationwide community. In approving the jury's application of California state standards to determine whether the materials were
obscene under the California statute, the Court held that juries
are not constitutionally required to apply a hypothetical national
standard in determining whether materials are obscene as a matter of fact.7
What remains unclear from the Miller opinion is whether the
decision is to be limited to a grant of authority for local juries to
use statewide standards in evaluating material under a state
statute or whether states may delegate to local governments the
authority to express contemporary community standards by enacting municipal ordinances which may be interpreted and applied by local juries using the contemporary standards of that
local community. Early reaction to the Miller decision indicates
that at least some commentators and some municipal governments interpret the Supreme Court's emphasis on a "local"
rather than a "national" standard as authorizing states to allow
their local governments to write legislation for each local community. One newspaper editorial, commenting on the Miller
opinion, remarked, "We find much to be said for regulating pornography through something like zoning laws." 8
Two weeks after the Miller decision was announced, a new
Denver municipal ordinance amending the provision prohibiting
obscene materials was filed with the Denver City Council.' Following a public hearing the ordinance was adopted on July 23,
1973. ' " This note examines briefly the potential success of the new
6378 U.S. 184 (1964). See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1961),
in which Justice Harlan first suggested the need for a national standard. The Jacobellis
decision produced a number of separate opinions rather than a majority opinion; only
Justice Goldberg joined Justice Brennan in the opinion of the Court that held allegedly
obscene materials must be judged on the basis of a national standard.
7Miller
v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2619 (1973).
'Wall Street Journal, June 27, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
'Prior to its amendment section 823.7 of the Revised Municipal Code read as follows:
Pornography: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to possess or
exhibit for sale, or to circulate or distribute any indecent or lewd book,
picture, or other thing whatever of an immoral or scandalous nature, or to
exhibit, perform or present any indecent, immoral or lewd play, motion
picture, lecture, demonstration, or other representation.
'DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE § 823.7 (1951) (Ord. 464, Series 1973).
.7. Obscene Material.
.7-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to possess obscene material
except within such person's home.
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Denver ordinance in two possible areas of litigation: first, whether
local governments in Colorado have the authority to regulate obscene materials under Colorado law; and second, to what extent
the Miller decision should be interpreted as authorizing municipal control of pornography."
I.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN COLORADO

An initial question in determining the validity of the municipal ordinance is whether the City of Denver has the authority,
under Colorado law, to prohibit obscene materials. This issue is
compounded by the prior enactment of a Colorado state statute
regulating obscenity. 2 The authority of the City of Denver to
.7-2. It shall be unlawful for any person to promote obscene material.
.7-3. Definitions.
.7-3(1). "Obscene" means that which appeals to the prurient interest
in nudity, sex, sexual excitement, excretion, sadism, masochism, or sadomasochistic abuse, and which is patently offensive in describing, portraying,
or dealing with such matters and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
.7-3(2). "Promote" means to produce, direct, perform in, manufacture,
issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute,
circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise or offer or agree to do
any of these things.
"The first conviction under the amended ordinance occurred on October 29, 1973.
City & County of Denver v. Menefee, No. 3-9140 (Denver County Ct. Gen. Sess., Oct. 29,
1973).
2
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-101 (Supp. 1971):
(1) "Obscene" means that which, considered as a whole, predominantly
appeals to prurient interest, i.e., a lustful or morbid interest in nudity, sex,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, excretion, sadism, masochism, or sadomasochistic abuse, and which goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in describing, portraying, or dealing with such matters and is utterly
without redeeming social value.
(2) "Predominant appeal", "customary limits of candor", and "redeeming social value" of a thing shall be judged by reference to the average adult
in the community as a whole, except that where the thing appears to be
designed for, or is made available to, minors, it shall be judged with reference
ot the average minor in the age group for which the thing appears to be
designed or to which it is made available.
(3) "Material" means any physical object used as a means of presenting
or communicating information, knowledge, sensation, image, or emotion to
or through the visual, aural, tactile, or olfactory senses of a human being.
(4) "Performance" means the presentation or showing to another person
or for recording by any means, of:
(a) Any material, including the information, knowledge, sensation, image, or emotion which that material presents or communicates; or
(b) Any live physical presence or live physical activity, including vocal activity.
(5) "Promote" means to produce, direct, perform in, manufacture, issue,
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control pornography and the validity of the ordinance in this
context will depend upon whether a municipal government may
pass an ordinance on a subject already covered by a state statute.
Theoretically, there are three possible lines of analysis resulting
from the existence of both a state statute and a local ordinance
on the same subject: first, the local ordinance may supersede the
state statute; second, the local ordinance and the state statute
may operate concurrently within the same area; or third, the
state statute may preempt the field of regulation and supersede
the local ordinance. This section examines the operation of the
Denver municipal ordinance under each of these three alternative
approaches.
A.

Municipal Supersession
Under the common law rule of state supremacy, statutes
supersede conflicting ordinances in states where municipal corporations are totally controlled by the state legislatures. However,
in states where the legislatures have enacted constitutional home
rule amendments, ordinances may supersede statutes in home
rule cities.
Denver is one of 45 home rule cities in Colorado whose municipal ordinances supersede state statutes in matters of local
concern. 3 The Colorado constitution provides that in "local and
sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate,
disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise, for pecuniary gain, or to offer or
agree to do any of these things for pecuniary gain.
§ 40-7-102 makes promoting obscenity a class 2 misdemeanor.
"COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 provides, in part:
Home rule for cities and towns.-The people of each city or town of this
state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants as determined by the
last preceeding census taken under the authority of the United States, the
state of Colorado or said city or town, are hereby vested with, and they shall
always have, power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said
city or town, which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and
municipal matters.
A later amendment to article XX removed, along with other restrictions, the population requirement:
[T]o afford to the people of all cities, cities and counties, and towns the
right to home rule regardless of population, period of incorporation, or other
limitation . ..
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 9(4) (adopted Nov. 3, 1970, effective Jan. 1, 1972).
Colorado's home rule cities are Alamosa, Arvada, Aspen, Aurora, Boulder, Burlington, Canon City, Cherry Hills Village, Colorado Springs, Commerce City, Cortez, Craig,
Delta, Denver, Durango, Edgewater, Englewood, Evans, Fort Collins, Fort Morgan, Glendale, Glenwood Springs, Golden, Grand Junction, Greeley, Greenwood Village, Gunnison,
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municipal matters" the municipal charter and ordinances made
pursuant thereto "supersede within the territorial limits and
other jurisdiction of said [home rule] city or town any law of the
state in conflict therewith."' 4 Additionally, Colorado case law reveals that when the matter is purely local or municipal, a home
rule city "may exercise exclusive jurisdiction by passing ordinances which supersede state statutes."' 5
Generally a matter is deemed strictly local only when it is
found to have no effect on state citizens living outside of the
municipality." In Colorado the interpretation of local and municipal affairs appears to be less restrictive. In City and County of
Denver v. Henry7 the regulation of traffic at intersections was
found to be a local matter "because proper regulation is almost
wholly dependent upon local conditions."'" Under these definitions it seems clear that in order for a subject to be construed as
strictly local, thereby permitting municipal supersession, an attempted state regulation must appear inappropriate because the
condition is not shared by citizens of the state living outside of
the municipality, or ineffective because different municipalities
may have unique local conditions. A recent case dealing with
municipal supersession reveals that "what is local and municipal
as opposed to what is of statewide concern is frequently difficult
to determine."' 9 However, the Colorado Supreme Court disallowed municipal supersession of an ordinance on the right to
resist arrest, observing that the matter was "not peculiarly municipal, but also concerns the public at large.""0
The sheer weight of the cases and commentary on obscenity
belies any argument that the matter is one of strictly local conLafayette, La Junta, Lamar, Littleton, Longmont, Manitou Springs, Monte Vista, Montrose, Mountain View, Pueblo, Rifle, Sterling, Thornton, Vail, Westminster, Wray.
COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, 1973 DIRECTORY OF MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY OFFICIALS IN COLORADO 37 (1973). The city of Steamboat Springs adopted home rule on November 6, 1973.
"COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. Even in the absence of such a state constitutional
provision granting exclusive jurisdiction to a home rule city there is usually a judicial
interpretation favoring municipal supersession where purely local affairs are concerned.
Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 H~av. L. REv. 737,
740 (1959).
'IVela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 466, 484 P.2d 1204, 1205 (1971). Accord, Davis v.

City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 35, 342 P.2d 674, 676 (1959).
"GNote, supra note 14, at 741.
1795 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895 (1934).

"Id. at 587, 38 P.2d at 897.
"Bennion v. City & County of Denver, 504 P.2d 350, 351 (Colo. 1972).
M
d.
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cern. Whether municipalities have a sufficiently greater interest
in the subject to justify added controls is a matter for another
discussion,"' but here at least the general public interest in the
problem seems clearly to preclude a ruling in favor of municipal
supersession by the Denver ordinance.
B.

Concurrent Regulation
The second possible result of a state statute and a local ordinance on the same subject is that they may exist concurrently.
An ordinance which regulates the same conduct as a statute and
does so in substantially the same manner is usually held valid."
Presently, under Colorado case law, "[t]here is nothing basically
invalid about legislation on the same subject by both a home rule
city and the state, absent some conflict between the two regula23

tions."

This more recent view of concurrent regulation in areas of
"mixed" state and local concern overruled the landmark case of
City of Canon City v. Merris2" decided by the Colorado Supreme
Court in 1958. In Merris the court held that in matters of local
concern a municipal ordinance displaces the state statute while
in areas of statewide concern supersession does not take place.
"Application of state law or municipal ordinance, whichever pertains, is mutually exclusive.

'2

For several years the doctrine of

mutual exclusion formulated in the Merris case marked Colorado
as the single state where matters of local and municipal concern
could not be regulated by statute even in the absence of municipal legislation. 6 Following the Merris decision, Colorado courts
were forced to make a case-by-case determination of whether
matters were statewide or local in nature." Later decisions ques"See notes 48-51 infra and accompanying text.
"Note, supra note 14, at 747.
2"City of Aurora v. Martin, 507 P.2d 868, 869 (Colo. 1973).
"1137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
5Id. at 180, 323 P.2d at 620.
"Note, supra note 14, at 740 & n.31. See also Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in
Colorado, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 267 (1958).

"Matters of statewide concern: Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342
P.2d 674 (1959) (driving under a suspended license); City & County of Denver v. Palmer,
140 Colo. 27, 342 P.2d 687 (1959) (driving under revoked license); City of Canon City v.
Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958) (driving under the influence of liquor).
Matters of local concern: Roosevelt v. City of Englewood, 176 Colo. 576, 492 P.2d 65
(1971) (zoning); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Temple, 176 Colo. 538, 491 P.2d 1371
(1971) (assessment for local improvement district); City & County of Denver v. Thomas,
176 Colo. 483, 491 P.2d 573 (1971) (disposition of money received by a home rule city as
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tioned the necessity and validity of this approach, and the doctrine of mutual exclusion was expressly overruled in Colorado in
1971.18 Today, the concept of mutually exclusive authority survives only "as between the home rule city and the state where the
subject matter is unquestionably and wholly local or is strictly
state-wide."2
The cases which contributed most significantly to discrediting the doctrine of mutual exclusion recognized the need for concurrent regulation in areas of mixed state and local concern.
Many of the cases acknowledged that "sometimes both the state
and the city has [sic] a legitimate interest in the subject justifying legislation on the part of both. 30 The most obvious problem
cases were those in which the state had expressly authorized the
local governments to legislate in areas of apparent statewide concern, sometimes in areas where the state had also acted.
Woolverton v. City and County of Denver,3 a case involving a
gambling offense, represents an early attempt to reconcile such a
situation with the rule of mutual exclusion. A statute of the State
of Colorado authorized cities and towns to regulate gambling and
associated activities." In addition, both the state and the City of
Denver had enacted legislation providing penalties for gambling
offenses. The defendants were charged with a violation of the city
ordinance. They challenged the city's authority to legislate,
claiming that it lacked legislative jurisdiction to enact the ordireimbursement under the workmen's compensation act); Davis v. City of Pueblo, 158
Colo. 319, 406 P.2d 671 (1965) (revenue bonds); Berman v. People, 156 Colo. 538, 400 P.2d
434 (1965) (sales and use tax); Freeland v. Fife, 151 Colo. 339, 377 P.2d 942 (1963) (regulation of traffic at intersections); Dominguez v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 233,
363 P.2d 661 (1961) (vagrancy); Retallick v. Police Court, 142 Colo. 214, 351 P.2d 884
(1960) (regulation of traffic at intersections); City & County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo.
582, 38 P.2d 895 (1934) (regulation of traffic at intersections).
'IVela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 484 P.2d 1204 (1971). Accord, City of Aurora v.
Martin, 507 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1973); Bennion v. City & County of Denver, 504 P.2d 350
(Colo. 1972).
"Woolverton
v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 252, 361 P.2d 982, 984 (1961).
3
Id. at 259, 361 P.2d at 987-88.
31146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961).
3COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 139-32-1(52) (1963). This section provides that the governing bodies of cities and towns shall have the power:
To suppress bawdy and disorderly houses, houses of ill fame or assignation, within the limits of the city or town, or within three miles beyond,
except where the boundaries of two cities or towns adjoin the outer boundaries of the city or town; and also to suppress gaming and gambling houses,
lotteries and fraudulent devices and practices, for the purpose of gaining or
obtaining money or property, and to prohibit the sale or exhibition of obscene
or immoral publications, prints, pictures or illustrations.
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nance because gambling was a statewide concern and the state
had preempted the field.
The Colorado Supreme Court found that gambling was a
matter of local as well as statewide concern. Launching a vigorous
attack on the doctrine of mutual exclusion, the court stated, "We
are of the opinion that such approach is arbitrary, highly impractical and not demanded by either the constitution or by our
decisions."33 The court concluded that "the state can validly consent to local exercise of authority even though the subject is pre4
dominantly state-wide.
In response to the argument that the consent statute applied
to non-home-rule cities only, the court observed:
To hold that a statutory city has more power than a home rule city
would be anomalous indeed. Yet a determination that gambling is
state-wia1e and that a home rule city is powerless to act in that field,
at once recognizes the superiority of the statutory city over a charter
city under the XXth Amendment.

The Woolverton case is particularly significant to the obscenity issue in that the Colorado statute which authorizes cities to
regulate gambling also gives statutory cities, as well as home rule
cities, authority to regulate obscenity. The statute empowers the
governing bodies of both cities and towns to "prohibit the sale or
exhibition of obscene or immoral publications, prints, pictures or
illustrations."36 Under the analysis of the consent principle in the
Woolverton case the existence of this statute specifically authorizing cities to regulate obscene materials would constitute a valid
delegation of authority to the city to enact concurrent
regulations.
Until very recently Colorado case law revealed that where the
subject matter was of general statewide concern and the state had
not consented to the exercise of local authority, the municipal
governments had no authority to act. However, more recent Colorado case law indicates that concurrent jurisdiction is possible
even in the absence of statutory authorization. 7
Even Colorado's statutory cities receive authority to regulate
'1146 Colo. at 253, 361 P.2d at 984.
3
Id. at 256, 361 P.2d at 986.
'Id. at 263, 361 P.2d at 990.
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
37

§ 139-32-1(52) (1963).

City of Aurora v. Martin, 507 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1973) (assault and battery); Bennion
v. City & County of Denver, 504 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1972) (resistance to unlawful arrest);
Quintana v. Edgewater Municipal Court, 498 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1972) (shoplifting).
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obscenity by virtue of the consent statute cited in the Woolverton
case. In regard to its statutory cities Colorado has adopted the
doctrine of preemption. Non-home-rule cities are governed by the
common law rule of state supremacy and may not enact any
ordinance which supersedes a state statute.3 1 "[Wihen the city's
acts or regulations attempt to interfere with or cover . . . a field
pre-empted by the state or which is of statewide concern . . .
they must fail. 13 9 Although the power of Colorado's non-homerule cities is usually preempted by a state statute on a matter of
general concern, the presence of the consent statute gives these
statutory cities authority to regulate obscenity concurrently with
the state. The Colorado Supreme Court has held:
[W]here the state has adopted a statute on a matter of statewide
interest or concern . . .then the local governmental units are deprived of jurisdiction over such subjects. . . . [Tlhis is not so however where the state has delegated power . . .to cities also to join
in regulation."0

Although home rule cities may regulate obscenity even in the
absence of express statutory authority, the legislative jurisdiction
of non-home-rule cities is dependent upon a consent statute.
In spite of the existence of a Colorado state statute on obscenity, and pending any future interpretation of the Miller case
which might remove from local governments the authority to
enact legislation on obscenity, the municipal governments of
every city and town in Colorado have the authority, under present
statutes and case law, to enact legislation on obscenity absent
some conflict between the local legislation and the state statute.
C.

State Preemption
As indicated by the discussion in the previous subsection,
both the state and the City of Denver may enact legislation prohibiting obscene materials by virtue of the consent statute or,
alternatively, under a theory of mixed state and local concern.
However, when both the state and a municipality have enacted
legislation on the same subject, a third possible result remains to
be explored: whether the state legislation has preempted the
city's legislative authority. Preemption may result from a finding
'Vanatta v. Town of Steamboat Springs, 146 Colo. 356, 361 P.2d 441 (1960).
aCity of Golden v. Ford, 141 Colo. 472, 479, 348 P.2d 951, 954 (1960). Accord, Sierotta
v. Scott, 143 Colo. 248, 352 P.2d 671 (1960); City of Aurora v. Mitchell, 144 Colo. 172, 437
P.2d 923 (1959).
I'Sierotta v. Scott, 143 Colo. 248, 251-52, 352 P.2d 671, 673 (1960).
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that a matter is strictly statewide and of no local concern, from
an express or grammatical conflict between the terms of a statute
and an ordinance, or by the implication that the nature and scope
of a statute covers a particular field and permits no additional
regulation. Colorado has thus far not applied the doctrine of
preemption to the regulation of obscene materials by home rule
cities. In cases such as this where there is statutory consent to
local regulation, there is a presumption that the state did not
intend to preempt the field, and local governments are free to
legislate. As noted earlier, the lack of a statutory grant of power
does not preclude home rule municipalities from regulating a
matter of statewide concern:
A statute specifically delegating the power of regulation to cities and
towns would be useful in the deciding that the state did not intend
to pre-empt that field of regulation ....
The absence of such a
statute is not determinative ....

1

Nevertheless, another possible analysis may result in a finding of preemption by the state. The validity of a city ordinance
depends upon whether there is a conflict between the city's legislation and a state statute. In Colorado, where there is an express
conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the state act
preempts the city ordinance. 2
The definition of "conflict" in Colorado cases dealing with
the issue is whether the ordinance authorizes what the state forbids, or forbids what the state has expressly authorized.43 Conflict, and therefore preemption, is essentially a question of fact.
There are only two express conflicts between the language of the
Colorado statute and the Denver ordinance. First of all, the statute provides that obscene material is that "which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing, portraying, or dealing with [sexual] matters,"" while the ordinance
defines obscene as that "which is patently offensive in describing,
portraying, or dealing with [sexual] matters."45 Also, the statute
provides that the allegedly obscene material must be found to be
"utterly without redeeming social value," 6 while the ordinance
requires a showing that the material "lacks serious literary, artis"City of Aurora v. Martin, 507 P.2d 868, 870 (Colo. 1973).
"Vick v. People, 166 Colo. 565, 445 P.2d 220 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 945 (1968).

"Ray v. City & County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 77, 121 P.2d 886, 888 (1942).
"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-101(1) (Supp. 1971).
"DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE § 823.7-3(1) (1951) (Ord. 464, Series 1973).

"CoLo.

REV. STAT.

ANN. § 40-7-101(1) (Supp. 1971).

1974
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tic, political, or scientific value. 4 7 The Colorado statute obviously reflects the formulation of the now discredited Memoirs
test, while the ordinance incorporates the newer standards of the
Miller decision. Although the Miller opinion provides that state
legislatures are free to use whatever standards they choose, providing they are within the new guidelines, it is likely that the
Colorado legislature will amend the existing statute to conform
to the newer standards and. to reflect the language of the Miller
decision now utilized in the Denver ordinance. However, even
with the language of the present statute there is no provision in
the ordinance authorizing what the state forbids or forbidding
what the state authorizes.
The city ordinance is stricter in its requirement that the
material be shown to lack any serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value as opposed to the statute's requirement that
the material have some modicum of redeeming social value. Generally, in cases where the state statute is prohibitory in nature,
most jurisdictions favor supplemental local ordinances which aid
the statutory purposes.4" In Woolverton the Colorado Supreme
Court held that "in a field of both local and state interest the
municipality has not a superseding authority

.

.

.

but an actual

supplemental authority to deal with the added problems arising
from municipal congestion."49 Although it is clear that a municipal ordinance cannot make legal what a statute forbids,5" in Colorado at least, stricter regulations imposed by a municipal government do not create a conflict.5 Therefore, unless the Colorado
state statute expressly authorizes certain conduct, a municipal
government may impose any additional prohibitions on obscene
materials which are in keeping with the statutory purposes and
7

" DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE § 823.7-3(1) (1951) (Ord. 464, Series 1973).

"Feiler, Conflicts Between State and Local Enactments-The Doctrine of Implied
Preemption, 2 THE URBAN LAWYER 398, 402 (1970).
"1146 Colo. 247, 254-55, 361 P.2d 982, 985 (1961).
"'Vick v. People, 166 Colo. 565, 445 P.2d 220 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 945 (1968).
"'Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 265, 361 P.2d 982, 991 (1961).
Accord, Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 484 P.2d 1204 (1971); Kelly v. City of Fort Collins,
163 Colo. 520, 431 P.2d 785 (1967). See also Blackman v. City & County of Denver, 169
Colo. 345, 352, 455 P.2d 885, 888 (1969), in which the court permitted an ordinance less
strict than the statute:
It is not required that the regulations of the ordinance be co-extensive
or identical with those enjoined by the statute. Here, the statute by its terms
is broader in scope than the ordinance . . . . We do not infer that the
broader scope of the statute renders it inconsistent with or in conflict with
the ordinance.
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which conform to the requirements of the Miller ruling.
In conclusion, a review of Colorado state and local governmental law reveals that the Denver city ordinance probably will
not supersede the state statute on obscenity. However, the city
does appear to have the authority to regulate obscene materials
concurrently with the state unless and until a new state statute
presents an express conflict between the two legislative acts.
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR PREEMPTION
The first conviction under the Denver ordinance has already
occurred.5" The appellate process will present to higher state
courts the question of whether the local enactment is a valid
exercise of municipal authority or whether it is ultra vires and
void. Apart from the considerations discussed in section I which
suggest that under present Colorado law the City of Denver has
the authority to regulate obscenity, the courts will need to decide
whether the state has nevertheless preempted the field. At least
two other states, California5 3 and New Jersey,54 have already
acted to preempt obscenity legislation from local control. This
section presents an argument favoring a similar action in
Colorado.
Those who argue against preemption suggest that state legislation should preempt the field to the exclusion of ordinances only
when "the situation absolutely requires it . . . [since] state regulation which precludes supplementary municipal action may
not serve the needs of a municipal area, which often has its own
peculiar problems."" The word "peculiar" implies something
which is unusual or unique to the locality, as opposed to being a
concern to other residents of the state. In matters of zoning, for
example, or regulation of intersection traffic, it is easy to see how
municipalities may have an interest in the problem which would
require city-by-city determinations of policy. Aside from considerations of morality, it is more difficult to imagine circumstances
which would require a locality to cut back or expand the state
"City & County of Denver v. Menefee, No. 3-914Q (Denver County Ct. Gen. Sess.,
Oct. 29, 1973).
-'In re Moss, 58 Cal. 2d 117, 373 P.2d 425, 23 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1962); Whitney v.
Municipal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 377 P.2d 80, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1962); In re Lane, 58 Cal.
2d 99, 367 P.2d 673, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1960); Spitcauer v. City of Los Angeles, 227 Cal.
App. 2d 376, 38 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1964); People v. Marler, 199 Cal. App. 2d 889, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 923 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. San Bernadino 1962).
I'Dimor, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 122 N.J. Super. 296, 300 A.2d 191 (L. Div. 1973).
"15Note, supra note 14, at 746.
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regulation of obscenity in order to serve the needs of the municipal area. The state statute establishes a standard for Colorado
residents, and to allow each municipality to enact a different
standard would defeat the state policy and might cause substantial harm.
Customarily, preemption is applied to those matters which
are best controlled by uniform legislation throughout the state.
For example, one Colorado case held that Denver could not set
telephone rates because to allow cities to act in this field would
harm the well-being of the state by undermining the uniform
system of state regulation and would infringe upon the equal
rights of the citizens of the state." In its decision to allow state
preemption of the field of obscenity regulation a New Jersey court
observed:
It is clear that the matter of obscenity must be governed by a
uniform mode of treatment. The affront against public morals, although of necessity a matter of local concern, is predominantly
within the domain of the state. It must be so."

The most compelling reason supporting an argument for
state preemption of obscenity regulation in Colorado is the liberality with which the state now allows concurrent regulations. As
noted earlier, local ordinances which are stricter than the state
statute are permissible, 58 as are ordinances which are less restrictive than the state legislation. 9 This permissive approach will
confound rather than contribute to uniform regulation of
obscenity.
In California and New Jersey, state preemption of obscenity
legislation occurs even where the statute and the ordinance are
identical. 0 The California decisions reveal other policy reasons
for preemption of obscenity legislation by the state:
The denial of power to a local body when the state has
preempted the field is not based solely upon the superior authority
of the state. It is a rule of necessity, based upon the need to prevent
5'People ex rel. Public Util. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo.

167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952). Subsequently, all public utilities were removed from local control. COLO. CONST. art. XXV.

"Dimor, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 122 N.J. Super. 296, 302, 300 A.2d 191, 194 (L. Div.
1973).

!"See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
51See note 51 supra.
'"Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 370, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942); Dimor, Inc. v. City
of Passaic, 122 N.J. Super. 296, 302-03, 300 A.2d 191, 195 (L. Div. 1973).
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dual regulations which could result in uncertainty and confusion."

Under present Colorado law, statutory cities through the
consent principle and home rule cities through the doctrine of
concurrent regulation may enact legislation on obscenity. With
hundreds of statutory cities and towns and more than 40 home
rule cities, the number of potential legislative enactments in Colorado is staggering. The uncertainty and confusion likely to result
from this legislative overkill is obvious.
In an article concerning the doctrine of preemption in California, one commentator concluded:
Only a standard of statewide uniformity can fully implement the
values of free speech and due process, the rights of privacy, and
other fundamental values. The doctrine of preemption by implica2
tion is necessary to their fulfillment.

Although an argument can be made that local governments
in Colorado have the authority to write legislation on obscenity
and to use the contemporary standards of their town or city in
prosecutions under the ordinance, the potential confusion of allowing local governments in some states to adopt municipal ordinances in addition to state statutes far outweighs the disadvantages of preemption.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Explicit in the Miller decision is the Court's approval of state
legislation on obscenity. In states such as California where the
authority to regulate obscenity has been preempted by the state
legislature, 3 the application of the Miller criteria will be relatively simple. Defendants will be prosecuted under state statutes,
and the triers of fact, the judge or a jury, will apply statewide
standards. However, in states where the authority to regulate
obscenity has not been lodged exclusively at the state level by
legislation or preemption, problems of interpreting the Miller
decision emerge. In New Mexico, for example, where the regulation of obscenity has been given exclusively to individual municipalities," there is no statewide legislative scheme. The contrast
"Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal. Rptr.
158, 163 (1960). "The invalidity arises, not from a conflict of language, but from the
inevitable conflict of jurisdiction which would result from dual regulations covering the
same ground." Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 371, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942).
'2 Blease, Civil Liberties and the CaliforniaLaw of Preemption, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 517,
569 (1966).
"See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
"N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-17-14(c) (1968).
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between these two approaches suggests a need for an interpretation by the Supreme Court of the Miller holding.
The Supreme Court may require that, following the Miller
case, state governments alone exercise the authority to regulate
obscenity. Alternatively, the Court may permit state legislatures
to retain or delegate their authority so that states such as California (where the state legislature has preempted the field) will have
statewide schemes, while states such as New Mexico (where the
state legislature has delegated its authority to individual communities) will have local ordinances but no statewide scheme. In
Colorado, absent a preemption of the field by the state legislature, there will be both a state standard and various local
ordinances.
This section examines the Miller decision to determine what
the Supreme Court intended to permit in terms of local authority
to legislate, and examines some constitutional considerations
which suggest a need for the Supreme Court to mandate state
preemption of the field.
Prior to the Miller decision the Supreme Court has upheld
state delegation of police power to municipal governments to regulate obscenity, 5 and struck down local ordinances which were
vague" or overbroad in prohibiting or punishing protected activities. 7 However, under these prior legislative schemes, the courts
were required to apply a national standard in the determination
of obscenity. The abrogation of the nationwide standard by the
Miller opinion leaves unclear the extent to which this delegation
of legislative authority is permissible as an expression of "local
community standards." References to statewide regulatory
schemes are abundant throughout the Miller opinion," and the
thrust of the decision places the responsibility for legislation in
1',Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
"Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Werner v. City of
Knoxville, 161 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Tenn. 1958).
"7Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Werner v. City of Knoxville, 161 F. Supp.
9 (E.D. Tenn. 1958). See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
369 (1931).
"E.g., "We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for
the States. That must await their concrete legislative efforts." Miller v. California, 93 S.
Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973). "People in different states vary in their tastes and attitudes, and
this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity." Id. at 2620.
"Obscene material may be validly regulated by a State in the exercise of its traditional
local power to protect the general welfare of its population ....
" Id. at 2619 n.13.
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the hands of state rather than local governments. Additionally,
the Miller case involved a defendant charged with the violation
of a state statute. During the trial the prosecution presented expert testimony by a police officer who specialized in obscenity
offenses and "had conducted an extensive state-wide survey"6 9 on
the issue of California "community standards." In limiting Miller
to its facts it would seem clear that states are authorized to legislate and juries are allowed to hear evidence on statewide community standards with no indication that local communities may
legislate.
Following the Miller decision the Supreme Court has systematically remanded obscenity cases to the lower courts for further
consideration in light of Miller and subsequent cases.7" Although
at least one case involved a conviction under a local ordinance,"'
the Court's remand is not conclusive on the issue of whether the
Court will support an interpretation of the Miller ruling which
permits local governments to legislate obscenity standards.
The confounding part of the Miller opinion is the Court's
observation:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or
2
New York City.

What is abundantly clear from this statement is that courts no
longer need to use a national standard. What is confusing is the
Court's mixture of states and cities. Does this mean that the
Miller decision permits cities as well as states to legislate and to
use their own contemporary community standards? Several constitutional arguments suggest that the better interpretation
would be to allow only statewide standards of obscenity.
First, the Supreme Court notes that "[o]bscene materials
may be validly regulated by a State . . . despite some possible
incidental effect on the flow of such material across state lines."7
"Id. at 2619 n.12.
"°Carlson v. Minnesota, 94 S. Ct. 263 (1973); Cherokee News & Arcade, Inc. v. Oklahoma, 94 S. Ct. 277 (1973); Groner v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 278 (1973); Harding v.
United States, 94 S. Ct. 274 (1973); McCrary v. Oklahoma, 94 S. Ct. 275 (1973); Roth v.
New Jersey, 94 S. Ct. 271 (1973); Trinkler v. Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 265 (1973); West v. Texas,
94 S. Ct. 268 (1973).
"Carlson v. Minnesota, 94 S. Ct. 263 (1973).
"Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2619 (1973).
"Id. at 2619 n.13.
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Obviously, the "incidental" effect on interstate commerce is
greatly magnified in that not only states, but also thousands of
smaller governmental units have the authority to interfere with
the distribution of materials. Although the Court held that the
Miller prosecution did not impose an "unconscionable [burden]
on the free flow of interstate commerce,""4 a realistic look at multiple local controls suggests a different result. For example, in the
Denver metropolitan area alone the number of potential local
ordinances reaches into the dozens.
One of the factors frequently contributing to state preemption of certain fields of regulation is "a serious impact on unwary
transients passing through the enacting municipality.""5 One
writer, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Lambert v.
9 suggests a
California,"
due process rationale for preemption by
state legislatures:
The transient Californian is no more likely to expect a non-statewide
standard of sexual behavior than the ex-convict could expect a local
7
registration ordinance.

The problems of numerous varying local ordinances raises
one of the most important considerations for denying local governments the authority to legislate, that is, the effect on first
amendment freedoms in the form of self-censorship. A Washington attorney has predicted:
The legitimate distributor, bookseller or movie theater owner is
seldom ready to go to jail for selling a book or showing a movie. If
there is a real risk that he may suffer the stigma and punishment of
a criminal conviction, he will choose-as most ordinary citizens
would-not to stock the book and not to run the movie."8

The New York Times reported, shortly after the Miller
decision, that librarians and booksellers had already acted as self79
censors out of fear of prosecution under vague local standards.
While the threat of prosecution may drive hardcore pornography
underground, the expense of defending the seller or distributor
against prosecution will surely affect attempts to produce or market marginal material.' If a book or film is permitted by some
7
7

d.

Feiler, supra note 48, at 407.
7-355 U.S. 225 (1957).
7
Blease, supra note 62, at 551.
'Lewin, Sex at High Noon in Times Square, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 7 & 14, 1973,
at 21.
7N.Y.
Times, June 25, 1973, at 46, col. 1.
T'he distributors of I Am Curious (Yellow), which reportedly grossed $7
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local ordinances it could not be categorically classified as beyond
the protection of the first amendment. However, in a state where
local governments are all permitted to legislate and prosecute,
the legality of a book or film could be litigated again and again.
The ultimate effect on legitimate expression will be to avoid prosecution by making all material fit for the locality with the strictest standards.
These considerations suggest that while the Supreme Court
has placed "hardcore pornography" beyond the protection of the
first amendment, the practical effect of allowing thousands of
cities and towns to legislate their own definitions of pornography
will be to place legitimate artistic expression in serious jeopardy,
adversely affect the free flow of commerce, and potentially eliminate materials considered legitimate by many or even a majority
of local ordinances.
IV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE Miller RULING
Apart from any considerations of whether local governments
have the authority under the Miller ruling to legislate on obscenity, the question remains to what extent the language of the Denver ordinance conforms to the requirements of the Miller test. To
some extent at least this answer will depend upon future cases
interpreting the Miller decision as well as upon judicial construction of the Denver ordinance.
However, some indication of the form of legislation which the
Supreme Court intended to follow the Miller ruling comes from
the language of the opinion and two exemplary state statutes
cited by the Court as satisfying the Miller criteria. 8' The opinion
million in box office receipts but spent much of it in defending the film
against scores of local proceedings, learned that it is a practical impossibility
to market a film on a national basis if it can be threatened with prosecution
in every local community.
Lewin, supra note 78, at 21.
'ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.060 (1971). The definitions in the Oregon statutes provide in
part:
(5) "Nudity" means uncovered, or less than opaquely covered, postpubertal human genitals, pubic areas, the post-pubertal human female
breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola, or the covered
human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. For purposes of this definition, a female breast is considered uncovered if the nipple only or the nipple
and the areola only are covered.
(7) "Obscenities" means those slang words currently generally rejected
for regular use in mixed society, that are used to refer to genitals, female
breasts, sexual conduct or excretory functions or products, either that have
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itself, as well as the language of these two statutes, suggests that
new legislation, whether enacted by states or smaller governmental units, should employ relatively specific definitions of prohibited conduct. The majority in Miller states:
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works
which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be
specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. 2

The new Denver municipal ordinance fails to meet this requirement. The terms "nudity," "sex," "sexual excitement,"
"excretion," "sadism," "masochism," or "sado-masochistic
abuse" are left totally undefined by the ordinance. There is little
authoritative construction of so recent an enactment.83 Perhaps
this hesitancy to define the relevant terms of the ordinance is
reflective of the policy expressed in a comment to the Colorado
statute on obscenity:
Certain definitions contained in existing law have been omitted,
namely, "nudity", "sexual conduct", and "sado-masochistic
no other meaning or that in context are clearly used for their bodily, sexual
or excretory meaning.
(9) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon
a person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre
costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically
restrained on the part of one so clothed.
(10) "Sexual conduct" means human masturbation, sexual intercourse,
or any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male
or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members
of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in the act of
sexual stimulation or gratification.
(11) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of the human male or
female genitals or the breasts of the female when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual
conduct or nudity.
Act 9, pt. 2, 1972 HAWAII SESSION LAWS 126-29. The definitions in the Hawaii statutes
provide in part:
(7) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, lesbianism, bestiality, sexual intercourse or physical contact with the person's
clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or the breast or breasts
of a female for the purpose of sexual stimulation, gratification, or perversion.
(8) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of the human male or
female genitals when in a state of sexual excitement or arousal.
(9) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon
a person as an act of sexual stimulation or gratification.
'193 S. Ct. at 2615 (emphasis added).
"The jury instructions in the case of City & County of Denver v. Menefee, No. 3-9140
(Denver County Ct. Gen. Sess., Oct. 29, 1973) contained no definitions of the relevant
terms. The trial judge read to the jury the definition of "obscenity" which is contained in
the Denver ordinance.
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abuse." Experience has demonstrated conclusively that these definitions have only served to create confusion and misunderstanding. 8"

Notwithstanding the Colorado policy on not providing specific definitions of prohibited conduct in this area, the Supreme
Court's requirement in the Miller decision seems to indicate that
the new Denver ordinance will be declared invalid because of
vagueness.
CONCLUSION

One month after the Supreme Court decision in Miller v.
California was handed down, the Denver City Council passed a
new municipal ordinance on obscenity. At the present time Colorado statutes and case law amply support the authority of home
rule cities to regulate obscenity concurrently with the state. Although Colorado has not acted to preempt municipal authority
to regulate obscenity, the need for a uniform treatment of the
subject on a statewide level suggests that Colorado should join
those states which have legislatively or judicially preempted this
field. In the absence of state action to preempt obscenity regulation, the effect on constitutional guarantees of allowing all local
governments to regulate obscenity suggests that the Supreme
Court should mandate statewide rather than multiple local legislation and standards.15 These policy considerations present a
strong argument that the Denver ordinance should be preempted
by a statewide legislative scheme. Finally, the Denver ordinance
itself appears to fall short of the requirements set out in Miller v.
California for specific definitions of prohibited conduct. Ultimately, the validity of the Denver legislation and other local ordinances will be challenged to determine whether the standards
used to regulate obscene materials must be those of a state or may
be imposed by individual communities.
C. Jean Stewart
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-101, Comment (Supp. 1971).
A previously enacted Denver municipal ordinance, § 812.4, relating to exposure of
minors to obscene materials, is considerably more specific and contains an almost exact
duplication of the definitions set out in the Oregon statute cited by the Court in Miller.

'The Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments in a case which may determine
whether standards used to judge obscenity should be those of the state or of individual
communities. Jenkins v. Georgia, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 719 (1973).

NOTE
PATENT LAW-PATENT VALIDITY:
The Public is the Third Party
It is as important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly ....
INTRODUCTION

A controversial issue in the field of patent law is whether the
judiciary, absent specific congressional legislation, should sanction the growing and diverse means for attacking the validity of
patents. 2 The Supreme Court in recent cases3 has reasoned that
the primary purpose in allowing an inventor the exclusive right
to his discovery for 17 years4 is to foster scientific advancement
for the direct benefit of the public. The public, it has therefore
been argued, has the right to be protected from the abuses of
invalid grants of patent monopolies through the express repeal of
such patents by the judiciary.
Those critical of such a direct role by the Supreme Court,
however, would find no repeal power in the judiciary unless Congress had specifically enacted such power.' Since 1836, Congress
'Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
'An example of this controversy is the statement by Mr. T. L. Bowes, Esq., chairman
of the Patent Law Section of the American Bar Association, before the Corporate Patent
Seminar in Cooperstown, New York, on September 23, 1973:
Too many judges have reached the stage where a patent is considered a
monopoly, and since monopolies are bad, patents are bad and any excuse
available . . . should be used to limit their effectiveness or invalidate them.
As reported in Carl Byoir & Assoc., Inc., Press Release, Oct. 4, 1973, Patent System in
Deep Trouble. See Fogt & Hollabaugh, Glaxo and its Ramifications: The Campaign to
"Wreck and Rebuild" Continues, 8 LEs NOUVELLES 127 (1973); Sutton, Glaxo: The New
Role for the Justice Department, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'\ 478 (1973); BNA PAT., T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J., No. 131, C-1 (June 7, 1973); BNA PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., No. 112, A-1
(Jan. 25, 1973).
'See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653 (1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
'35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
[Ojur Constitution gave no power to the executive, but gave all to Congress; and the power it gave to Congress was the power to create by legislation a system according to its own judgment. . . . The essence of our patent
system is that what is not authorized by the act is ultra vires.
Brief for Appellee at 339, United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888);
see Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884). Unlike that in England, the patent system
in America "is founded exclusively on statutory provisions." Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7
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has enacted only one condition under which a patent may be
subsequently repealed: the interposition of a successful defense of
invalidity in an infringement proceeding At all other times a
patent is presumed valid when issued.7
The issuance of invalid patents is a major and growing problem. In 1972, a record 77,908 patents were granted by the Patent
Office." Generally a patent examiner spends only 15 hours analyzing an application; 9 he is also given considerable latitude in the
interpretation of what constitutes inventiveness.'I As a result of
the crush of applications, the enormous backlog of applications,
the lack of examiner morale, and the length of turnover time,
invalid patents are frequently issued." Studies indicate that on
the average 64 percent of all patents challenged in court are found
to be invalid.' 2
Pet.) 292, 319 (1833); accord, James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 359 (1881). See also Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52,
64 (1973).
135 U.S.C. §§ 281-82 (1970). An infringement proceeding occurs when, for example,
X manufacturer produces and sells a product covered by Y's patent. Y sues X for infringement of Y's patent rights and X defends by claiming that Y's patent is invalid.
735 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
'King, Patent Office Affairs, 1973 AM. PAT. L. Ass'N BULL. 406, 407.
'Commenting upon the shortcomings of such a limited time for application analysis,
one authority has observed that:
It seems to be amply clear that if the present state of affairs is permitted to
continue unchecked, then one simply cannot look for improvement in the
validity of patents which are issued by the Patent Office.
Weissman, An Editorial Comment on Patent Invalidity, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 282, 283
(1973).
"'Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). The following quotations from two
Supreme Court cases emphasize the inconsistent interpretation of "inventiveness" by the
Patent Office:
A patent . . . simply represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent
Office. Moreover, the legal conclusion is predicated on factors as to which
reasonable men can differ widely.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
To be honest, this Court is rather amazed to find a patent as flimsy and as
spurious as this one has been granted by the Patent Office. Clearly, the
Patent Office is still not applying the strict constitutional standard required
in all patent cases.
Ken Wire & Metal Prods. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 338 F. Supp. 624, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). However, over the past few years
the Patent Office has been engaged in improving these conditions. In 1972, 103,000 patent
applications were filed. The backlog for that year was 200,000, the lowest in 20 years. The
turnaround time for the average patent is now 24 months, the shortest in 50 years. Gottschalk, The Patent Office Today . . . Alive and Well and Looking Ahead, 1973 AM. PAT.
L. Ass'N BULL. 259, 262.
"This figure was reported from one study of 669 reported cases from the circuit courts
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Typical of the harms to the public caused by such invalid
patents are the elimination of free competition, " the restraint of
trade, 4 the repression of knowledge, 5 and higher prices for consumers. " Similar harms to the public were encountered in 17th
century England when corrupt officers of the King issued invalid
monopoly grants. Such abuses led to the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies by Parliament. 7 Similarly, Congress in the late
of appeal and the Court of Claims during the period from 1961 to 1970. Horn & Epstein,
The Federal Courts' View of Patents-A Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 134, 139,
146 (1973). An earlier study (1948-54) based on 429 patent cases found 62.7 percent were
held invalid by the United States Court of Appeals. Ladd, Business Aggression Under the
Patent System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 353, 353-54 n.4 (1959).
"'Kidwell, Patent-Right Interchange and Antitrust Policy: Defining the Interface, 43
U. COLO. L. REV. 373 (1972). Kidwell presents an analysis of the techniques used by
holders of invalid patents to work the patent monopoly to their advantage. Kidwell begins
with an example which illustrates the flavor of patent abuses:
An interesting example of such behavior is set forth in United States v.
Vehicular Parking, Ltd. One of the defendants in that case, prior to the
creation of the patent pool, had written a letter which said in part:
The parking meter business is new and seems to offer ample opportunity for profit. From my study of the Patent aspects it seems that
very little has been done to create a Patent monopoly.
The letter went on to suggest the pooling of certain specified patents to
accomplish the monopoly. In a later letter he informed the other defendants
that the "Doyle Patent" contained the broadest claims:
These claims are not such, however, as should be put into litigation
because I am afraid they might be invalidated by certain prior art.
At present they are accorded a prima facie validity which could be
used to advantage in discouraging competition.
And in this instance the weak patents plus threats of litigation were used
successfully to establish price maintenance and other anticompetitive practices within the industry under the umbrella of a patent pool.
Id. at 369 (footnote omitted).
"See, e.g., Keating, The Patent Monopoly Versus Antitrust Activism: Open Warfare
or Armed Truce?, 77 DICK. L. REV. 1. 9 (1972).
For the evidence is strong that our system tends to frustrate invention and
tie up technology so the public can not benefit from it.
119 CONG. REC. S5378 (1973) (remarks of Senator Hart). See also Chope, Conflicts Between Patents and the Antitrust Laws, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 819, 821 (1967).
"Since the owner of a patent has a monopoly, his prices tend to be higher due to the
lack of competition.
This illegal monopoly exaction from the public can often be of great magnitude, as witnessed by the invalid tetracycline antibiotic patent issued as a
result of fraud on the Patent Office. One witness estimated that the $100
million plus damage settlement offered by the tetracycline offenders represents only 10 cents on the dollar of the damage done to the public. . . . That
$100 million alone-the minimum damage caused the public by just one
invalid patent-is nearly double the annual appropriation of the U.S. Patent
Office.
119 CONG. REC. H2866 (1973) (remarks of Representative Owens).
'7D. FALCONER, W. ALDOUS & D. YOUNG, TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS 3 (1971)
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19th century also legislated against many abuses caused by monopolies," but constitutionally-authorized patent monopolies
have escaped much of the corrective legislation."'
The armor of patent monopolies is being pierced by the judiciary in allowing greater leeway to attack patent validity in antitrust proceedings, in infringement actions by patentees, in licensee cross-actions in defense of royalty claims, and so forth. "' In so
doing, the courts have relied heavily on a developing body of law
based on concepts of public policy. Such protection of the public
arguments appear to be the result of a judicial revitalization of
the old common law remedies originally adopted in response to
monopoly abuses during the Elizabethan Era.
After examining the common law basis of the patent system
and demonstrating that the evolution of the present patent system has involved a departure from and reunification of the patent
system with common law, this note will present authority and
support for the proposition that the government should have the
capability, as a roving advocate for the public, to challenge patent validity."
I.

COMMON LAW HERITAGE

The practical beginnings of the patent system occurred during the 16th century reign of Queen Elizabeth I with the issuance
of letters-patent and letters-patentfor inventions by the Crown.22
In order to encourage the creation and growth of new industries
the Crown issued legal monopolies authorized by letters-patent.2
[hereinafter cited as TERRELLI.
"For the relationships between antitrust and patent law see W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND
ANTITRUST LAW (1973); G. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (1942); R. NORDHAUS
& E. JUROW, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW (1961); Feuer, The Patent Monopoly and the AntiTrust Laws, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1938); Ladd, Business Aggression Under the Patent
System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 353 (1959).
"'Note, Invalid Patents: Removing Statutor, Protection From Improperly Granted
Monopolies. 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 247, 248 (1970).
""Id. at 247-78.
2
'Others who have advocated this approach are 2 W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 725, at 471 (1890) Ihereinafter cited as W. ROBINSON]; Feuer,
The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1176 (1938);
Note, Revocation of a Patent by Government Suit, 48 YALE L.J. 1095 (1939).
2
"TERRELL, supra note 17, at 2.
ILietters patent, that is, open letters, literae patentes: so called because
they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the great seal pendant
at the bottom; and are usually directed or addressed by the king to all his
subjects at large.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 346 (Christain ed. 1822). Practically, the holder of a

PATENT VALIDITY

Thus activities such as the importation of tea, the manufacture
of soap, and the sale of playing cards were granted as monopolies
to select individuals. The first adjudication of a letters-patent
was the Case of Monopolies2 wherein the King's Bench held that
a grant by the Crown was invalid if:
1. it prevented a craftsman from carrying on his trade;
2. it raised the price of a commodity; or
3. the Crown was deceived or mistaken in granting the patent.
Soon thereafter, the first case concerning the legality of a
letters-patentfor invention, the Clothworkers of Ipswich Case, 'held that patents for inventions were a special monopoly not
subject to restrictions of other patents provided that they were
not contrary to law or harmful to trade or to the state. Thus the
letters-patentfor inventions became a different type of monopoly
with fewer common law restrictions than the standard letterspatent monopoly.
At common law, three methods were available for challenging the validity of letters-patent for inventions, and all were
based on the writ of scire facias:25
(1) When the King by his letters-patent has by different patents
granted the same thing to several persons, the first patentee shall
have a scire facias to repeal the second; (2) When the King has
granted a thing by false suggestion, he may by scire facias repeal his
own grant; (3) When he has granted that which by law he cannot
grant, he jure regis, and for the advancement of justice and right,
2 7
may have a scire facias to repeal his own letters-patent.

In 1623 the issuance of letters-patent by corrupt officials
caused the King to invoke his in terrorem powers and to summarily repeal 20 patents.2 8 Many remaining letters-patent were also
letters-patent acquired a crown-authorized monopoly on a certain industry or enterprise.
The letters-patent was notice to the world of this privilege.
"Darcy v. Allen, 1 Web. Pat. Cases 1, Noy 173, Moore K.B. 671, 11 Co. Rep. 84b

(1602).
2

Godbolt 252; 1 Abb. Pat. Cases 6 (1615).
2 A judicial writ, founded upon some matter of record, such as a judgment
or recognizance and requiring the person against whom it is brought to show
cause why the party bringing it should not have advantage of such record,
or (in the case of a scirefacias to repeal letters patent) why the record should
not be annulled and vacated.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (4th ed. 1968).
" 7Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 439 (1872), citing 4 Coke's Inst. 88, Dyer
197-98, 276, 279.
'TERRELL 3; see also Note, supra note 21, at 1097-98, where it is observed that:
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attacked in the courts where the King as parens patriae
challenged their validity.29 Also in 1623 Parliament passed the
Statute of Monopolies" which, based on the principles expressed
in the Magna Carta, 3 ' further restricted monopolies. Letterspatent for inventions, otherwise excepted from these restrictions,
were nevertheless subject to the important proviso that:
they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by
raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally
inconvenient. 2

In summary, letters-patent were monopolies granted by the
Crown to foster industrial development, and the rights and remedies of such monopolies, for the most part, developed at common
law. Special restrictions, however, were statutorily imposed by
Parliament (as witnessed by the Statute of Monopolies) when
abuses became intolerable. On the other hand, letters-patentfor
inventions were early recognized as a unique monopoly essential

for industrial progress and were not subject to the same restrictions as letters-patent. It is important to note, however, that
letters-patent for inventions were not allowed to restrain trade,

raise prices, nor harm the public. This philosophy concerning
The power of the crown to repeal its grants summarily without judicial
proceedings, hanging in terrorem over the owners of early English patents,
served as a deterrent to flagrant abuse.
"Note, supra note 21, at 1098. See also Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1874):
It may be considered as settled that so much of the royal prerogatives as
belonged to the King in his capacity of parens patriae,or universal trustee,
enters as much into our political state as it does into the principles of the
British constitution.
"'21 Jac. 1, ch. 3 (1623).

The Statute of Monopolies created no new right either in the Crown or the
people; it was simply declaratory of the common law enacted into statute
law . . . and reiterated those principles of the Magna Carta . . . which
declared that the liberties of his subjects shall not be infringed or broken by
royal usurpation ....
I A.W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS 34 (2d ed. 1964).
And we have granted unto them, on the other part, that neither we nor our
heirs shall procure or do anything whereby the liberties in this charter contained shall be infringed or broken; and if anything be procured by any
person contrary to the premises it shall be had of no force nor effect.
Magna Carta, 9 Henry 3, ch. 37 (1225) (emphasis added).
"Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 3, 6 (1623). See also United States v. Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 330-31 (1948) (dissenting opinion), where it is observed that:
That Section [section 61 has become the foundation of the patent law securing exclusive rights to inventors not only in Great Britain but throughout the
world.
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harm to the public continued in the United States until the early
1800's.:*
Abuses caused by the English letters-patentmonopolies were
strongly detested in America. The American Revolution was precipitated at least in part by popular resentment of the East India
Company's monopoly on tea." The Madison-Pinckney proposals
for the adoption of the concept of letters-patentfor inventions,'
however, were readily received as necessary for the encouragement of industry and for the benefit of the public good. :"
The framers of the Constitution, in tune with the feelings of
the general population, avoided the words "patent" and "monopoly" in the final draft, although the words were present in earlier
drafts. 7 Article I, section 8 of the Constitution nevertheless established a legal monopoly for patent holders by granting Congress
the power:
[tfo promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by Securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

The patent clause thereby empowered Congress to bestow complete, constitutional monopolies on inventors."
Under the power granted by the patent clause, Congress
passed the Letters-Patent Act of 179031 (hereinafter- referred to as

the 1790 Act) which was a codification of the doctrines espoused
in the British common law decisions.' The argument that the
American patent system is solely of statutory fiat is weak, since
the origin of the American patent system as embodied in the 1790
Act was a reformulation of common law tradition.
One deviation of the 1790 Act from common law, however,
was section 5," which provided that any citizen could, upon mo"'See text accompanying note 48 infra.
'1G. FOLK, supra note 18, at 117.
:THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (A. Hamilton);

see

1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 496 (1866).
'Note, supra note 21, at 1097.
: It was doubtless to this knowledge of the common law and statuteable
rights of authors and inventors [referring to the Statute of Monopolies],
that we are to attribute this constitutional provision.

3 J.STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §

1147 (1933).

:"1Stat. 109.
"'W. ROBINSON § 725, at 470; see Cullen & Vickers, Fraud in the Procurement of a
Patent, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 110, 111 (1969).
i That upon oath or affirmation made before the judge of the district court,
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tion, prompt a district court judge to compel a patentee to show
cause why his fraudulently obtained patent should not be revoked.' 2 Apparently, this provision was passed in the democratic
fervor of the times. In England such power rested in the Crown
under the writ of scire facias, but the Congress of 1790 placed that
power in the free and independent citizenry. The 1790 Act was
subsequently revised twice, but the essence of section 5 was
maintained.'
Patent adjudications under these acts were argued with constant reference to the then maturing English patent law. Chief
Justice Marshall in 1818 published a treatise,44 as an appendix to
a case, . which summarized both the English common law and
the Letters-Patent Act of 1800 and noted American law's heavy
reliance on English developments. In 1813 Circuit Court Judge
Story concluded that American patent law was the same as English common law." Eleven years later in Ex parte Wood,' Justice
Story, then on the Supreme Court, wrestled with the deviation
of section 5 from common law and held that the wording of section 5 was in the nature of scire facias.
Justice Story was concerned in Ex parte Wood about the
where the defendant resides, that any patent which shall be issued in pursuance of this act, was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon, false suggestion,
and motion made to the said court, within one year after issuing said patent,
but not afterwards, it shall and may be lawful to and for the judge of said
district court, if the matter alleged shall appear to him to be sufficient, to
grant a rule that the patentee . . show cause why process should not issue
against him . . .to repeal such patents; and if sufficient cause shall not be
shown to the contrary, . . . the said judge shall order process to be issued
. .. .And in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary ....
judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patents; and
if the party at whose complaint the process issued, shall have judgment given
against him, he shall pay all such costs as the defendant shall be put to in
defending the suit, to be taxed by the court, and recovered in such manner
as costs expended by defendants, shall be recovered in due course of law.
Patent Act of 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 109.
' 2In the 1790-1820 time frame it was economically feasible for a citizen to act as a
private attorney general. But see note 50 and accompanying text infra for today's
conditions.
'The first revision was in 1793 where section 5 became section 10. 1 Stat. 318. The
second revision was in 1800 with no change to section 10. 2 Stat. 80.
"See note 81 infra.
'Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 519 (1818).
'129 F. Cas. 1120, 1122 (No. 17,600) (C.C. Mass. 1813).
'p22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 610 (1824):
On the other hand, if the process was to be in the nature of a scire facias, all
the words [of section 51 are sensible and operative, and describe the proper
progress and proceedings upon such a writ.
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protection of the public and the harm caused by invalid patents.
He reasoned that if a citizen did not challenge a patent via an
action based on section 5 (which had a 3-year limitation) that
"still, the public have a perfect security"4 in that anyone could
violate the patent with impunity and, when sued for the violation, he could then show the patent to be invalid under the common law infringement defense action. Story confidently stated
that the public was totally protected from patent abuses:
Many patents, under this section, have already, in such suits, been
adjudged void; so that the danger of extensive imposition or injury
is wholly chimerical.49

Perhaps Justice Story's full protection philosophy with its
reliance on infringement proceedings is chimerical when compared to the 1968 cost of 50 thousand dollars'" to litigate a patent:
Because of the potential for having to defend a suit for patent infringement the mere issuance of even an invalid patent is often
sufficient to permit the holder to exclude competitors. . . .Thus
the advantages which flow to the holder of an invalid patent operate
to a very large extent to injure competitors and to restrain
trade. . . . [Tihe holders of invalid patents traditionally have
managed to escape the proscriptive reach of the law.'

Today, infringement proceedings primarily represent the struggle
between large corporations for patent control rather than any
concern for the protection of the public. Industrial power, patent
complexity, and litigation costs have rendered Story's protection
inadequate, although the object of his theorizing-public protection-certainly remains viable.
In summary, a paramount concern of English common law
and early American patent law was the protection of the public
from the evils of patent monopolies. One such evil was the issuance of invalid patents. Although American patent law is statutory in nature, the early court decisions relied on common law
Id. at 614.
d.

"'Hearingson S. 1042 before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Patent Law Revision, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at

616 (1968) (statement of Henry J.Cappello, President, Space Recovery Research Center,
Inc., and consultant on patent policy for the National Small Business Association). Judge
Frank observed in 1942 that "the expense of defending a patent suit is often staggering to
the small businessman." Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir. 1942).
"'Note, supra note 19, at 248. A thorough discussion of this problem appears in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 334
(1971).
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doctrines. Indeed, Justice Story relied on the Statute of Monopolies (in the absence of specific authority in the 1800 Act) to render
a patent void when challenged in an infringement action:
If the public were already in possession and common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right
to anyone to monopolize that which was already common. There
would be no quid pro quo, no price for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the inventor ....
.1

In conclusion, a primary concern in the origin of the American patent system was protection of the public. The next section

discusses the denial of that protection.

II.

DENIAL OF COMMON LAW

In Wood v. Williams,": Story's concern for the protection of

the public through the combined coverage of section 5 and infringement litigation was reiterated. The issue in Wood, however,
was whether the United States could be brought in as a party

under section 5 to challenge the validity of any rights claimed or
denied under the patent laws. Wood held that, in view of Story's
reasoning, the matter was purely between citizens. This case subsequently became precedent for denying the right of the government to sue in patent validity actions.
In 1836, however, Congress revised the patent laws to encour-

age invention." The Patent Act of 1836 omitted section 5. Unfortunately, the committee reports and the various debates which
might have illuminated the legislative reasons for leaving out this
"Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829).
It has been observed that:
Since Pennock ... was decided in 1829 this court has consistently held that
the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes
for the owners of patents, but is to "promote the progress of science and the
useful arts."
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1917).
1130 F. Cas. 485, 486 (No. 17,968) (D.E.D. Pa. 1834):
On a careful review of the patent laws of the United States, I have found no
indication of an intention, that the United States are to be brought in as a
party to a litigation, respecting the validity of any rights claimed or denied
under those laws.
"The act of 1836 was evidently intended for the benefit of inventors, and was
the offspring of a public sentiment in their favor which increased rather than
diminished during the ensuing forty years. In less than three years afterward
the act of 1839 was passed, every other provision of which was marked by
the same liberal spirit toward inventors, and was manifestly designed for the
furtherance of their interests.
1 W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 357, at 506 n.2 (1890).
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major deviation from common law were never recorded. 5 The
effect of this omission was not determined until 1871, when
Mowry v. Whitney " held the omission to be an implied repeal by
Congress; that is, Congress thereby intended that a private citizen could no longer bring an action to repeal fraudulently obtained patents.
With respect to patent validity challenges in the courts, the
1836 Act has remained unchanged to date. The last statutory
enactment in 1952 incorporated no substantial or controversial
changes and hence was speedily enacted.57 In April 1965, President Johnson established the President's Commission on the Patent System and instructed it to conduct a comprehensive survey
and to recommend improvements." The President's Commission
subsequently made 35 recommendations59 for reform, and the
Senate finally reported a bill in October 1971 implementing 14 of
the proposed changes. 0 Although President Nixon in his March
1972 technology message called for a "strong and reliable patent
system,"" there has nevertheless been no congressional action on
the 1971 bill or subsequent reform.6"
Under the 1836 Act, the infringement proceeding provided
the only means whereby a patent could be repealed. With the
omission of section 5, therefore, Story's complete protectionof the
public logic failed and likewise the restriction of Wood failed.
Nonetheless, the precedent established by Wood that the government lacked the power to sue for patent repeal was upheld.63
With this background, District Judge Gasch in 1969 adamantly denied any authority in the government to challenge patent validity:
[1It would be impetuous for this Court to set about curing the ills
of both the patent system and the antitrust laws in a "wreck and
"Cullen & Vickers, supra note 40, at 112 n.12.
'181 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1872).
"Rich, Comm entary-ProposedPatent Reforms, 1967, 36 GEO.
(1967).
-,Exec. Order No. 11,215, 3 C.F.R. 123 (Supp. 1965).
"'REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM

WASH.

L. REV. 95, 96

5-8 (1966).

"'S.643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
"Owens, supra note 16, at H2866.

621d.
'United States v. Colgate, 21 F. 318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); United States v. Gunning,
18 F. 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); Attorney General ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works,
32 F. 608 (C.C.D.R.I. 1876); United States v. Frazer, 22 F. 106 (D.C.N.D. 11. 1884).
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rebuild" fashion by fertilizing a dormant power in the Department
of Justice to challenge patents collaterally for any reason."

Congressional legislation protecting the public from the evils
of invalid patents has been nonexistent since 1836. This absence
of reform, as will be discussed in the next section, has effected a
narrow return to common law by the judiciary, based on the right
of the government to challenge patents obtained by fraud.
III. RETURN TO COMMON LAW
The Supreme Court, in Field v. Seabury,"' anticipated in
dicta that the government had authority, whether or not expressly granted by Congress, to maintain suits to challenge patent validity. Fifteen years later Justice Miller, in Mowry v.
Whitney," also in dicta, found authority in the government to
attack an invalid patent under the same conditions for which a
writ of scire facias would have been issued at common law. After
reviewing the requirements for a scire facias, Miller stated:
The scire facias to repeal a patent was brought in chancery where
the patent was of record. And though in this country the writ of scire
facias is not used as a chancery proceeding, the nature of the chancery jurisdiction and its mode of proceeding have established it as
the appropriate tribunal for the annulling of a grant or patent from
the government."7

Justice Miller continued:
If, on the other hand, an individual finds himself injured, either
specially or as part of the general public, it is no hardship to require
him to satisfy the Attorney-General that the case is one in which the
government ought to interfere either directly by instituting the suit,
or indirectly by authorizing the use of its name, by which the
Attorney-General would retain such control of the matter as would
"United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 410 U.S.
52 (1973).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 323 (1856).

In England, a bill in equity lies to set aside letters patent obtained from the
King by fraud . . . .and it would in the United States; but it is a question
exclusively between the sovereignty making the grant and the grantee.
Id.at 332.
"81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1872).

"Id. at 440. Mowry relied on the following rationale:
Nor is fraud in the patentee the only ground upon which a bill will be
sustained. Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or by mistake, where
the officer has no authority in law to grant them . . . . In such cases courts
of law will pronounce them void.
United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1864).
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enable him to prevent oppression and abuse in the exercise of the
right to prosecute such a suit."

Mowry was decided, however, upon another issue, and the
sweeping dicta was ignored until United States v. American Bell
Telephone Co.',! (Bell 1), when Justice Miller gave final recognition to the idea that the government may sue for repeal of a
patent obtained by fraud:
That the government, is authorized both by the Constitution and
the statutes to bring suits at law and in equity . . . is so clear that
it needs no argument .... A

Later, in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.7 (Bell
//), Justice Fuller agreed:
In [Bell T1,it was decided that where a patent for a grant of any
kind issued by the United States has been obtained by fraud, by
mistake or by accident, a suit by the United States against the
patentee is the proper remedy for relief .... 7

Finally, in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.73 (Bell
III), Justice Brewer concurred:
[The government] has a standing in court either in the discharge
of its obligation to protect the public against a monopoly it has
wrongfully created, or simply because it owes a duty to other patentees to secure to them the full enjoyment of the rights which it has
conferred by its patents to them.7

Seabury, Mowry, and the Bell trilogy thereby revived one of
the common law scire facias remedies by recognizing that the
government may challenge the validity of a fraudulently procured
patent. Certainly the other scire facias remedies, with the government acting as parens patriae,should likewise be revived to challenge patents obtained by mistake or accident that caused harm
or injury to the public. The dicta in these cases are broad, with
much concern for the protection of the public, and therefore
should not be construed as permitting only one narrow remedy.
Other areas of law have recognized common law remedies,
especially for the protection of the public. In matters of statutory
construction, for example, the Supreme Court has stated:
"81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 441 (1872).
"128
U.S. 315 (1888).
7
"Id. at 370.

U.S. 548 (1895).
1d. at 555.

7'159

72

,'167 U.S. 224 (1897).
"Id. at 265-66.
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[W]here a statute creates a right and provides a particular remedy
for its enforcement, the remedy is generally exclusive of all commonlaw remedies.
. . . [These] are not rules for the conduct of the State. It is a
familiar principle that the King is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular
words. . . . It may be considered as settled that so much of the
royal prerogatives as belonged to the King in his capacity of parens
patriae, or universal trustee, enters as much into our political
state. ..... 1

The Supreme Court has also held that when statutory crimes are
silent as to elements, remedies, and defenses, the courts can resort to common law holdings. 6 In the area of government grants,
Chief Justice Marshall held that the only authority to challenge
a grant issued by the government resides in the government acting through the courts to ascertain the validity of the grant.77
In the area of land patents, 7 United States v. Beebe 71 recognized a duty of the government to institute judicial proceedings
to vacate invalid patents, and United States v. San Jacinto Tin
Co.81 placed this power in the United States based on a direct
derivation from English common law (citing Mowry).
Yet in spite of these Supreme Court decisions recognizing the
government's common law remedies for the protection of the public, the right of the government to challenge patent validity, except for fraud on the Patent Office, has not been recognized by
the courts. Such reasoning, while admitting a common law heritage, 8 ignores the rights of the public to be protected from the
abuses of invalid patents.
IV. MODERN PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS
During the late 19th century, abuses from industrial monopolies became intolerable and Congress enacted corrective legisla"Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 238-39 (1873).
7'Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
7"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 698 (1819).
7

1Cases on land patents and patents for inventions often considered their common
basis in the government grant. See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224,
239 (1897); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364 (1888); Mahn v.
Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884).
7.127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888).
"1125 U.S. 273, 281 (1888).
1 The Patent Acts of the United States are in a great degree, founded on
principles and usages which have grown out of the English Statute on the
same subject.
Marshall, On the Patent Laws, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 519 (1818).
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tion in the form of the Sherman Antitrust Act." Primarily
founded on the theory that a patent is a constitutionally protected monopoly, intricate relationships developed between patent and antitrust law. 3 For purposes of this note, it is important
to recognize that the Justice Department has the authority to
challenge those who restrain trade, monopolize the marketplace,
and repress free competition. 4 These practices are similar to
those which the King, as parens patriae, sought to eliminate at
common law. 5 The holder of a patent monopoly, however, has
generally escaped the corrective reach of antitrust law and, ironically, under the evolution of the patent system such abuses,
harms, and injuries are protected even when the government invalidly grants them."8
The courts have recently wrestled with this incongruity of
logic as is witnessed in the following public policy decisions on
patent validity. The trend of the rulings is to increase the means
for attacking patent validity. Kendall v. Winsor, 7 in 1858, foreshadowed the modern public policy philosophy:
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly
granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or
advantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was
another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing
that monopoly.... The rights and interests, whether of the public
or of individuals, can never be made to yield to schemes of selfishness or cupidity ....
"

Justice Fuller in Bell H also demonstrated a precognition for the
current public policy philosophy:
In instituting this suit, the government appeared on behalf of the
public, and, as it were, in the exercise of the beneficent function of
superintending authority over the public interests, and the rule of
construction in such cases is properly regarded as affected by considerations of public policy."

In the past 40 years, many cases have made public policy
arguments a part of viable patent law. In Sola Electric Co. v.
215

"A.

U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS ANTITRUST LAWS §§

Keating, supra note 14.
"15 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
"See text accompanying notes 29 and 32 supra.
"See text accompanying note 51 supra.
762 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858).
"Id. at 327-28 (emphasis added).
"United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548, 554 (1895).

141-61 (1972);
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Jefferson Electric Co.,90 where the licensee in an antitrust action
attacked the validity of the patent under which he was licensed,
the Court held the attack valid based on the interest of the public
in free competition, even though the licensee had agreed not to
sue. In another antitrust action, United States v. United States
Gypsum Co.," the government was held to have the power to
attack the validity of patents when the patents were used as a
defense (i.e., patent monopolies are constitutionally-authorized
monopolies) to charges of antitrust violations.
The breakthroughs of Sola and Gypsum were solidified in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co."2 Sears involved an infringement action, brought by the holder of an invalid design patent,
against Sears, Roebuck & Company for its marketing of an
identical product at a retail price equal to the patentee's wholesale price. In finding the patent invalid, the court noted:
[Siharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent ....
is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise
of which a consuming public is deeply interested."

Later, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins94 posed the problem of whether,
in a suit by the patentee for nonpayment of royalties, the licensee
was estopped from challenging the validity of a patent under
which he was licensed. The Court held in favor of the patent
validity challenge, observing:
[Slurely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when
they are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality
a part of the public domain. "

Similarly, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of
9" the Court held that in certain cases when
Illinois Foundation,
a
patent has been found invalid in a prior judgment, the patentee
is estopped from pleading validity in a subsequent action.
These Supreme Court decisions have generated considerable
comment by those concerned with the impact of such radical
public policy decisions on the hitherto preeminent doctrine that
'1317 U.S. 173 (1942); accord, MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S.
402 (1947); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
"1333 U.S. 364 (1948).
"2376 U.S. 225 (1964).
"Id. at 231, citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).

"1395 U.S. 653 (1969).
"Id. at 670.
"402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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once issued, a patent is valid and untouchable."7 Although these
rulings are aligned with common law dictates, they represent
case-by-case adjudications in separate branches of the patent law
field: infringement actions (Sears); antitrust suits (Gypsum); and
licensee defenses (Sola and Lear). A return to the common law
interest in protecting the public, however, is the apparent trend
in recent cases.
Recently a controversial decision of the Supreme Court further emphasized this return. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd."
has been accused of "sending shock waves through the fields of
patent and antitrust law."" Glaxo held that the government in
an antitrust action has the power to attack patent validity as a
collateral issue whether or not the patentee raises the patent as
a defense. The patent must, however, be shown to have a nexus"'°
with the antitrust action. The Court, after reviewing Bell I, Pope,
Gypsum, Sola, Lear, and Blonder-Tongue, held:
We think that the principle of these cases is sufficient authority for
permitting the Government to raise and litigate the validity of the
. . .patents in this antitrust case.101

The dissent, however, concluded that:
the sort of roving commission that the majority now authorizes
whereby the Government may request a court to invalidate any
patent owned by an antitrust defendant that in any way related to
the factual background of the claimed antitrust violation cannot be
regarded as a reasonably necessary extension of any of these princi0 2
ples.'

The protection of the public from invalid patent monopolies
and abuses by direct government challenges existed and was encouraged at common law. Unfortunately, the majority in Glaxo
denied full application of the common law heritage by their chary
holding:
[Wie do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to
attack a patent by basing an antitrust claim on the simple assertion
that the patent is invalid . .

.

. [nior do we invest the Attorney

note 2 supra.
"410 U.S. 52 (1973).
"BNA PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., No. 112, A-1 (Jan. 25, 1973).
"""In this context, where the court would necessarily be dealing with the future
enforceability of the patents .... " 410 U.S. at 59. A good discussion of the Glaxo nexus
is found in Comment, The Governmental Challenge to Patent Validity After United
States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 50 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 145 (1973).
:7See

"1410 U.S. at 58.
'"'ld. at 69.
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General with a roving commission to question the validity of any
113
patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case.

Thus, instead of solidifying a return to a common law basis,
the Court in Glaxo merely added another exception as to when a
patent can be challenged for validity. History, logic, and a social
concept of the public good dictate that the government has not
only the power, but the duty to challenge invalid patents to the
same extent that the owner of a truly valid patent has the common law and constitutional rights to a monopoly.
If the remedies of common law were to be revived by the
Supreme Court to correct the abuses of invalid patents, would
they be utilized by the government? The Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department believes that they would:
We also believe that attacks on invalid patents will have a beneficial
effect on the quality of patents generally . . . . and thereby provide
additional protection to the public against the burden of invalid
patents. Therefore, where we believe the invalidity of a patent to be
clear, we will not hesitate to attack it. And, of course, where we
believe a patent has been procured by fraud, we will bring suit to
cancel the patent grant.'0

The practicality of the Justice Department challenging patent validity not only in antitrust violations but also in a selfstarting role on behalf of the public will be open to debate. Certainly some members of the judiciary 05' feel that the current Patent Office structure, with its 64 percent invalidity rate, is harmful
to the public and injurious to commerce. Yet reform of the Patent
Office by Congress appears to be only a remote possibility.'' The
answer lies in vesting in the Justice Department the common law
right to challenge the government's own grant of a patent monopoly.
" Id. at 59.
"'McLaren, Patent Licenses and Antitrust Considerations, 13 IDEA 61, 66 (1969).

(Richard McLaren was Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division when he
delivered this speech to the Thirteenth Annual Public Conference of the PTC Research
Institute held June 5, 1969, at George Washington University. Mr. McLaren is now a
United States District Judge.)
"The patent involved in the present case belongs to this list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has spawned. The fact that a patent as
flimsy and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the way to this Court
to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system
frequently departs from the constitutional standards which are supposed to
govern.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 158 (1950) (Mr.
Justice Douglas, concurring).
'Owens, supra note 16, at H2869.

PATENT VALIDITY
CONCLUSION

A patent is a constitutional grant of a monopoly for a limited
time after which the invention is freely available for public use
and competition; it is not a creature of the Congress or of the
Patent Office. Invalid patents, when obtained by fraud, mistake,
or accident of the Patent Office, work injury and harm on the
public through the restraint of free trade and competition and the
creation of higher prices for consumer goods.
The patent is constitutionally bargained for. The public
reaps the benefits of new ideas and inventions, but endures the
detriment of the anticompetitive harm of a monopoly. The inventor receives the award of a market monopoly for his creativeness,
but he suffers the detriment of making full public disclosure of
his secrets.
When a monopoly is granted for an invalid patent, the consideration of the bargain fails and the public becomes the injured
party. The government, as grantor of the patent, has an obligation to challenge invalid patents on behalf of the public. Such
public rights have been ignored until recently when patent monopoly abuses, resembling those which led in part to the liberation of the United States from England, became intolerable to the
Supreme Court. While the trend of these decisions is to increase
patent validity attacks based on public policy reasons, the weapons are few and narrowly construed.
A uniform approach, recognizing the government's role as a
roving public advocate to challenge invalid patents, is clearly
grounded in common law and is the logical extension of the present public policy decisions. A return to common law is necessary
since, in the government's grant to the inventor, the public is
clearly the third party.
Robert C. Dorr

NOTE
REAL PROPERTY-THE COLORADO RECORDING ACT:
Race-Notice or Pure Notice?
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-6-9
INTRODUCTION

Every state currently has in force a statute providing for the
recording of deeds and other instruments affecting the title to
land.' Such laws are designed at least in part to determine the
priority of competing claims to interests in real property.2 Problems typically arise when a landowner makes successive conveyances of land to third parties, each of whom then claims title.'
At common law, as between successive conveyees of an interest in land, priority of title was determined by the priority in time
of the conveyances. The rationale was that once a grantor had
conveyed an interest in land to a grantee, he no longer had that
interest to convey to any subsequent grantee. 4 The recording acts
for the most part replace the common law rule with statutory
schemes specifying the priorities in cases of successive conveyances of the sane interest in land. These acts are generally classified into any of three basic types-pure race, pure notice, or racenotice-depending upon the criteria used to determine the priority of competing title claims under a particular statute.
The Colorado recording act provides that:
no such instrument or document [affecting the title to real property] shall be valid as against any class of persons with any kind of
rights, except between the parties thereto, and such as have notice
thereof, until the same shall be deposited with such recorder.5

This statute was labeled race-notice by the Colorado Supreme
Court in the 1968 case of Eastwood v. Shedd.' Two years later,
in Plew v. Colorado Lumber Products,7 the Court of Appeals ap11R.

PATTON

&

C.

PAr-rON.

LAND TITLES

15 (2d

ed.

1957)

[hereinafter cited as

PAT"ON I.
"1d. at 15, 16.

:'For the sake of simplicity, this paper discusses the problem in terms of successive
conveyances of the same land by the same grantor.
'Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 Mici. L. REv. 405, 406 (1924).
'Coi.o. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-6-9 (1963).
'166 Colo. 136, 139, 442 P.2d 423, 425 (1968).
728 Colo. App. 557, 481 P.2d 127 (1970).
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parently followed suit.
This comment discusses the Colorado statute in light of the
distinction between a pure notice and a race-notice construction
of the statute. Two propositions are advanced. First, the classification of the Colorado act as race-notice was not necessary in
either Eastwood or Plew, as the same result would have been
reached in both cases under either a pure notice or a race-notice
construction of the statute. Second, given the conclusion that it
would not affect the rights of the parties in those two cases, an
interpretation of the Colorado act as one of the pure notice variety
is urged.
I.

THE NOTICE/RACE-NOTIcE DISTINCTION

Pure Notice Acts
The central feature of pure notice statutes is the protection
of subsequent claimants who have no notice of prior claims. In the
early case of Steele's Lessee v. Spencer,8 the United States Supreme Court said of such a statute:
A.

The . . .deed not being recorded, the statute avoids it in terms as
against all subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice, whether their titles be recorded or not . . . .A deed not

being recorded, avoids it as against subsequent, but not as prior
9

purchasers.

Thus, the two main features of a pure notice act emerge:
first, for a subsequent purchaser to prevail over a prior unrecorded interest he must qualify as a good faith purchaser for value
without notice; 0 and second, for an owner of an interest in land
to prevail over later purchasers, he must record his interest before
the acquisition of the later conflicting interest." Under a pure
notice system, a grantee without notice need not worry about
having his interest defeated by the subsequent recordation of a
prior grant. His interest may, however, be defeated by a
subsequent grant by his grantor to another grantee without
notice.
Pure notice acts appear to exist in about half of the states."
126 U.S. (1 Pet.) 552 (1828).
Oid. at 560 (emphasis added).

"'Note that under the Colorado act, lack of notice is the only qualification for the later
grantees; nothing is said about valuable consideration. In Eastwood v. Shedd, 166 Colo.
136, 442 P.2d 423 (1968), the court in a liberal interpretation of the act extended its
protection to donees of land.
"PATrON, supra note 1, at 39 (Supp. 1973).
1"4AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 545 n.63 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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The general wording of this type of act is exemplified by the
Massachusetts act, which provides that "a conveyance . . . shall
not be valid as against any person, except the grantor or lessor,
his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice of it,
unless it . . .is recorded ...
B.

Race-Notice Acts
A race-notice statute combines the requirement that the
later claimant be without notice with the requirement that he
also secure priority of record. These acts may be treated conceptually as "notice-plus" acts. The subsequent purchaser for value
without notice will be protected against earlier unrecorded interests only if he in addition places his conveyance of record before
the earlier conveyances are recorded. 4
The typical wording of race-notice acts is found in the California statute, which provides:
Every grant of an estate in real property is conclusive against the
grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him,
except a purchaser or incumbrancer who in good faith and for a
valuable consideration acquires a title or lien by an instrument that
is first duly recorded.1

C.

The PracticalEffect of the Distinction
The distinction between the pure notice and race-notice acts
is highlighted by the following hypothetical. Assume 0, the owner
of Blackacre, conveys it to S, the senior grantee, and subsequently conveys it again to J, the junior grantee, who has no
knowledge of the earlier grant to S. After the conveyance by 0 to
J, S records his grant. Still later, J records his deed. As between
S and J, who owns Blackacre?
Under a pure notice system, J owns Blackacre, since he
bought without notice of the earlier unrecorded grant to S, and
he is protected against such unrecorded grants. The fact that S
thereafter beat J in the race to the county courthouse makes no
difference, as long as J had no notice of S's claim. 6
However, with a race-notice system, S owns Blackacre. He
183, § 4 (1958);
supra note 1, at 43.

'"MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
"PATrON,
1'CAL.

PATTON, supra

note 1, § 9.

CIv. COnE § 1107 (West 1954) (emphasis added). See B. WEBB, A TREATISE ON

RECORD OF TITLE § 13 (1890). See also the recording acts of Alaska, Hawaii,
Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, and New York for more examples of similarly worded acts.
"PATTON, supra note 1, at 39 (Supp. 1971).
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has no notice of prior unrecorded claims (J's claim is subsequent), and he secured priority of record by recording before J
did.
Thus, the essential distinction between pure notice and racenotice acts is that under the former the dispute is decided solely
on the basis of whether the second claimant paid value and had
no notice of the earlier claim, while under the latter the priority
of title is decided by the order in which the conflicting instruments are filed for record, with the race limited to the first purchaser and a subsequent grantee who must qualify as a purchaser
for value without notice. 7
However, it should be noted that such a case appears to be
atypical. By far the more common pattern is that in which the
junior grantee secures priority of record. In these cases, 0 conveys
Blackacre to S, and then conveys it again to J, who records his
grant. Later (generally upon hearing of 's claim), S records the
deed evidencing his claim. In such a case, under a pure notice
recording system, J, being the subsequent or junior grantee and
being without notice of S's claim, would prevail. However, contrary to the first hypothetical discussed, in this case the same
result would be reached under a race-notice act. The reason for
this is that J, being (1) a subsequent purchaser without notice
who (2) first recorded, is precisely the sort of person against whom
the statute voids S's instrument.
Courts, even in pure notice jurisdictions, tend to blur the
theoretical notice/race-notice distinction by couching their holding for J in the second hypothetical in terms of his securing priority of record. Such appears to be the case in the Colorado cases
of Eastwood v. Shedd'" and Plew v. Colorado Lumber Products.9
D.

Eastwood and Plew
Eastwood v. Shedd, decided by the Colorado Supreme Court
in 1968, was the first case to label the current Colorado statute
race-notice. In this case the grantor had deeded the property by
warranty deed to the defendant in December 1958. Subsequently,
in October 1963, the grantor deeded the same property to the
plaintiff, who recorded her deed 8 days later. Then, almost a year
later, the defendant-senior grantee recorded her deed. Both trans"7Id. at 100.
"1166 Colo. 136, 442 P.2d 423 (1968).
"28 Colo. App. 557, 481 P.2d 127 (1970).
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fers were gratuitous, and the plaintiff had no knowledge of the
earlier grant until it was recorded a year after the plaintiff received and recorded her grant. The issue was whether a donee of
real property was entitled to the protection of the recording act.
The court answered in the affirmative on the basis of the broad
language of the statute ("as against any class of persons with any
kind of rights").2 "
Then the court proceeded to label the Colorado statute
"race-notice," presumably as part of its holding for the plaintiff."
However, under a pure notice interpretation the plaintiff as junior
grantee would have prevailed by virtue of having been without
notice of the defendant's earlier claim (as in the second hypothetical above). Thus, the same result would have been reached had
the court chosen to rely solely on the fact that the plaintiff was
the junior grantee without notice as was reached by casting the
outcome in terms of plaintiff's priority of record.
In Plew, the times of acquisition and recording were relatively the same. The owner granted timber rights to the defendant in the years 1955, 1957, and 1958, but these agreements were
never recorded. Subsequently, in September 1965, the owner executed a contract for the sale of the entire property to the plaintiff.
This contract was recorded within 2 months. When the plaintiff
brought this action by virtue of its claim under the contract of
purchase, the issues centered on two points. The first was whether
the contract of sale was entitled to be recorded under the
Colorado statute. The second issue was whether the fact that the
plaintiff received notice of the earlier claim before the conveyance
was actually made (but after the contract was entered into and
recorded) prevented his being without notice under the statute.
The court of appeals answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative, again relying on the breadth
and scope of the Colorado act.
However, following Eastwood, the court then went on to cast
its holding (that the plaintiff-junior claimant had priority) in
terms of priority of record: "[B]ecause of the legal impact of our
recording act the unrecorded rights of Colorado Lumber Products
[defendant] were rendered legally invalid as against Plew
[plaintiff] when Plew recorded his contract of purchase. 2 2
='166 Colo. at 138, 442 P.2d at 425.
"'Id. at 139, 442 P.2d at 425.
28 Colo. App. at 563, 481 P.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
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This was unnecessary in view of the fact that the plaintiff,
Plew, being a junior grantee without notice, would prevail under
a pure notice theory regardless of any recordation. Thus, the Plew
case, as well as the Eastwood case, is of the same factual type as
the second hypothetical discussed above, so that the result would
be the same under a pure notice as under a race-notice interpretation of the act.
The result of Plew and Eastwood is that the Colorado courts,
by casting their holdings in terms of the junior claimant's priority
of record, have made what would appear on its face to be a pure
notice statute into a race-notice statute. Presumably, therefore,
in a case such as the first hypothetical above (where the senior
grantee recorded after the grant to the junior grantee but before
the latter recorded) the courts would hold in favor of the senior
grantee by virtue of his priority of record.23
The power of the courts to construe the Colorado statute
adding this requirement of recording and thereby effecting a
change in the theoretical type of recording act is not questioned
here. However, it is submitted that a change in interpretation
may be desirable in view of current Colorado law in related areas.
II.

THE EFFECT OF A RACE-NOTICE INTERPRETATION

A.

The Doctrine of Constructive Notice
Under both race-notice and pure notice recording acts, the
subsequent purchaser must be without notice of prior claims of
interests in the land in order to avail himself of the act's protection.2 Notice sufficient to make the protection of such acts unavailable to a purchaser may be either actual or constructive. Actual notice covers the cases where the purchaser had subjective
knowledge of prior claims, as would be the case if he had been
present when the earlier claim arose. Constructive notice, in the
broadest sense, is notice which is imputed by law to a person not
having actual notice.",
One basis for imputing notice under the doctrine of constructive notice centers on the recording acts. It has long been held in
Colorado as elsewhere that recording of deeds is notice to all the
world,2" or at least to all those bound to search for it," of the
"'No such case has been found under the current statute.
"See text accompanying note 13 supra.

"Stone v. Bartsch, 76 N.D. 721, 725, 39 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1949).
-"Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 236, 14 P.2d 187, 192 (1932); Neslin v. Wells, 104 U.S.
428. 433 (1881).

1974

COLORADO RECORDING ACT

interest claimed by the person recording. Furthermore, not only
do the records afford a means of giving notice, but a purchaser of
real estate is also bound to know what the record discloses concerning the title,2" and he may rely on it for protection against
outstanding claims of which he has no other notice.29
A race-notice act weakens the efficacy of the records as a
means of giving constructive notice by restricting the class of
persons entitled to rely on the records as notice of prior grants to
those who secure priority of record. For example, a prospective
buyer of Blackacre from the owner would (after tracing the title
to the owner) search the index from the date of grant to the owner
up until the present time in order to discover if the owner has
previously conveyed all or part of Blackacre. Finding nothing, the
purchaser buys Blackacre. Before he can record his conveyance
the grantee of an earlier unrecorded deed records. If the act is of
the pure notice variety, the buyer is protected, assuming that he
had no actual notice of the earlier conveyance. If the act is a racenotice one, however, the earlier grantee prevails. Leaving aside
for the moment the question of equities,3" it is clear that in the
latter case the records are no longer constructive notice to all the
world nor to all persons bound to search them. Instead, the records constitute constructive notice only to all persons bound to
search who also obtain priority of record. Thus, a race-notice act
places a condition upon the buyer's being able to rely on the
record as notice of previous conveyances by protecting him, if he
so relies, only if he obtains priority of record. However, as mentioned above, a pure notice act protects the buyer unconditionally
from claims by holders of prior unrecorded conveyances of which
he had no notice.
B.

The Equities of Each Type of Recording Statute
The preceding section demonstrated that under a pure notice
theory, the later grantee is protected against prior unrecorded
grants if he is without notice of them. However, under a racenotice theory, he is only protected if (1) he is without notice, and
(2) he also secures priority of record. It is submitted that the
'Carroll v. Kit Carson Land Co., 24 Colo. App. 217, 219-20, 133 P. 148, 149 (1913).
'Delta County Land & Cattle Co. v. Talcott, 17 Colo. App. 316, 321, 68 P. 985, 987
(1902).
"Bray v. Trower, 87 Colo. 240, 247, 286 P. 275, 278 (1930). See also Earle v. Fiske,
103 Mass. 491, 493-94 (1870).
:'See subsection B. infra.
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equities in such cases are best protected by a pure notice
interpretation.

In the typical case, as between the senior grantee and the
later or junior grantee, the equities are not equal. If the senior
grantee had recorded promptly upon receiving his grant, the records would have shown his claim, thereby preventing a subsequent purchaser from being without notice. Thus, where a controversy arises, it is due to the senior grantee's failure to record
promptly.:'
The Colorado courts have stated that "[w]here one of two
innocent parties must suffer loss because of the fraudulent act of
a third person, the law places the loss upon the one who put it in
the power of the third person to commit the fraud.""2 In the instant hypothetical situation, it was the failure of the first or senior
grantee to record which left a power in the grantor to commit a
fraud on an innocent third party by conveying the same interest
in land a second time. It would seem to be only just that he, and
not the innocent purchaser, bear the loss. The subsequent innocent purchaser's equity comes from being without notice in his
purchase, and it seems unfair that it could be defeated by the
subsequent recordation by an earlier grantee whose lack of diligence allowed the difficulty to occur.
The argument is made, however, that under a race-notice
system the condition imposed upon later purchasers (the requirement of priority of record) before they can rely on the records
provides an incentive for prompt recordation. Furthermore, it
could be said that a subsequent purchaser, whose rights were
defeated by the recordation of an earlier grant after the subsequent purchase, suffers only by virtue of his own failure to record
promptly.
These arguments overlook two aspects of pure notice as opposed to race-notice statutes. First, it is under a pure notice stat:"RE:s'rATEINT OF PROPERTY § 3 (1936). See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
LIgal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). In Hohfeldian
terms, the senior grantee's failure to record his claim leaves a power in the owner to again
convey the land to another and subjects him to the corresponding liability that the grantor
will exercise that power by conveying the land again.
-:Moorev. Ellison, 82 Colo. 478, 481, 261 P. 461, 462 (1927), cited with approval and
quoted in Bray v. Trower, 87 Colo. 240, 247, 286 P. 275, 278 (1930); Brown v. Driverless
Car Co.. 86 Colo. 216. 219, 280 P. 488, 490 (1929); Federal Acceptance Corp. v. Dillamn,

82 Colo. 598, 600, 262 P. 85, 86 (1927). See Greenless v. Chezik, 68 Colo. 521. 523, 190 P.
667. 668 (1920).
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ute that there is the greatest incentive to record promptly. This
is because a given purchaser's rights can be more quickly cut off
in a pure notice case, since a subsequent second conveyance by
the grantor to another party without notice cuts off the first grantee's rights. : Under a race-notice system, it is not the conveyance
to the second grantee that cuts off the nonrecording grantee's
rights; it is the recordation of the subsequent grant which does
so. Since recordation may occur no sooner than contemporaneously with the grant, and usually occurs a matter of days or
weeks thereafter, the senior claimant in a race-notice system may
regain his priority by recording at any time after the grant to the
second grantee and before the latter records. The following example is illustrative.
0 owns Blackacre and conveys it on Monday to S, the senior
grantee. On Tuesday, 0 conveys it again to J, the junior grantee.
On Thursday, J records.
Looking at the senior grantee, S, it is apparent that he must
record before Tuesday (the date of the subsequent grant) to prevail in a pure notice system. In a race-notice system, however, S
has until the time that J actually records (Thursday) in which to
perfect his title. Therefore, contrary to what the names of the
statutes seem to imply, for a given grantee to be protected against
subsequent grants it is more important that he record immediately in a pure notice system than in a race-notice system.
In addition, should the junior grantee fail to record immediately, he, too, begins to run an increasing risk that his claim may
be impaired by a subsequent conveyance. Thus under a pure
notice system a nonrecording grantee may also have to bear the
burden of his own neglect, but only as to subsequent grants. By
not recording his claim the junior grantee is placing it within the
power of the grantor to work another fraud, and the resulting loss
should fall upon him. But the same argument does not apply
where a junior grantee's claim is defeated by the subsequent recordation of a prior grant, since it is thereby possible for one who
has long slept on his rights to take away the claim of an innocent
later grantee who delayed only a few days in placing his grant of
record. If such were the case, the Colorado rule on priorities
among the competing equities of two or more innocent purchasers :" would be violated.
''See text accompanying note 8 supra.
"'Sce text accompanying note 32 supra.
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CASES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The foregoing sections have examined the Colorado courts'
construction of the Colorado recording act as race-notice. It has
been submitted that a pure notice interpretation of the act is to
be favored in view of the Colorado rule on priority in cases of
competing equities.
It should be remembered, however, that cases in which the
rights of the parties have turned on the notice/race-notice distinction are rare and that the courts of many states with supposedly
pure notice statutes have, like the Colorado courts, cast their
holdings for innocent junior grantees without notice who were also
prior on record in terms of the priority of record. However, in
those few cases where the rights of the parties have turned on the
distinction, states with statutes similar to the Colorado act appear to have applied the pure notice interpretation.
The Missouri recording statute is almost identical to the Colorado law and states that "[n]o such instrument . . .shall be
valid, except between the parties thereto, and such as have actual
notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the recorder
for record.""5 The Federal Circuit Court for Missouri in 1890 construed this statute as a pure notice one in a case with precisely
the fact pattern in which the notice/race-notice distinction becomes crucial." There G conveyed land to B and subsequently
conveyed the same land to H, after which B recorded his deed
first. In concluding that the Missouri recording act protected H
over B, regardless of the fact that B recorded first, the court noted
that in those states where priority of record must be obtained to
have superior title, their statutes clearly so express it by terms
such as "the unregistered conveyance shall be void against a subsequent bona fide purchaser whose conveyance is first
recorded."I'
The Texas recording statute provides:
All bargains, sales and other conveyances whatever, of any land...
and all deeds of trust and mortgages shall be void as to all creditors
and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, unless they shall be . . .filed with the clerk, to be recorded as

required by law."
"Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.400 (1959).
:'Miller v. Merine, 43 F. 261 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1890).
4

'11d. at 264 (emphasis added).
:"]'EX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (1960).
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In 1876 the Texas Supreme Court held, with regard to the recording statute then in effect (which is identical in operative language
to current Texas law), that the subsequent registration of a claim
or title would not destroy the rights of a bona fide purchaser or
creditor whose claim arose after the earlier claim arose but was
not recorded until after the subsequent recordation of the earlier
claim. :"' The court said:
[lit would be equally as absurd to say that the right acquired by
the creditor by his lien . . .when once secured, can be taken away
by subsequent record of such instrument levidencing a prior but
unrecorded granti ....

The Kentucky recording act states that "[n]o deed or deed
of trust or mortgage . . .shall be valid against a purchaser for
valuable consideration, without notice thereof . . . until such
deed or mortgage is . . .lodged for record."" Regarding this stat-

ute the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
This section has uniformly been held to be for the protection of
subsequent purchasers, and, where the first purchaser fails to record
his deed, if another person without notice thereof innocently purchases the land and accepts a deed therefore, the latter's title will
not be affected by the subsequent recording of the first deed, even
2
though prior in point of time.
CONCLUSION

The Colorado recording act is on its face very similar to the
bulk of the recording acts which have been termed pure notice,':'
and on its face it has no requirement of priority of record, as
seems to be the case in most race-notice acts. However, the leading cases in both the supreme court and the court of appeals
appear to have been decided on the basis of priority of record (as
well as lack of notice) on the part of the junior grantee. No Colorado case has been found under the current statute which depends for its outcome on the notice/race-notice distinction.
The power of the courts to require priority of record in
construing the Colorado statute is not doubted. However, it is
submitted that in a case which turns on the notice/race-notice
distinction, the courts should give careful scrutiny to the compet"Grace v. Wade, 45 Tex. 522 (1876).
"Id. at 527. See also Simpson v. Chapman, 45 Tex. 560 (1876).
"1K\'. REV. STA'r. ANN. § 382.270 (1969).
11Rouse v. Craig Realty Co., 203 Ky. 697, 699, 262 S.W. 1083, 1084 (1924).
"Indeed, at least two authorities have suggested that the Colorado act is pure notice.
I'AIroN. supra note 1. at 36; 4 AMEHICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 545 n.63 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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ing equities of the parties in light of the rule of letting the loss
fall oh that innocent party who put it within the power of the
grantor to commit the fraud of conveying the same property more
than once. Should such a case arise, it is urged that the courts
treat the recording act as being for the purpose of protecting
subsequent purchasers and that they accordingly adopt a pure
notice construction of the statute.
Charles G. Rogers

COMMENT
WATER LAW-WELL PERMITSUnappropriated Water and Maximum Utilization
Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1973).
INTRODUCTION

In an early Colorado case Justice Helm explained the consequences of the West's scarcityof water:
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by.the usual
rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a-few favored sections,
artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in
the various streams thus acquires a value unknown in moister climates.'

These conditions made a system for allocating water essential,

and therefore led to the development of the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Simply stated, the doctrine is an application of

the maxim "first in time, first in right," because it gives to an
appropriator whose diversion and beneficial use of water is prior

in time to that of others the right to use that water in the future,
free from interference by subsequent appropriators. Prior appropriation was incorporated into the state constitution2 and has

been applied not only to water in "natural streams," but also to
tributary ground water3 and designated ground water4 as well.
Increased development in Colorado has led to an increased
demand for water, a trend expected to continue in the future.5 In
'Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882).
2

The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to

beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the
better right as between those using the water for the same purpose ....
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
:'Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951); Nevius v. Smith, 86
Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1928); Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913); CoLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-2(1), -3(3) (Supp. 1969).
'CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-1 (Supp. 1965). Designated ground water is:
ITIhat ground water which in its natural course would not be available to
and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights, or ground water in
areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein ground
water withdrawals have constituted the principal water usage for at least
fifteen years preceding the date of the first hearing on the proposed designation of the basin; and which in both cases is within the geographic boundaries of a designated ground water basin.
Id. § 148-18-2 (Supp. 1971).
'Harrison & Sandstrom, The Groundwater-Surface Water Conflict and Recent
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the Arkansas Valley, for example, demand for irrigation water is
predicted to double by the year 2000.6 This prediction must be
viewed in the context of the vastly greater use of water for irrigation in Colorado than for all other uses.7 Not surprisingly, surface
water has become scarcer as a result of this increased demand.
This growing scarcity of surface water has had two results.
The first is an increase in the number of wells drilled in recent
years, which in turn has led to conflicts between ground and
surface water users.8 In an attempt to bring some order to the
chaotic state of ground water development, the Colorado General
Assembly passed the Ground Water Management Act,' which
sets up a permit system for wells. The second result of this growing scarcity has been the articulation of a doctrine of maximum
utilization.
In the recent case of Hall v. Kuiper,'" the Colorado Supreme
Court interpreted the well permit statute and began a new direction in the development of maximum utilization. This comment
will consider that case in detail, examining its impact on both
these facets of Colorado water law.
I. Hall v. Kuiper
An owner of farm land near Wellington, Colorado, applied to
the State Engineer for permits to construct two tributary ground
water wells, each of which would have been used to irrigate an
80-acre tract. Both wells would have been pumped at a rate of 500
gallons per minute, and the total annual pumped volume would
have amounted to 240 acre-feet. The ground water to be pumped
by the wells was tributary to the Cache la Poudre River, 13 miles
distant, yet the wells would not "substantially affect" any surface
rights or wells in the immediate area."
Colorado Water Legislation, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 1. 3 (1971) Ihereinafter cited as Harrison
& Sandstroml.
'Id. at 2-3.
7In 1965, 3,900,000 acres were irrigated in Colorado, requiring 13,000,000 acre-feet, or
11,000 million gallons per day (mgd) of water. In the same year, 360 mgd were required
for public supplies and 40 mgd for rural use. THE WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA 226, 228, 230 (D.
Todd ed. 1970).
'See, e.g., Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268
(1971); Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968). For a discussion of the
conflicts between ground and surface water users, see Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note

5.
'CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965).
"'510 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1973).

"Id. at 330.

UNAPPROPRIA TED WATER

The State Engineer initially denied the applications and,
following a hearing on the matter, he denied them again. The
Halls then purchased the property and continued efforts to obtain
the well permits by taking an appeal in the form of a trial de novo
to the Larimer County District Court, which upheld the State
Engineer's denial. On appeal the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed."1
For the State Engineer to issue a permit to construct a well
under the Colorado Ground Water Management Act, he must
find that (1) there is unappropriated water available, and that (2)
the proposed well would not cause material injury to the vested
rights of others."3 In addition, these findings must be supportable
by hydrologic and geologic facts. The Cache la Poudre is tributary
to the South Platte River, and both are over-appropriated some
of the time. 4 Further, there was testimony at the trial that the
proposed wells would have caused a steady diminishment in the
amount of ground water reaching the stream, thereby depriving
senior surface appropriators of some of the water to which they
were entitled. On the basis of these facts, the court concluded
that there was support for the findings that no unappropriated
water was available and that the wells would have caused material injury to other appropriators. Acknowledging that it would be
difficult for the State Engineer to single out any particular appropriator who would be injured by the wells, the court held that he
could nevertheless refuse to issue the well permits without having
to make such specific findings. The court also held that the constitutional guarantee of the right to make an appropriation' was
inapplicable because of the lack of unappropriated water.
As a first step toward appreciating Hall's significance, it is
necessary to analyze the statute giving the State Engineer the
power to grant well permits, and to examine carefully the court's
interpretation of it.
II.

WELL PERMITS AND THE GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT ACT

The Colorado Ground Water Management Act of 1965 provides that no well may be constructed outside a designated
ground water basin 6 without a permit from the State Engineer,"
"Id. at 329.
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-36(2) (Supp. 1971).
"Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 330 (Colo. 1973).
SCOLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
"The applications for well permits in Hall were not in a designated ground water
basin.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

and such a permit may be obtained only under the following
circumstances:
If the state engineer shall find that there is unappropriated water
available for withdrawal by the proposed well and that the vested
water rights of others will not be materially injured, and can be
substantiated by hydrological and geological facts, he shall issue a
"permit to construct a well", but not otherwise ....

Significantly, the two major requirements for issuing a well
permit-availability of unappropriated water and lack of material injury-are defined nowhere in the statutes. Therefore, the
court's application of the statute in Hall is important because it
puts flesh on the bare bones of the statute.
A.

The Court's Interpretation
The court's approach to dealing with the requirement of unappropriated water in Hall is clear. After stating that the Poudre
and South Platte Rivers are over-appropriated, the court explained:
This means that in the irrigation season, except during storm and
flood times, there is not enough water in the streams to satisfy all
of the decreed surface appropriations."

What the court did, then, is to hold that if a river is fully
appropriated at any time of the year, it has no unappropriated
water available within the meaning of section 148-18-36(2). The
rationale for this holding would seem to be that no new user
should be allowed to make an appropriation unless adequate
water is available for him on every day of the year.
The court seems to follow a similar approach in its treatment
of the material injury question. Although admitting that at some
times there is adequate water available for all appropriators, the
court countered with the observation that:
Itihe applicants . . .cannot escape the evidence in the record that
during other times of the year there would be material injury to
2

surface appropriators.

11

In other words, the fact that there is no unappropriated water
available some of the time leads inexorably to the conclusion that
there will be material injury. Such an approach in effect equates
the two requirements of unappropriated water and no material
'7CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §

148-18-36(1) (Supp.1965).

"Id.§ 148-18-36(2) (Supp. 1971).
'510 P.2d at 330 (emphasis added).
'"Id.at 332.

UNA PPROPRIATED WATER

injury; the absence of unappropriated water some of the time
makes it impossible to meet the material injury test.
By making these two requirements synonomous, the court
adopted a position Which could result in prohibiting the issuance
of all well permits for new water rights in the future. Colorado's
rivers are all fully appropriated, at least some of the time;2 therefore, in the court's view, there would be material injury and no
unappropriated water for new wells, and hence no well permits
could be issued. This result could hardly have been in the contemplation of the legislature, for it would be absurd to establish
the machinery to issue well permits and at the same time set
requirements such that no permit could ever be issued.
The fact that the court's reasoning leads to this unexpected
result suggests that its interpretation of the statute may be incorrect. To explore this possibility, an alternate interpretation of the
statutory requirements for issuing a well permit is suggested.
B.

A Proposed Interpretation

It must be noted that the requirement of unappropriated
water was added to the statute in 1971; prior to that time, the
only question was one of material injury. 22 This fact strongly suggests that the General Assembly intended that the new requirement deal with something other than material injury. Otherwise,
there would have been no reason for the amendment.
The proposed interpretation of these requirements is based
upon the fact that prior appropriation has two distinct functions,
and it is suggested that each of the two statutory requirements
deals with one of these functions. To be more specific, prior appropriation provides a means by which water rights can be acquired, and it also provides a mechanism for regulating the exercise of rights thus acquired. The availability of unappropriated
water is essential to the acquisition of water rights, and questions
of material injury concern the exercise of these rights.
1.

Requirement of Unappropriated Water

The right to make an appropriation is guaranteed by the
Colorado constitution, but only with respect to unappropriated
"IHolland & Hart. Report to Governor ,John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law
Problems. Dec. 20, 1972, at 5, 39: C. McGUINNESS, THE ROLE OF GROUND WATER IN THE
NATIONAL WATER SITUATION 214, 216 (Geologic Survey Water-Supply Paper No. 1800.
196:3); Delaney. Water for Oil Shale Development, 43 DENVER L.J. 72, 75 (1966).
:''Coompare CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-:16(2) (Supp. 1971) with id. (Supp. 1965).
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water.2" If there is no unappropriated water, there can be no right
to appropriate nor indeed, any water which can lawfully be appropriated. The availability of unappropriated water is thus important as a threshold question.
Assuming that the existence of unappropriated water is a
prerequisite to obtaining a water right, how is this requirement
to be met? Traditionally, the courts have held that when, on any
given day, the needs of all appropriators on a stream are being
met, any excess water in the stream is considered to be unappropriated. 4 This approach takes account of the fact that on a given
day a stream may have more water than needed to fill decreed
priorities, or it may simply be that the stream has more water
than appropriators are taking. Allowances are made for day-today differences in the stream, and simply because a stream is
fully appropriated one day, it may not be so on the following day.
In other words, the existence of unappropriated water on a particular day depends upon conditions that day. Contrast this with
the approach in Hall, where the fact that a stream was fully
appropriated some of the time dictated that there could be no
unappropriated water any day of the year, regardless of whether
or not there was excess water in the stream that day.
That a stream may be fully appropriated on some days and
yet have unappropriated water on other days was illustrated in
Cache la Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co.25
There the court pointed out that even though an appropriator
acquires the right to use a given quantity" of water for a particular period of time, subsequent appropriators can acquire the right
to take that same quantity of water from the stream during a
different period of time. Of course, for the later appropriators to
acquire such rights, the water would have to be unappropriated
when they make their initial diversions. Hence, the extent of
appropriation of a stream at one time should not be determinative for other times.
The court has also recognized, in Humphreys Tunnel &
Mining Co. v. Frank, 7 that even if a stream is normally fully
§ 6.
"See, e.g., Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 522, 532, 105 P. 1093,
1096 (1909).
'125 Colo. 161, 53 P. 331 (1898); accord, United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 330 F.2d
897, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1964).
""Quantity," it should be noted, refers not to volume of water, but rather to rate of
flow. See City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
146 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093 (1909).
"CoLo. CONST. art. XVI,

UNAPPROPRIATED WATER

appropriated, conditions may sometimes result in unappropriated water:
Though other appropriations, to the full capacity of the stream during its ordinary flow, were made before plaintiff's rights accrued,
this does not prevent him from building a ditch and diverting and

using its waters whenever his seniors do not need it. Floods often
occur and the natural flow of the stream is thus augmented. No
appropriator uses water all the time. It is well known that many
streams of this state are over-appropriated, yet appropriators whose
rights accrue after the ordinary flow is fully appropriated, have,
nevertheless, acquired valuable rights . ..

.

Because Humphreys Tunnel is an older case, one might well
question whether the possibility referred to there of unappropriated water appearing at any time is realistic under present day
conditions. " This question may be answered by examining the
number of days in a year with no call on the river. When a senior
appropriator is not receiving sufficient water to fill his decreed
rights, he puts a "call" on the river, thereby preventing upstream
junior appropriators from taking water to which he is entitled.
But, when there is no call, it is a "free river"; anyone can divert
water from it, and by applying it to beneficial use, he can acquire
rights to it in the future.
Table 1 shows the number of days during each of the last 10
years when there was no call on the South Platte River in District
3." This district was chosen as an example because the property
involved in Hall is located there.
"'Id. at 532, 105 P. at 1096.
"lnterestingly enough, in a recent district court opinion holding the Colorado Ground
Water Management Act unconstitutional. Judge Carpenter cited Humphreys Tunnel for
the proposition that there can always be some unappropriated water even on a fully
appropriated stream. Kuiper v. Lundvall, Civil Action No. 20093 (Weld County Dist. Ct.,
decided July 10, 1973).
"This information was obtained from the Summary Sheets of the South Platte River
Call, which may be examined in the State Engineer's office in Denver.
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Table I
Number of Days with No Call on South Platte
District 3
Year

Jan.-Dec.

Apr.-Sept.

1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
Average

216
284
294
293
100
158
194
159
26
222
195

33
102
112
111
22
120
94
67
0
48
71

A glance at Table 1 shows that although during some exceptionally dry years, such as 1964, there was little unappropriated
water available, during most years there was considerable water
available. Diversions could have been made an average of 195
days per year over the last 10 years. Even during the irrigation
season, April through September, there was an average of 71 days
with no call on the river in District 3. What this indicates is that
the statement quoted from Humphreys Tunnel is relevant to
present day conditions on the South Platte.
According to the interpretation of section 148-18-36(2)
argued for here, the question of the availability of unappropriated
water is a threshold matter. Water is considered unappropriated
if it is not required by senior appropriators, and the extent of
appropriation on a stream may change from day to day.
2. Requirement of No Material Injury
The existence of unappropriated water is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for the issuance of a well permit. Additionally, there must be a finding that there would be no material
injury to vested rights, a requirement, it is suggested, which looks
to administration. The logic of this proposal may be clarified by
considering how prior appropriation regulates the exercise of surface rights. Once a right to water is acquired by appropriating
otherwise unappropriated water, it is regulated to prevent material injury to earlier vested rights. That is, when the exercise of a
junior right would deprive a senior appropriator of water to which
he is entitled, the junior appropriator will not be allowed to exercise his right.

UNAPPROPRIA TED WATER

The Water Right Determination and Administration Aci of
196911 also suggests that the question of material injury is relevant
to administration. This Act gives the State Engineer and the
Division Engineers authority to order the discontinuance of diversions causing material injury to prior vested rights. 2
In addition, language in Fellhauer v. People13 gives further
support to the proposition that material injury is an aspect of
regulation:
[Wihenever ... the pumping of a junior well materially injures
senior appropriators who are calling generally for more water, there
exists a legitimate and constitutional ground and reason for the
regulation of the well . . .

If material injury does relate to the administration of wells,
should a well permit be issued only if there will be no material
injury, or rather, whenever regulation of the well can eliminate
possible material injury?
The manner in which prior appropriation regulates surface
water rights suggests an answer to this question. Any new surface
right will almost of necessity interfere with prior vested rights at
some time or another, and when this occurs, the holder of the
junior right is not allowed to make a diversion. Note, however,
that the virtual certainty of material injury at some time or another is not the decisive factor. If regulation (i.e., prohibiting the
junior from diverting water when it is required by senior appropriators) can eliminate material injury, the mere possibility of injury
in the absence of regulation does not defeat the junior's right to
appropriate otherwise unappropriated water.
The law concerning change of water rights offers an analogue
helpful in understanding the well permit statute's requirement of
no material injury. Although the holder of a water right may be
allowed to change the type or location of use, such a change will
be allowed only if it will cause no material injury to other vested
:"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 to -45 (Supp. 1969).
:"Id. § 148-21-35(2) (Supp. 1969). This material injury depends upon such factors as:
the current and prospective volumes of water in and tributary to the
stream from which the diversion is being made; distance and type of stream
bed between the diversion points; the various velocities of this water, both
surface and underground; the probable duration of the available flow; and
the predictable return flow to the affected stream.
Id.
167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
"Id. at 329, 447 P.2d at 991.
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rights. :'- Often, though, a change will result in material injury, as
when the change is from irrigation to municipal use. In such a
case, rights previously exercised only intermittently would henceforth be exercised continuously."' When material injury is a possibility, "the courts will impose conditions upon the change of use
and point of' diversion sufficient to protect the rights of other
appropriators.'

:7

Only the impossibility of imposing restrictions

adequate to protect vested rights will cause a court to deny a
change in water right. :"
Thus, the operation of' prior appropriation and the law of
change of' water rights both suggest that the requirement of no
material injury be interpreted as meaning no material injury
which cannot be removed by regulation. This raises the question
of how wells can be regulated to minimize material injury to
surface appropriators. Essentially, there are four methods by
which this can be done.
The first is simply to order the offending well to stop pumping. :" This approach will obviously be more effective when the
well is close to the stream, where the effects of pumping are
quickly noticeable. Because the ground water in Hall traveled
approximately 3/10 mile per year over the 13 miles to the Cache
la Poudre River,"' the effects of pumping would not reach the
stream for many years. And, by the same token, the effect of
shutting off the wells would not reach the stream for many years.
Furthermore, the court in Hall noted that intermittent pumping
would diminish the amount of ground water reaching the stream
by an amount constant throughout the year." Prohibiting pumping by these wells during the irrigation season-or any other period, for that matter-would therefore not eliminate material
injury.
0
:'City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968); Boulder & White
Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. City of Boulder, 157 Colo. 197, 402 P.2d 71 (1965); Farmers

Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954); City
of Colo. Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151 (1952); Bates v. Hall, 44 Colo. 360,
98 P. 3 (1908).
:"See, e.g., City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
:7Authorities
cited note 34 supra.

":FarmersHighline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629 (1954).
"This was done in Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d
268 (1971).
'1510 P.2d at 330.
"Id.

1974
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Another method of dealing with material injury is to prohibit
continuous pumping. When a well pumps, it lowers the level of
ground water in the area near the intake, an effect known as
"draw down." By pumping intermittently, the cone of depression
thus formed can recover, and hence the effect at a distance from
the well is greatly lessened. 2 Assuming, as the court in Hall did,
that even with intermittent pumping the Halls' proposed wells
would have caused a constant diminution in the amount of
ground water reaching the stream, 3 the technique of stop-and-go
pumping would probably have been ineffective.
A third method for minimizing material injury to surface
users from a well is bypass pumping. It was mentioned in
Fellhauer v. People:
The possibility has occurred to us that, if the defendant would discharge a certain portion of the well water into the stream and use
the remainder for his land, no material injury to senior users would
result."

Bypass pumping is based upon the fact that the volume of ground
water required to support a surface flow is significantly greater
than the volume of the surface flow itself. For example, if four
acre-feet of ground water are required to support one acre-foot of
surface flow, it would be possible to pump out all five acre-feet. 5
Then, one acre-foot could be given to the surface users, and the
remainder used by the well owner. 6 This practice is limited, however, by the recharge capacity of the aquifer and by its effect on
adjacent wells.47 If carried to an extreme, bypass pumping could
dry up surface streams and thus cause ecological problems. Used
in moderation, however, it can help to alleviate adverse effects
from wells. Perhaps the Halls could have used this method to
prevent material injury.
A fourth way to minimize the adverse effects of pumping is
through artificial recharge, which replaces ground water pumped
out by the well. Off-season irrigation is one method of doing this.4"
'"Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 33.
'1510 P.2d at 330.
"167 Colo. 320, 335, 447 P.2d 986, 993 (1968).
"5As the amount of ground water decreases, the amount of surface water which it can
support decreases, and so some surface water percolates into the ground.
"This example was taken from Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 39.
171d.
"Id. at 14-15.
" d. at 41.
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Another technique is to pump water into the ground via injection
wells,' or, less efficiently, to use the well itself as an injection
well)' With all these methods of artificial recharge the water used
to recharge the aquifer must, of course, come from a source other
than the aquifer. As noted earlier, however, it is still possible on
many days to make a surface appropriation from a river as fully
appropriated as the South Platte.5 2 Therefore, the Halls could
conceivably have made a surface appropriation during periods of
low demand, and by using that water to recharge the acquifer
they could have eliminated material injury to surface
appropriators.
The existence of the four techniques discussed above for
eliminating material injury from pumping wells means that even
if' the ground water pumped by the well is not always unappropriated, material injury to senior users need not necessarily result. Thus, the interpretation of section 148-18-36(2) proposed in
this comment does not equate lack of unappropriated water at
some time in the year with material injury.
C.

Comparison of the Two Interpretations
The facts in Hall can serve as a concrete example for comparing the court's interpretation of section 148-18-36(2) with the one
offered in this comment. The court there held that because the
river was fully appropriated some of the time, it had no unappropriated water, and therefore the proposed wells would have
caused material injury to vested rights. Hence, a well permit
could not be issued. It is important to note that the court used a
single level test in Hall.
Under the proposed interpretation, however, the first step is
to consider the unappropriated water question. In 'Hall there
would have been a finding of "unappropriated water available for
withdrawal."'"' Perhaps it would not have been available every
day, but unappropriated water would nevertheless have been
available. The second step is to determine whether the wells
could be regulated to prevent material injury. Assuming the
court's finding was correct that even intermittent pumping would
'"On techniques of artificial recharge, see W. WALTON, GROUNDWATER RESOURCE EVAL168 (1970): R. DE WIEST, GEOHYDROLOGY 147 (1965); Todd, Groundwater, in
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED HYDROLOGY 13-41 to 13-46 (V. Chow ed. 1964).
"'Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 41.
See Table 1 and accompanying discussion supra.
""CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-36(2) (Supp. 1971).
UATION
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cause a decrease in the amount of ground water reaching the
stream at all times, and assuming that bypass pumping and artificial recharge would be impractical for some reason or other, it
is therefore apparent that the wells would have caused material
injury. Again, no permit could be issued.
The fact that the same result is reached under these facts
does not mean that the two interpretations always lead to identical results. In Hall the court's shortcut approach yielded the same
result as the proposed interpretation because of the material injury issue. If', however, there had been a practical way of preventing material injury by the wells in Hall, then the State Engineer
should have granted the permits. The major difficulty with the
court's interpretation is that by making the presence of unappropriated water in the stream all year long the sole criterion, it
oversimplifies the two statutory tests. On the other hand, the two
step analysis proposed here keeps the statutory tests separate.
The advantages of the proposed interpretation over that
employed by the court in Hall can be summarized as follows:
1. It defines unappropriated water in a manner consistent with prior case law.
2. It recognizes that the well permit statute involves
two requirements rather than one.
3. Because it does not automatically equate lack of
unappropriated water with material injury, the proposed interpretation takes into account the possibility
that regulation of wells may remove any material injury
to vested rights.
4. As a further consequence of not equating the two
requirements, and by defining unappropriated water in
the traditional manner, it does not automatically foreclose the possibility of obtaining a well permit for a new
water right.
For these reasons, the proposed interpretation of section 14818-36(2) appears to be superior to that adopted by the court in
Hall. Having established this, it is still possible to gain additional
insight into the meaning of Hall by approaching it from a different direction-by examining its impact on maximum utilization.
III.

MAXIMUM UTILIZATION

Although always implicitly a part of Colorado water law, the
doctrine of maximum utilization has gained explicit recognition
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only in recent years. No precise definition of the doctrine has yet
been formulated, nor have all.its implications been explored. A
brief review of the development of maximum utilization will aid
in attempting to define its elements.
A.

Development of the Doctrine
The prohibition against wasting water has long been a means
of insuring that water be used efficiently. An appropriator otherwise entitled to water may not divert it if he will not be able to
apply it to beneficial use; he must leave it in the stream for others
to use beneficially. 54 If he has already diverted the water, he must
return to the stream what he cannot use beneficially.5 5 The obvious result of these rules is to allocate water on the basis of
priority of right and upon need, thus rendering water usage more
efficient.
City of Colorado Springs v. Bender 6 has been cited as marking the beginning of the "new era" in maximum utilization. 7
There a senior appropriator sought to enjoin Colorado Springs
from pumping ground water because the city's withdrawals deprived him of water. This occurred because the draw down from
the city's well lowered the ground water level below the intake of
the plaintiff's well, which did not reach to so great a depth as the
city's due to irregularities in the aquifer. The court held that an
appropriator must employ an efficient means of making a diversion, and that he is "not entitled to command the whole or a
substantial flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking the
fraction to which he is entitled."" The court reasoned that since
the plaintiff's well did not reach to a depth great enough for both
himself and the city to pump water from the aquifer, his means
of diversion was inefficient, and hence he could not prevent the
city from withdrawing water. 9
In dictum the court in Bender also discussed the futile call
doctrine. Generally, when a senior appropriator is not receiving
sufficient water to fill his adjudicated priority, he may "call" the
river to prevent appropriators junior to himself from making di"Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423,
210 P.2d 982 (1949); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 P. 37 (1905).
"5Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P. 681 (1922).
11148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
"Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 336, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968).
"148 Colo. at 462, 366 P.2d at 555, citing Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co.,
224 U.S. 107 (1912).
"1148 Colo. at 462, 366 P.2d at 555.
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versions. However, the senior is not permitted to make a call
which is futile; that is, if shutting off a particular junior appropriator will not increase the amount of water reaching the senior, the
junior may not be shut off.
Bender thus furthered the development of maximum utilization in two ways: first, it refused to encourage inefficient means
of diversion; and second, by forbidding futile calls it helped to
increase the number of users who could make appropriations.
Although Bender and the early decisions against waste suggest a predisposition of the court to favor the more efficient use
of water, the doctrine of maximum utilization was not consciously
articulated until Fellhauer v. People."' In 1969 the Division Engineer attempted to shut down 39 of the more than 1600 major wells
in the Arkansas Valley without prior written regulations or, as far
as the court could discover, without standards of any sort. The
court held that this action was so arbitrary that it violated the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the
due process clause of the Colorado constitution."
In addition, the court discussed maximum utilization. After
quoting from the provisions in the Colorado constitution relating
to prior appropriation, 2 the court concluded:
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions that, along with
vested rights, there shall be maximum utilization of the water of this
state. As administration of water approaches its second century the
curtain is opening upon the new drama of maximum utilization and
how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of
vested rights. "

The court did not explain what it meant by maximum utilization
beyond pointing to the decisions forbidding waste and the statement in Bender regarding the need for an efficient means of
diversion.
Following the decision in Fellhauer, the Colorado General
Assembly passed the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, which recognizes the need for maximum utilization. The Act declares that:
it shall be the policy of this state to integrate the appropriation,
use and administration of underground water tributary to a stream
6"167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).

"'ld. at 334, 447 P.2d at 993.

"CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.

167 Colo. at 336, 447 P.2d at 994.
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with the use of surface water, in such a way as to maximize the
beneficial use of all of the waters of this state."1

The Act prohibits futile calls"' and requires that an appropriator
establish a reasQnable means of diversion. 6 In addition, the statement of policy declares that ground water has thus far received
insufficient attention and that the integration of ground and sur67
face water is vital.
The next mention of maximum utilization appeared in
6
Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Association,'
where the
court quoted from Fellhauerand from the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969. The court viewed that
legislation as an attempt to promote in detail the general thought
in Fellhauer.9'
It might be useful at this point to summarize the preceding
discussion of the development of maximum utilization by listing
the elements of the doctrine which have been hammered out by
the Colorado Supreme Court and the legislature:
70
1. No wasteful use of water.
2. No futile calls.
72
3. Need for an efficient means of diversion.
4. Development of ground water and its coordination
73
with surface water.
Underlying these rules is the policy of increasing the efficiency of water use and thus making water available to more
people.
B.

The Hall Decision and Maximum Utilization
Prior to Hall the development of a doctrine of maximum
"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(1) (Supp. 1969).

5
Id. §§ 148-21-2(e), -35(2) (Supp. 1969).
"Id. § 148-21-2(c) (Supp. 1969).
7
9 Id. § 148-21-2(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
"176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971).
"Id. at 149-50, 490 P.2d at 283.
7'Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423,
210 P.2d 982 (1949); Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P.
681 (1922); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 P. 37 (1905); see COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN.

§§ 148-7-7 to -9 (1963); Id. at § 148-21-35(2) (Supp. 1969).

"City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 148-21-2(e), -35(2) (Supp. 1969).
"City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 148-21-2(c) (Supp. 1969).

"CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-2(1), -2(2)(a) (Supp. 1969); Hall v. Kuiper, 510
P.2d 329, 332 (Colo. 1973).
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utilization, although somewhat tentative and uncertain, seemed
to hold the promise of bringing a new era in which Colorado's
water would be used with greater efficiency. However, in Hall
there appears to be an attempt to limit the further development
and application of maximum utilization. For example, the court
stated:
It was in the spirit of Feltlhauer, supra, to add weight to what was
referred to as the "new drama of maximum utilization," viz., among
other things, to use as much underground water as possible. We
dream and we hope that in some future day technology will provide
a means where by [sicl persons in the position of these applicants
can use some water which would represent that reaching the stream
during flood and storm stages. But today these are merely dreams."

Believing, as the court did, that the wells applied for would cause
material injury to vested rights, the court refused with reluctance
to weigh maximum utilization with the other factors used to
reach a decision. Seemingly the court chose not to explore "how
constitutionally that doctrine [maximum utilization] can be integrated into the law of vested rights. '7" It is not clear whether
the court has declined to further maximum utilization in general
or merely under the facts in Hall. But one thing is certain: the
court's treatment of maximum utilization in Hall will probably
stunt the doctrine's future growth.
CONCLUSION

The drive to make water available to as many people as
possible who can put it to beneficial use is the common factor in
the decisions dealing with maximum utilization. This drive is
also present in the court's pre-Hall definition of what constitutes
unappropriated water, for the day-to-day approach in determining the existence of unappropriated water would allow a greater
number of appropriators to share in Colorado's water than the allor-nothing approach followed in Hall.
Thus, when the court redefined the requirement of unappropriated water in Hall, it also implicitly rejected one aspect of
maximum utilization. This suggests that perhaps maximum utilization is much more basic to Colorado water law than had been
previously suspected. Both the prior appropriation and maximum utilization doctrines derive from the scarcity of water. The
first appeared to allocate water, and the second to insure that it
1'510 P.2d at 332.
7'People v. Fellhauer, 167 Colo. 320, 336, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968).
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be used efficiently. Hall v. Kuiper is thus significant because it
gives insight into how the court interprets the well permit statute
and how the court views maximum utilization; and perhaps even
more importantly, it illustrates how basic maximum utilization
is to Colorado water law.
Thomas F. Cope

COMMENT
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PREMISES

LIABILITY:

The Foreseeable Emergence of the Community Standard
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
INTRODUCTION

A defendant's liability for the tort of negligence is determined, in part, by the nature of the duty he owes the plaintiff-generally, a duty not to expose the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm.' Since duty depends on the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant,' and since this relationship often
defies precise legal characterization, defining the level or quality
of duty is usually a difficult task. At early common law, special
rules were developed to define duties in terms of frequently occurring relationships. These rules were actually a judicial "codification" of the level of duty to be imposed upon a defendant who
stands in a particular relationship to the plaintiff.
One of those special relationships was that between a
defendant-landowner or -occupier3 and a plaintiff who entered
upon the defendant's land. The rules fashioned at common law
to define the duty created by such a relationship depended solely
upon the ancient classification of the plaintiff as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee.'
These categories and their attendant duties were far from all
encompassing, and almost from the beginning difficulties arose in
their application. In some factual situations the plaintiff did not
fit comfortably into any of the classifications.5 In other situations,
the defendant escaped liability because of the plaintiffs classification, even though the defendant's conduct was patently unrea'See Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 41 (1934).
'See LeLievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 (1893).
'The orthodox view treats all those in possession of land in the same manner as the
landowner when determining the duty owed to an entrant upon the land. See W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS 395-96 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
'PROSSER 357.
'See Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955), for a discussion of the controversy
surrounding the proper classification of social guests. See PROSSER at 395-96 for a thorough
discussion of the difficulty of categorizing an entrant who is a public servant performing
a function within the scope of his official duties.
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sonable or irresponsible." Beyond the difficulties inherent in
applying the categories, the judicial methodology of their application was necessarily mechanical: first, the class of the entrant was
determined; then, the duty owed by the landowner followed from
that determination without regard to the reasonableness of the
landowner's behavior. This mechanical and often rigid approach
stands in contrast to the more articulated and flexible methods
of modern jurisprudence. 7 Under the mechanical approach,
courts often arrived at results fraught with conflict and harshness. This generated years of debate over the proper application
of the common law classifications in determining the duty of
defendant-landowners."
With this backdrop of controversy, Colorado, in the 1971
decision of Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,"joined a small but
growing number of states"' in abrogating the common law classifications as conclusive determinants of the level of duty owed by a
landowner to persons coming upon his land. Instead, the court
applied a standard of duty no different from that imposed upon
any other defendent: the landowner must conduct himself as a
reasonable man under the circumstances. The category of the
entrant is to be considered, but is not to ultimately control the
liability of the land occupier."
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the significance
of this change in the law of Colorado, highlighting both procedural and substantive effects of the Mile High decision and exploring its impact upon the theoretical foundations of negligence
'Blyth v. Topham, 79 Eng. Rep. 139 (C.P. 1607). See also Susquehanna Power Co. v.
Jeffress, 159 Md. 465, 150 A. 788 (1930) (harm caused by an unguarded, dangerous electric
wire).
7See, e.g., C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 249-52 (1953).
'For some of the more frequent criticisms, see Green, Landowner v. Intruder:Intruder
v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort. 21 MICH. L. REV. 495 (1923); Hughes, Duties
to Trespassers: A ComparativeSurvey and Revaluation. 68 YALE L.J. 633 (1959): Marsh.
The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV.
182 (1953); Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo.
L. REV. 186 (1957).
1175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
"'See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108. 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See
also Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Louisville
Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1968) (classifications of entrants are no longer
controlling in application of "attractive nuisance" doctrine); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956) (although the common law rule appears
to have been reinstated in New Jersey by Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153
A.2d 1 (1959)).
'175 Colo. at 548, 489 P.2d at 314.
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law. We begin by examining the historical development of the
common law scheme of entrant classification.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODIFICATION OF THE COMMON
LAW CLASSIFICATIONS

Under the common law, the landowner's duty to those entering upon his land was strictly defined according to the classification of the entrant as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.'2 The Colorado decision in Gotch v. K. & B. Packing & Provision Co.' 3
exemplifies this traditional status approach. Here the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit on grounds of the
plaintiff's status. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court, reasoning that the plaintiff was a mere licensee and as such
he was required to take the defendant's premises as he found
them. Had the plaintiff possessed the status of an invitee, however, the defendant's duty would have included the maintenance
of the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and, arguably,
recovery would have followed.
It is generally conceded that the common law formulation is
rooted in the characteristics of feudal society. The medieval landowner occupied a privileged position in society and as a result
possessed a nearly absolute right to maintain and use this property in whatever manner and for whatever purpose he wished.' 4
Although numerous qualifications and exceptions to absolute
property rights appeared in early common law,'" these did not
include the duty to maintain and use land so that others were not
harmed. Duty, as such a qualification, did not emerge until the
law of negligence developed several centuries after feudal notions
of property rights had become cemented in English jurisprudence.'" As a result, the classifications of entrants upon land were
12For early cases, see Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856); Chapman
v. Rothwell, 120 Eng. Rep. 471 (Q.B. 1858): Hounsell v. Smyth, 141 Eng. Rep. 1003 (C.P.
1860). See also the following three American cases which adopted the distinctions: Sweeny
v. Old Colony & N.R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644 (1865); Beck v. Carter,
68 N.Y. 283. 23 Am. R. 175 (1877); Gillis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 59 Pa. 129, 98 Am. Dec.
:317 (1868).
'"93 Colo. 276, 25 P.2d 719 (1933).
"Marsh, supra note 8, at 184.
'The basic land rights grew from a system of feudal tenure. Attendant to the rights
of a landowner were the many incidents of tenure such as homage, primer seisin, and
others which restricted the rights of the land possessor. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962).
"rhe concept of duty was first defined in terms of foreseeability in Heaven v. Pender,
11Q.B.D. 503. 509 (1883).
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developed independently of the law of negligence and were later
borrowed from other doctrinal areas of the law for application in
negligence cases. 7
A.

The Evolution of the Three Classifications
1. Trespasser
The category of trespasser grew largely from the law of nuisance. Acts by a landowner, such as felling a tree onto an adjacent
highway, gave rise to an action in nuisance against the landowner
for damage suffered by a traveler." The law gradually expanded
to protect one who strayed onto land adjacent to a highway,
where his presence was considered incidental to the use of the
highway. If, however, his entry was something other than incidental, the law afforded him no protection. This resulted in two
classes of entrants: those who possessed a right of presence incident to the use of the public way; and those who entered the
landowner's premises in violation of his property rights. The latter were deemed trespassers. 9 Thus, a trespasser was one who
entered the land without legal right; that is, the landowner had
neither actually nor constructively consented to the entrance, and
the trespasser possessed no other legal privilege.20
2. Licensee
It has been suggested that the category of licensee grew from
an analogy to the law of bailments."' The bailor's duty to the
bailee, with regard to the condition of the chattel, varied according to whether the bailment was gratuitous or for hire. If the
bailment was gratuitous, the bailor's duty was only to warn of
known defects which were concealed from the bailee.2 The relationship between landowner and licensee is analagous to that
between a bailor and gratuitous bailee. The licensee, then, is one
who possesses only the tolerance or bare consent of the landowner. The relationship is a gratuitous one, with the landowner
gaining no economic or other benefit from the licensee's
presence .23
"James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE
L.J. 144, 145 (1953); Marsh, supra note 8, at 186.
'"Marsh, supra note 8, at 186-90.
"Id. at 187.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
"Marsh, supra note 8, at 193-94.
"18 C.J.S. Bailments § 25 (1962).
"Marsh, supra note 8, at 190.
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3. Invitee
The invitee class developed primarily under the influence of
the law of contracts." Whereas the licensee appeared in the common law as a gratuitous bailee, the invitee assumed many of the
legal traits of a contractual bailee or bailee-for-hire. The bailor
owed his bailee-for-hire the duty to inspect, correct, and/or warn
of defects in the bailed chattel.15 This relationship parallels that
between the landowner and his invitee. Invitee status existed
where the presence of the entrant provided some economic benefit
to the landowner.2" In short, the landowner exchanged the benefit
or prospective benefit that he gained from the invitee's presence
for an obligation to protect the invitee while on the premises. This
is analogous to the role of consideration in the bailment-for-hire.
It is clear then that the various categories of entrant arose in
the law of nuisance, bailment, and contract. When negligence
emerged as a tort in its own right, it borrowed these classifications
and assigned them new and often distorted meanings to meet the
needs of the general law of negligence.
B.

The Emergence of Negligence
Before the early 19th century, the common law recognized
negligence as a type of fault, and as such it was often treated as
one element of a substantive tort." Thus negligence first appeared in actions on the case, but gradually grew to its modern
status as a distinct tort in its own right. 9 The tort of negligence
requires proof of (1) a recognized legal duty owed by the defendant to avoid exposing the plaintiff to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) some injury to
the plaintiff recognized by law as compensable, and (4) a causal
connection between the breach of duty and the plaintiff's injury.'
As has already been observed, 3 duty is dependent upon the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Thus, in defin"ISee PROSSER 386-87; see also Marsh, supra note 8, at 190-95.
'RESTATEMENT, supra note 20.

"The characteristics of this class were established in the leading English case, Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. I C.P. 274, 35 L.J.C.P. 184, aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311, 36 L.J.C.P. 181
(1866). See also RESTATEMENT § 332.
7
' Marsh, supra note 8, at 191.
"For a discussion of the historical development of negligence as a tort, see Gregory,
Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951).
""PRossER 139-40.

:'Id. at 143.
:"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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ing the landowner's duty, the law of negligence looked to the
relationship between him and the entrant upon his land. This
relationship was characterized by the entrant's classification as
a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.:2
The landowner's duty to the entrant was determined by (1)
his awareness of the presence of any member in the entrant's
class, and (2) his consent to this presence. The law imputed to
the landowner no knowledge of or consent to the trespasser's presence, and thus the landowner owed no duty to make or to keep
his premises safe for a trespasser, although he could not willfully
or wantonly injure him. 31 In part, this limited duty reflected the
fact that the trespasser was committing a tortious wrong against
the interest of the landowner by entering the premises in the first
instance."
However, under the principle of volenti non fit injuria (no
violence is done to one who consents), an entry consented to by
the landowner was not tortious: 5 Such bare consent to an entrance converted the legal status of the entrant from one of trespasser to one of licensee. Thus, the licensee presumably entered
the land with the knowledge and consent of the landowner who
tolerated-but did not affirmatively encourage-the entrance. 6
The licensee, like the trespasser, had to take the premises as he
found them, and the landowner's duty was only to avoid affirmative acts which might injure the licensee. 7
Where consent was present in combination with the landowner's affirmative encouragement of the entrance for a specific
economic purpose, the entrant's status was that of an invitee.3 5
To the invitee, the landowner owed a higher level of duty than
was owed to a trespasser or licensee. Not only did the landowner
have to avoid willful and affirmative injury to the invitee, he also
had to inspect for hazards and, upon discovery, act to rectify
them or warn the entrant of their existence.39
:"PROSSER 357.
:9Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489, 521 (C.P. 1817).
"Green, supra note 8, at 502.
:.LPROSSER 101.
:qd. at 376.
"The source of the licensee rule is Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex.
1856).
:"PROSSER 385-91.

"Id. at 392-94. See also COLO. JURY INST. 12:9 (1969). A leading Colorado invitee
decision is Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Tucker, 72 Colo. 308, 211 P. 383 (1922).
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In this manner, the classifications of trespasser, licensee, and
invitee constitute a continuum of the landowner's consent to and
knowledge of the plaintiffs presence upon the land. The trespassing plaintiff stands in a relationship with the defendant void of
both consent and knowledge, the implication being that even if
the defendant had had knowledge of the plaintiffs presence he
would not have consented to it. The licensee relationship with the
defendant includes only that consent and knowledge which might
be inferred from the landowner's toleration of the plaintiffs presence. The invitee's relationship with the defendant-landowner,
on the other hand, is one of both consent and knowledge inferred
from the affirmative encouragement of the plaintiffs presence by
the defendant-landowner.
The classes of entrants, when applied to the wide range of
circumstances surrounding the landowner-entrant relationship,
proved to be ill equipped for their new role in the law of negligence.", The devotion to history and historical antecedents in the
laws of nuisance, bailment, and contract retained considerable
importance to the relationships of the landowner with the various
classes of entrants upon his land. In these areas of the law, the
classification scheme was narrowly applied to the relationships of
landowners and entrants." However, in their application to negligence cases the discrete, nearly rigid classes of plaintiffs could not
accommodate the broad scope of relationships in which negligent
injury occurred. In short, courts were forced to determine the
defendant's duty by pigeonholing the plaintiff into one of the
categories fashioned from the narrow applications of the law of
nuisance, bailment, or contract. Until recently, this mechanical
jurisprudence has persisted in the common law, and courts,
rather than abandoning it, have fashioned numerous modifications of the classification scheme-modifications as mechanical
as the original doctrine.
The Development of Exceptions to and Modifications of the
Common Law Categories
As a result of general dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the
categories and the increasing momentum of the general law of
negligence, exceptions and refinements developed in the plaintiff
C.

"'See C. WILLIAMS, THE REFORM OF THE LAW 77 (1951); see also Hughes, supra note 8;
Wright, The Low of Torts: 1923-47, 26 CAN. B. REV. 46, 81-89 (1948); Comment, supra
note 8.
"Marsh, supra note 8, at 199.
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classifications and their corresponding defendant duties. These
changes included the redefinition of both the membership in the
three classes and the duty owed to each class.
1. Modifications in Class Definition and Duty Owed Trespassers and Licensees
The earliest common law rules held that the landowner owed
no duty to avoid negligent injury to a licensee upon his property.
Courts soon carved out an exception to the no-duty rule, holding
that where a licensee was injured because of the landowner's
failure to warn of a "latent defect," liability might be imposed. 2
Latent defects were those unknown to the entrant, as distinguished from patent defects-those obvious to him upon a reasonable inspection.' :' There was no duty to warn an entrant of the
obvious or patent defect, but where the condition was latent,
unknown to the entrant, and known to the landowner, a duty to
warn was imposed." This distinction between latent and patent
defects probably arose as an extension to the liability imposed on
a landowner when he acted to trap the licensee.4" Courts found
great similarity between an injury caused by a trap and that
caused by a failure to warn of a dangerous, concealed hazard
known to the landowner but not to the entrant." In both situations, courts were seemingly responding to the wanton or willful
character of the defendant's misfeasance or nonfeasance. In this
sense the expansion of duty for latent defects was not truly an
expansion at all, but rather a recognition of more diverse conduct
as willful.
This duty to warn of latent defects was extended to both
licensees and to certain types of trespassers.4 7 Thus where a trespasser's presence became known to the landowner the latter owed
not only a duty to refrain from affirmative conduct injurious to
the trespasser but also a duty to warn him of any "latent defects"
that might exist on the premises. 5 In short, where the landowner
'The source of this exception is found in the cases of Bolch v. Smith, 158 Eng. Rep.
666 (Ex. 1862), and Corby v. Hill, 140 Eng. Rep. 1209 (C.P. 1858). See also COLO. JURY
INST.

12:10 (1969).
"PROSSER 380-82.
"RESTATEMENT § 342.
'Griffith, Licensors and 'Traps', 41 L.Q. REV. 255 (1925).
'Id.
17RESTATEMENT

§ 338.

"Davis' Adm'r v. Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co., 127 Ky. 800, 106 S.W. 843 (1908);
Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 81 N.W. 333 (1899); Omaha & Republican Valley Ry.
v. Cook. 42 Neb. 577, 60 N.W. 899 (1894).
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had actual knowledge of a trespasser's presence, and where he
failed to eject him, the law implied his toleration of the trespasser's presence and imposed upon the landowner the additional
duty to warn of latent defects, as though the trespasser were
actually a licensee.'
A similar extension of duty occurred where the landowner
had implied rather than actual knowledge of the trespasser's
presence. For example, if the plaintiff was a "constant trespasser
on a limited area '"," of the premises, and if the landowner had not
taken any action to stop the practice, the trespasser again assumed the status of a licensee under the fiction that customary
and tolerated trespasses were known of and consented to by the
landowner."
The duty of the landowner was also expanded in cases where
the trespasser was a child. If a hazardous or defective artificial
condition existed on the land, situated in a place where children
were likely to trespass, and if the condition constituted an "attractive nuisance, ' 52the landowner was under a duty to "exercise
reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect
the children."' :1An "attractive nuisance" was defined as any artificial condition on land which presented an unreasonable risk of
harm to children-unreasonable in that the risk could not be
perceived by children due to their youth." Consequently, the
duty owed the trespassing child approached that owed an invitee.
This is not surprising since the attractive nuisance, in some sense,
lured the child onto the premises and into danger, and thus it had
an effect similar to that of "affirmative encouragement" in invitee situations. ,
These modifications of duty owed licensees and the three
subclasses of the general class of trespassers are really responses
"See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Douthit. 208 S.W. 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
'"See. e.g., Wise v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 355 Mo. 1168, 76 S.W.2d 118 (1934).
"'Smith v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 274 Pa. 97, 117 A. 786 (1922); St. Louis S.W. Ry.
v. Douthit, 208 S.W. 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Davis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 58 Wis.
646, 17 N.W. 406 (1883).
"Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 307 (1875).
"'RESTATEMENT § 339 (emphasis added).
"Meagher v. Hirt, 232 Minn. 336, 45 N.W.2d 563 (1951).
'In 1934 the first Restatement of Torts supported the special rules pertaining to
trespassing children without any fiction of attractive nuisance. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ :339 (1934). For a discussion of the competing policies embraced by the trespassing
children doctrine, see Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 142, 237, 340, 348 (1921).
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to the strain of applying discrete plaintiff categories to negligence
cases. For many entrants, the mechanical classification scheme
worked well. To illustrate, a trespasser's presence on the land was
unconsented to, unprivileged, and unknown by the landowner,
and hence the latter's duty was severely limited. But if "known
trespassers," "constant trespassers," or "trespassing children"
were negligently injured upon the land, classifying them as mere
trespassers would bar their recovery, even though the circumstances of their trespass suggested at least constructive consent to and
knowledge of their presence by the defendant.5" To avoid the
harsh consequences of the original common law scheme, courts
began to distort the clear demarcations between classes of plaintiffs, extending new protection to licensees and treating some
trespassers as licensees or invitees. From case to case these expansions invited uneven applications and finely-drawn distinctions
between plaintiffs.57 However, as will be demonstrated shortly,58
they did foreshadow later, more candid departures from mechanical jurisprudence.
2.

Modifications in Class Definition and in Duty Owed Invitees
At common law, one who entered land under a social invitation was classified as a licensee since his presence provided no
economic benefit to the landowner. 59 The courts, however, had
difficulty in squaring the minimal duty owed the "social invitee""' with the affirmative nature of his invitation. This difficulty
encouraged a broadening of the definition of an invitee to include
one who was encouraged to enter by the words or conduct of the
landowner, irrespective of economic benefit." The courts implied
from the invitation of the landowner his guarantee that the premises would be reasonably safe for the guest. Thus in some jurisdictions the social guest became an invitee.6 2
"For an analysis of these modifications in terms of the post-Mile High foreseeability
test, see section III. A. infra.
57See authorities cited note 8 supra.
"See section II. infra.
I'Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195, 1197 (Ex. 1856).
"'See, e.g., Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951).
"The economic benefit requirement actually developed later than the implied assurance theory; however, the social guest in earlier cases did not receive a per se assurance
of the safety of the premises. See PROSSER 388-89.
"'The social guest was made an invitee by statute in Connecticut. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (Supp. 1973). The same result was achieved by judicial decision in
Lousiana. See Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730

1974
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The reasoning underlying the modern social invitee rule
found further expression in the development of a "public invitee
doctrine." As the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the
term, "A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or
remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which
the land is held open to the public." 3
These broader definitions brought a larger number of plaintiffs under the umbrella of duty owed the invitee. The modifications, however, affected only the membership of the invitee class,
not the duty owed the class. The landowner was still required to
inspect his premises 4 in order either to make them safe for an
invitee or to warn him of any hazards. 5
Although such modifications of the categories permitted
more "just" results in particular cases, they failed to correct the
confusion and complexity in issues of duty. In fact, they served
to further confuse the determination of the landowner's duty by
creating additional rigid categories to be applied to the plaintiff."
In distinguishing, for example, a "known trespasser" from all
other trespassers, courts were often forced to split definitional
hairs, and still the spectre of harsh results remained. Where a
plaintiff was injured by the clearly unreasonable conduct of a
defendant, but where the plaintiff could not be rationally placed
in a favored category, his recovery was still often barred.
Dissatisfaction with the common law expansions which had
occurred on both sides of the Atlantic led England to abolish the
distinction between invitee and licensee in 1957.67 The same pressures for change were then building in America."
A.

II. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE
Rowland v. Christian
With the confusion and conflict created by the varied appli-

(La. App. 1957). Colorado, however, followed the majority rule, treating social guests as
mere licensees. See Kenny v. Grice, 171 Colo. 185, 188-89, 465 P.2d 401, 403 (1969).
aRESTATEMENT § 332.
"Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133 A. 568 (1926); Kallum v. Wheeler, 129 Tex. 74,
101 S.W.2d 225 (1937). See also RESTATEMENT § 343.
"Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946); Dean v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957).
"The court in Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955), underscores this
observation
in detail.
7
1 Occupiers Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, at 308 (1957). The limited duty owed a
trespasser was not changed by this legislation.
" See, e.g., O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal. 2d 729, 414 P.2d 830, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1966).
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cations of the common law rules, it was inevitable that some
courts would break with tradition and refuse to apply the original
classification scheme or the modifications which had been grafted
onto it. The first court to do this was the California Supreme
Court in its 1968 decision, Rowland v. Christian.9 In this case the
plaintiff, a guest in the apartment of the defendant, injured his
hand while using a faucet in the bathroom. The defendant had
notified the landlord of the defect in the faucet and had requested
its replacement 1 month prior to the accident. At trial, the defendant moved for a summary judgment alleging that the plaintiff
had used the bathroom facilities on a prior occasion and that he
had been aware of the faucet's condition. Under the traditional
common law approach, the plaintiff had been a mere licensee
since his presence in the defendant's apartment had been gratuitous. 7' The trial court therefore granted the defense motion, ruling that the plaintiff, as a licensee, had not been entitled to a
warning.
In his appeal from the summary judgment, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had owed him a duty of warning because
she had been aware of his impending use of the bathroom and of
the hazard existing therein. As a licensee, the plaintiff might still
have been entitled to a warning of the defective condition if the
7
condition had been latent, and if he had been unaware of it. '
Alternatively, if the definition of invitee had been expanded, as
it had in some jurisdictions, the plaintiff might have been considered a social invitee, and thus entitled to a warning.7 1 Instead of
permitting or denying recovery by selecting an appropriate plaintiff classification, or by creating a new one, the court held:
The proper test ... is whether in the management of his property
[the defendant] has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiffs status as a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise
to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the
7
status is not determinative. 3

The court concluded that modern society could no longer justify
the supremacy of landowner rights over the life and limb of entrants. Since the common law classifications primarily served
"'69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
7"Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 481, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911 (1967).
7See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
2
See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
7:'69 Cal. 2d at 114, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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landed interests, the court chose to "turn the corner" away from
the classifications and to install in their place the general rules
of negligence for determining the duty of the landowner vis-A-vis
the entrant upon his land. 7 This decision provided the stimulus
for other jurisdictions, including Colorado, to institute a more
modern concept of duty in cases of premises liability.
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich
In 1971 the Colorado Supreme Court was faced with a situation much like that presented by Rowland. In Mile High Fence
Co. v. Radovich,75 the defendant occupied land for the purpose of
erecting a fence. At the end of a day's work, several post holes had
not been permanently filled with fence posts; however, employees
of the defendant had temporarily placed posts in all but one of
the empty holes. This open hole was located approximately 7
inches from the edge of an alley. Late that evening Radovich, a
policeman on duty, strayed from the alley and stepped into the
open hole, breaking his leg. There were no barricades, warning
the
lights, or other protective devices to alert the plaintiff to
7
B.

hazard. The trial court granted judgment for the plaintiff.

1

The defendant appealed, alleging that Radovich entered the
property as a licensee, that the hazard was apparent upon a reasonable inspection, and that he was therefore owed no duty of
warning.77 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiff, concluding that the entrant's status or classification as
an invitee, trespasser, or licensee was no longer controlling in
determining the landowner's duty. 71 In affirming the court of appeals decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held:
IS/tatus or classification of one who is upon the property of another
responsibility or the
is not to be determinative of the occupant's
7
degree of care which he owes to that person. 1

"The court cited as a further justification for its decision section 1714 of the Civil
Code:
Every one is responsible, not only for the results of his willful acts. but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person . ...
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
7.175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).

'Id.
at
'7d. at
not finding
7'1d.
at
7
1Id. at

538-39, 489 P.2d at 309.
539. 489 P.2d at 310. The company also argued that the trial court erred in
Radovich contributorily negligent for his failure to use his flashlight.
539-40, 489 P.2d at 310.
548. 489 P.2d at 314.
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The court gave two reasons for its decision. First, *thetraditional rules bred conflict and confusion, resulting in a number of
th'e exceptions and modifications discussed earli.er. '" The different interpretations of an individual's status in different courts in
the same jurisdiction also compounded litigation."
The second reason given by the court was that the traditional
approach usurped the jury function. The court felt that the common law rules were active in "preventing the jury from applying
changing community standards to a landowner's duties, a harshness which is inappropriate to a modern legal system.""2 The
court expressed concern that the mechanical application of the
common law classifications to determine the landowner's duty
often resolved the question of liability as a matter of law. Thus,
the rigid application of the common law classifications, instead
of permitting a flexible jury assessment, often acted to deny meritorious claimss :' In order to achieve more equitable results, the
court set forth the following rule:
[lit is the foreseeability of harm from the failure by the possessor
to carry on his activities with reasonable care for the safety of the
entrants which determines liability."

Thus, Colorado joined California in abrogating the common law
classifications as the sole factor in ascertaining the duty of a land
5
occupier to one injured upon his land.
"See section I.C. supra.
"The court cited Smith v. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. as having been before the
court on four occasions as a result of conflict and confusion in determining the class to
which an entrant belonged. These four cases, all of the same name, are found at 78 Colo.
169, 240 P. 332 (1925); 82 Colo. 497, 261 P. 872 (1927); 88 Colo. 422, 298 P. 646 (1931); 92
Colo. 464, 21 P.2d 1116 (1933).
12175 Colo. at 542, 489 P.2d at 312.
"Id. at 543-46, 489 P.2d at 312-13. The court indicated that decisions as a matter of
law were the rule rather than the exception in Colorado citing, inter alia, Dunbar v.
Olivieri, 97 Colo. 381, 50 P.2d 64 (1935); Gotch v. K. & B. Packing & Provision Co., 93
Colo. 276, 25 P.2d 719 (1933); Catlett v. Colorado & S. Ry., 56 Colo. 463, 139 P. 14
(1914); Watson v. Manitou & P.P. Ry., 41 Colo. 138, 92 P. 17 (1907).
"175 Colo. at 547, 489 P.2d at 314 (emphasis added) (adopting the position of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts). This foreseeability and reasonableness standard in Mile
High was "codified" in the 1973 revision of the Colorado civil jury instructions. The new
instruction states that the owner or occupant of the premises must use reasonable care to
keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition, in the light of the foreseeability of injury
to others. COLO. JURY INST. 12:9 (Supp. 1973).
"A comparsion of Mile High and Rowland reveals several similarities. First, both
plaintiffs would have been licensees under the common law rules. The instrumentalities
in both cases were either unknown to the plaintiff or not obvious to him upon a reasonable
inspection. In Rowland, the defect in the faucet was not obvious to the plaintiff. In Mile
High, the indirect lighting in the alley was insufficient to illuminate the open post hole.
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III.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE Rowland AND Mile High IMPACT

Thus far we have examined the rigid common law classifications as they grew from the privileged status of the landowner in
feudal society. The classification scheme attempted to divide the
duty owed by landowners to entrants into three discrete levels
according to the equally discrete classes of entrants. Since the
duty actually varied continuously across the spectrum of possible
plaintiffs and depended on other factors in addition to the entrant's class, the results of this scheme were uneven and often
harsh. C*ourts created a number 6f exc'eptions to the .classes and
fashioned 6ertain legal *fictions which either elevated some entrants to a class -owed a higher duty or raised the level of duty
owed a particular class. But far from correcting the problems,
these changes further compounded the confusion and complexity
surrounding questions of landowner duty.
The California Supreme Court in Rowland sought to rectify
these difficulties by refusing to apply the entrant's class as the
conclusive determinant of the landowner's duty and instead imposed a duty of reasonable care under all relevant circumstances.
This constituted an application of the general law of negligence.
Subsequently, in Mile High, Colorado joined California in abrogating the strict classification scheme and in adopting the general
law of negligence for questions of landowner duty.
To date, subsequent case law in both California and Colorado has been inadequate for a conclusive evaluation of either
Rowland's or Mile High's impact. Nevertheless, the existing case
experience does point to certain trends and influences developing
as a result of these decisions. For example, 1 year after Rowland
was decided, the California Court of Appeals, in the case of
Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course," refused to apply the principles of Rowland to an invitee case. The court ruled that although Rowland may have changed the method of determining
it did not alter the duty rules of prior
the duty owed a licensee,
7
decisions.
invitee
Thus, both courts suggested that a basis for the liability of the landowner might have
existed under common law. In both cases, the court chose not to perpetuate the common
law classifications but rather to impose upon the occupier an obligation to use his property
reasonably in light of the foreseeability of harm.
"273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). The California Court of Appeals for
the Fifth District has also sanctioned this approach of not applying Rowland to invitees.
See Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.. 16 Cal. App. 3d 881, 884 n.1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474
n.1 (1971).
17273 Cal. App. 2d at 23, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
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Decisions like Beauchamp in both California and Colorado
serve to focus the remainder of this comment upon the theoretical, procedural, and substantive implications of abrogating the
common law classification scheme. The theoretical implications
act to establish the framework in which the new rule will be
applied and hence provide a logical starting point for analysis.
A.

The Foreseeability of Relation and Risk: A Theoretical
A nalysis
In the famous decision of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.," Chief Judge Cardozo stated the essence of the general law
of negligence: "itihe risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed""' and "negligence, like risk, is . . . a term of

relations."!' ) Read together, these two statements support the earlier observation' that the "risk to be reasonably foreseen" depends largely upon the "relation" between plaintiff and defendant. This reasoning prompted Professor Prosser to characterize,
in extremely broad terms, that relation between a plaintiff and
defendant which determines duty: a relation "of close proximity
in time, space, and direct causal sequence, between a negligent
defendant and the person he injures." 2
The common law classification scheme for determining a
landowner's duty to those entering upon his land arose outside
these principles of the general law of negligence.93 Reformulating
the classification approach in terms of these principles reveals the
root cause of the difficulty with the scheme's operation. To illustrate, the presence of an adult trespasser is usually "unknown"
to the landowner. This is equivalent, in most cases, to saying the
trespasser's presence is not "reasonably foreseeable" and, like
'' 5
Mrs. Palsgraf," the trespasser is an "unforeseeable plaintiff. 11
Under both the common law scheme and the general law of negligence then, the trespasser is owed no duty to be protected from
risks of harm. This follows because all risks of harm to a plaintiff
"248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
"Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 100.
"'Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 101.
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
2
1 Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mint. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953).
See section I. supra.
"The court's decision in Palsgrof constituted a finding that Mrs. Palsgraf was not a
foreseeable plaintiff, and therefore no duty was owed her by the railroad. See Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
'PROSSER 254.
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whose presence is unforeseeable must be outside that class of
risks that are to be "reasonably foreseen" and which "define the
duty to be obeyed." Phrased differently, the plaintiff-trespasser
and the landowner-defendant stand in a relation devoid of "close
proximity in time, space, and direct causal sequence," and no
duty in negligence terms exists.
Similarly, the common law exceptions to and modifications
of the original status approach can be described in terms of foreseeability. When courts created the special classes of "constant
trespasser,". "known trespasser," and "trespassing children,"
and provided greater protection to these classes, they were implicitly recognizing that these plaintiffs were more foreseeable
than the typical trespasser. Likewise, courts perceived a greater
foreseeability of harm to noninvitee entrants from latent defects
than from patent ones, and hence recognized a duty to warn of
latent defects. As to social and public invitees, the courts which
recognized these statuses were responding to the absence of any
real difference in foreseeability of harm to members of the economic, social, and public invitee classes."
The difficulty with the common law scheme should now be
clear: the presence of all entrants, even within the same class, is
not equally foreseeable, and to apply a single rigid level of duty
to any one class of plaintiffs disrupts the underlying theory of
negligence law. Although foreseeability, with few exceptions, increases continuously as the plaintiff moves through the classes
(from trespasser, through licensee, and into invitee), the specific
level of duty increases in discrete steps.
B.

The Post-Mile High Role of Plaintiff Status
In cases where the plaintiff would have been classified as a
trespasser or licensee under the traditional scheme, the general
law of negligence should now increase the probability of his recovery. Instead of losing to a per se rule of law because he is classified
as a trespasser or licensee, the plaintiff may recover under the
tests of foreseeable risk, foreseeable plaintiff, and reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct. However, in the case of an invitee, it
"It is of note that the early common law rules gave greater protection to invitees than
to any other class of entrants. Although the differing levels of duty for trespassers and
licensees demonstrate a correspondence between "knowledge of presence" and the Mile
High foreseeabilitv approach, the old invitee rule turned on the existence of economic
benefit. Economic benefit, however, has no correspondence with the foreseeability standard, since such benefit is irrelevant to the foreseeability of the plaintiffs presence.
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is quite possible that the strict duty of inspection, repair, and/or
warning owed him under the common law scheme will not be
owed under these tests of general negligence law (or may not be
owed in every situation where the plaintiff is an invitee).
Although we know from both Rowland and Mile High that
the common law classifications retain some importance in determining the extent of landowner liability, 7 defining the role of the
classifications with any precision is a difficult task. In Mile High,
the Colorado Supreme Court commented on this role rather
cryptically:
A person's status as a trespasser,licensee or invitee may, of course,
in the light of the facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing
on the question of liability, but it is only a factor-not conclusive."

It is noteworthy that the court speaks of the plaintiff's status as
a factor in establishing liability. In contrast, the tests of foreseeability and reasonableness are characterized as questions going to
the landowner's duty." This suggests that the plaintiff's status is
relevant in determining the defendant's breach of duty as defined
under the general principles of foreseeability and reasonableness.
In making reference to "facts giving rise to such status," the
Mile High court probably had in mind facts such as the plaintiff's
purpose in entering the premises, his manner of entry, and his
conduct while on the premises, as well as the defendant's consent
or lack of consent to the entry. These were the salient factual
considerations under the original common law approach used in
determining the plaintiff's status. Although these facts, like the
status which they determine, may bear on the breach of duty
question, it is also possible that such facts will serve as key factors
in other elements of liability, most notably causation. Indeed, the
conditions of entry and the details of plaintiff and defendant
conduct during the injury-producing relationship are the very
facts needed to support any finding on the causation issue.
Whatever the precise role ultimately given the plaintiff's status, it is certain the plaintiff classes will act at least as a guide
in characterizing that critical "relationship" between the plain"7Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 114, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 548, 489 P.2d 308, 314-15 (1971).
11175 Colo. at 548, 489 P.2d at 314-15 (emphasis added to "liability").
"Id. at 548, 489 P.2d at 314. The court here speaks of status as no longer being
determinative of the landowner's "responsibility" and the requisite "degree of care";
rather, reasonableness and foreseeability apply in this regard.
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tiff and defendant which measures the foreseeability of the plaintiff's presence. In a majority of cases, the risk of harm and the
foreseeability of presence will still be greater for an invitee than
for a trespasser, and hence the duty owed the former will still be
greater than that owed the latter. However, it is also clear that
circumstances other than the plaintiff's classification may significantly influence the foreseeability of his presence or of the risk of
harm to him, and these, too, will now be considered in defining
duty. For example, on a construction site in a crowded urban area
the risk of harm and foreseeability of presence may be nearly the
same for a trespasser as for an invitee.
C.

From Law to Fact
Examining the role of the plaintiff's status suggested by Mile
High leads to other interrelated changes in premises liability
cases. It seems certain that status is to have more impact as a
matter of fact or facts than as a matter of law. In Mile High itself,
the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed many facts which would
previously have gone to the legal classification of the plaintiff, but
now such facts are used to test the foreseeability of the entrant
and the risk of harm to him. The court examined such facts as
the quality of lighting and the proximity of the open hole to the
edge of the alley" ' and held that foreseeability and reasonableness could be determined as matters of fact during the trial. The
court thus stressed the need for a comprehensive presentation of
facts in defining the level of duty owed the plaintiff by the premises occupier.
In a 1972 decision, Ward v. Enevold,11" the Colorado Court
of Appeals applied the Mile High ruling and accomplished a result which probably could not have been achieved under the traditional status approach. This case clearly illustrates the importance of factual analysis to the tests of foreseeability and reasonableness. In Ward the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and
fell after leaving a bar and while entering the rear portion of
property owned by an adjacent bar. The injury occurred at night
and the area was poorly lit. In holding the defendant bars liable,
the court reasoned that the pedestrian was a foreseeable entrant
upon the affected properties and that the hazardous condition
which caused her injury constituted an unreasonable risk of
"'Id. at

538-39, 489 P.2d at 309.
"'u504 P.2d 1108 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
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harm. Under the traditional status approach this plaintiff would
have been classified a licensee at best, and2 the possibility of recovery would have been severely limited."
Although cases like Ward imply an extensive foreseeability
to be imputed to many landowners, the Colorado Supreme Court
in Mile High explicitly warns against any imposition of absolute
liability upon such defendants."' : This warning was heeded by the
Colorado Court of Appeals in its 1972 decision, Kaffel v. Cloverleaf Kennel Club. "" Here the plaintiff was a paying customer of
the defendant racetrack (and hence, an invitee). He was injured
when a beer keg fell off a vehicle and onto his foot. The keg was
under the control of a delivery man not employed by the racetrack, and the keg was being delivered to a concession stand
leased to a concessionaire by the defendant. Citing Mile High as
precedent, the court concluded that nothing in the evidence
would lead a reasonably prudent man in the defendant's position
to foresee this risk of harm, and recovery was denied. Thus, although Mile High demands an extensive foreseeability analysis,
application of the test is not synonymous with plaintiff victory.
Jury Function: The Importance of the "Community Standard"
Since the issue of duty is no longer a matter of per se legal
classification, judges may not decide the issue purely as a matter
D.

of law."' 5 They must permit the trier of fact to judge circumstan-

ces, reasonableness, and foreseeability, and to apply "community
standards"'" in these judgments. This change was foreshadowed
by the majority in Mile High when it observed that the abrogation of the classification scheme would end the usurpation of jury
functions by judges. Under the traditional approach the plaintiff
was often deprived of a jury's "community-oriented" evaluation
of the defendant's conduct "in light of all the relevant circum""In relation to the bar that she had patronized, the plaintiff's status as an invitee
had terminated prior to the time of the injury. As to the second defendant bar, the plaintiff
was a trespasser.
""Specifically, the court comments that "[ilnoverruling Lunt and Gotch we do not
mean to imply that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover as a matter of law." 175 Colo.
at 548, 489 P.2d at 314.
1'504 P.2d 374 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"''See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
"'"The leading case on "community standards" and their role in duty determination
is Levine v. Russell Blaine Co., 273 N.Y. 386, 7 N.E.2d 673 (1937). See also Weisbart v.
Flohr, 260 Cal. App. 2d 281, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1968).
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stances," because judges would rule on duty as a matter of law." 7
Now, however, the plaintiff's status is only one of many relevant
circumstances to be considered by a jury in applying community
standards to the facts of the case.
The community standard in negligence cases defines what
risks the "reasonably prudent man""" would have reasonably
toreseen under the particular set of circumstances. This constitutes the "standard of care" by which the defendant's conduct is
to be measured. In view of both the theoretical and practical
importance of' the community standard, it is fitting for the jury
to assume a larger role in questions of duty, since a jury is supposedly the true representative of the community and its standards.""' Arguably, a jury in its collective wisdom is better
equipped than any single judge to represent community standards. Indeed judges applying an ancient classification scheme,
even with modern twists, are in a doubtful position to reflect the
dynamic nature of contemporary society.")
The shift of decisionmaking to the jury has not occurred as
smoothly as one might have hoped. There has been concern expressed for the potential lack of certainty created by the
Rowland-Mile High approach. Juries, for example, will vary
greatly in the quality and rationality of their deliberations. Such
systemic biases as the imposition of liability against defendants
merely because they are capable of compensating a less fortunate
plaintiff may now be permitted free rein in negligence cases."'
Justice Burke, dissenting in Rowland, expressed the fear that
"today's decision appears to open the door to potentially unlimited liability .*.. ."2 These concerns prompted the California
1'Mile

High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 543, 489 P.2d 308, 312 (1971).

""PRoSSER 149-66.

""'See Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 427. 430-31 (1969).
"'The shift to a larger role for juries is borne out by the case experience in both
jurisdictions. Many of the California decisions following Rowland and the Colorado decisions following Mile High overturned judgments in favor of defendants because they were
based on rulings made as a matter of law. Such cases were remanded for consideration
by a jury. See Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 908 (1972); Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d :321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972); Hurst
v. Crowtero Boating Club, Inc., 496 P.2d 1054 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Hall v. Cheyenne
Mt. Museum & Zoological Soc'y. 492 P.2d 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"'This fear was first expressed in the 19th century. See Marsh, supra note 8, at 18586.
o'69 Cal. 2d at 115, 443 P.2d at 569. 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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Court of Appeals in Beauchamp'"to delimit the full implication
of Rowland:
IWle do not believe such established decisional principles [as
those relating to the invitee status] have been abandoned and freewheeling by the triers of fact substituted in their stead."'

The court cautioned that withdrawal from the status approach
would limit the power of the court to control potential jury
abuses." 15 It is noteworthy, however, that these very same concerns led to the original judicial "codification" of duty for "frequently occurring plaintiff-defendant relationships" and ultimately to the classification scheme abrogated by Rowland and
Mile High. It is of further note that Colorado courts, as exemplified by the Kaffel decision,"' have shown no reluctance in applying Mile High to invitee cases.
The concern expressed by the California court in Beauchamp
about possible jury abuses has not surfaced in the post-Mile High
decisions in Colorado. Generally, the courts are demanding that
premises liability cases go to the jury. In Cline v. Brown Palace
Hotel Co.," 7 for example, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's directed verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the
issue of negligence may be taken from the jury and decided by
the court as a matter of law only in the clearest of cases, as where
there are undisputed facts about which reasonable minds could
not differ."6
There are often other concerns attending a jury preference in
questions of landowner duty. For example, locale will influence
the attitude of jurors. In urban areas land will tend to be far less
important than people, while in rural areas the sanctity of the
landowner's interest is more likely to dominate."' A related factor
important to jury preference is the identity of the parties. In
Colorado negligence cases which have followed Mile High, a high
proportion of the defendants have been corporate entities."" If the
":1273 Cal. App. 2d 25, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). See also text accompanying note 86
supra.

"'Id. at

24, 77 Cal. Rptr.
"'Id. at 25, 77 Cal. Rptr.
""See text accompanying
"7492 P.2d 873 (Colo. Ct.

at 918.
at 919.
note 104 supra.
App. 1971).

"lId. at 875.
Juries are now drawn from voter registration lists instead of from property tax rolls
as a constitutional requirement to insure the cross-sectional character of juries. See Thiel
v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
'2"Ranke v. Fowler Real Estate Co., 497 P.2d 1268 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Hurst v.
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tendency of a jury to favor individual plaintiffs over corporate
defendants persists,'' the jury preference could have a profound
effect on the probability and amount of recovery.
All such fears of jury bias are questionable. There is little
evidence of any differences, quantitative or qualitative, between
juror and judge biases.' Moreover, even jury biases are part of
that "community standard" underlying the law of negligence.
Admittedly existing biases will exert more influence in the absence of strict guidelines for the jury in the determination of the
defendant's duty, and neither Rowland nor Mile High provide
guidance other than the generalized tests of "foreseeability" and
"reasonableness." The absence of restrictive guidelines is not surprising, however, since by their very nature the tests of foreseeability and reasonableness of conduct defy any a priori definition.
To do more than set forth the general principles of decisionmaking would signal a return to rigid mechanical rules not unlike
those of the original status approach.
CONCLUSION

Through the Rowland and Mile High decisions, the narrow
levels of defendant duty defined by rigid and discrete plaintiff
classifications have been replaced by a continuum of duty-a
continuum far more consistent with the fundamental principles
of negligence law. Duty depends now on the reasonable foreseeability of the risk of harm which proximately causes the injury
suffered by the plaintiff. The foreseeability of the plaintiff's entry
and the risk of harm to him, and not the label of the entrant, have
become the ultimate determinants of duty.
The Rowland-Mile High approach places the jury in the pivotal role of applying community standards to measure the foreseeability of risk and the reasonableness of the landowner's conduct. This application of community standards under the general
law of negligence is far more flexible and responsive to individual
fact settings than the mechanical common law status approach.
Admittedly abrogation of the common law scheme may necessitate some loss of certainty in premises liability cases, but the
Crowtero Boating Club, Inc., 496 P.2d 1054 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Kopke v. AAA Warehouse Corp., 494 P.2d 1307 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Hall v. Cheyenne Mt. Museum &
Zoological Soc'y, 492 P.2d 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"'This jury bias is discussed in James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949).
'1See Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1964).
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gains achieved in terms of "justice" and judicial methodology
would seem to more than compensate for this loss.
Mile High thus represents a shift from the application of
fragmented rules to a unified methodology which promises more
explicit reasoning. Although rules are not inherently bad, they are
open to abuse when rigidly applied. They act to obscure the
court's underlying thought processes and thereby preclude articulated opinions. In contrast, under the general law of negligence
the plaintiff receives an evaluation of all relevant circumstances
and an application of the community standard to determine the
reasonableness of the landowner's actions. This represents a
straightforward, rational judicial method-one which squares the
practice of negligence law with its theory.
Some California courts have demonstrated a reluctance to
apply the full force of Rowland. They have seemingly limited its
precedential value to cases involving licensees. In marked contrast, the Colorado courts have begun to build a foundation of
precedent which refines and strengthens the Mile High decision.
It is hoped that future decisions will continue this development.
Carl E. Edwards, Jr.
Richard J Jerome

COMMENT
LABOR LAW-MANDATORY ATTORNEY'S FEESSection 102 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
Hall v. Cole, 93 S. Ct. 1943 (1973).
INTRODUCTION

Fee-shifting is the transfer of an obligation to pay for legal
services from the contracting party to another party. The United
States Supreme Court, in the decision of Hall v. Cole,' affirmed
an award of counsel fees for a successful action brought under
section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA).2 The decision ended any lingering doubts as to
whether or not a district court might award the successful section
102 litigant legal fees. But at the same time, Hall raised the
troubling question of whether the successful section 102 litigant
must be awarded counsel fees. This comment will explore why the
Court's reasoning leads to the conclusion that counsel fees are no
longer to be awarded on a discretionary basis, but rather that a
successful section 102 litigant must be granted attorney's fees.
I. FACTS
John Cole attempted to present a set of preambles and resolutions :' that would have modified existing union rules.4 Following
a heated debate, union officers finally relented and permitted a
vote on the resolutions. The resolutions were defeated and a
"Charge Sheet" demanding Cole's expulsion was subsequently
filed. It alleged that Cole had violated the union constitution by
presenting the resolutions. His actions were said to be a "malicious vilification" of the officers and of the union. Cole was tried
'93 S. Ct. 1943 (1973).
'Section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1959), provides in pertinent part:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have
been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action
in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions)
as may be appropriate.
:'At a membership meeting of petitioner's labor union in Brooklyn, New York, on
August 6, 1962, the Respondent, John Cole, introduced for consideration a proposed resolution calling for reform of the union's shipping rules.
'The resolution sought to regularize the union's rotary hiring process so that men
would be shipped in proper order; it also sought to end the ruinous policy of "raiding"
sister unions. Brief for Respondent at 1-7, Hall v. Cole, 93 S. Ct. 143 (1973).
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before the Union Trial Committee which found him guilty and
ordered his expulsion. After exhausting all intra-union remedies,
Cole was granted a temporary injunction forbidding his expulsion.' Trial on the merits resulted in a permanent injunction and
an award of attorney's fees.7 This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Second Circuit.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of
whether (1) an award of attorney's fees is permissible under section 102 of the LMRDA, and if so, (2) whether such an award
under these facts constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. The Court found that the award of counsel fees is within
the discretion of a district court, and that such discretion was not
abused in this case.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The American Rule
The decision in Hall to award attorney's fees was dictated by
following a recognized exception to the American rule. American
courts typically will not include counsel fees, either as part of a
cash award or in conjunction with equitable relief,9 absent a statutory or contractual authorization.' 0 "In support of the American
rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at best uncertain,
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting
a lawsuit."" If the penalty for losing may include an opponent's
'The resolution contained several "Whereas" clauses of which two-the eighth and
the ninth-were the subject of the charges. The eighth "Whereas" clause commented that
"moral arguments fabricated to justify the [petitioner-union's] interference in interunion
beefs are both contridictory and phony." The ninth "Whereas" clause criticized Paul Hall
for having begun a pattern of "organizational hijacking" by a raid on a sister union.
The trial took place on October 9, 1962. Cole submitted to the Trial Committee a
written statement admitting that he had introduced the resolution but denied that it
constituted a "malicious vilification." There was no oral testimony taken at the trial. A
recommendation made by the Trial Committee that Cole be found guilty and expelled
was ratified by the union members. Brief for Respondent at 1-7, Hall v. Cole, 93 S. Ct.
1943 (1973).
'Cole v. Hall, 56 L.R.R.M. 2606 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
'Cole v. Hall, 66 CCH Lab. Cas.
22,011 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
'Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972).
'Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L.
RE~v. 792 (1966).
"Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). See
Havenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363
(1852).
"Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
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legal fees, many individuals might be unjustly discouraged from
instituting actions to vindicate their rights." There are, however,
three recognized exceptions under which federal courts will award
counsel fees.
First, awards Will be granted when the other party's action
is vexatious, oppressive, or deemed to be in bad faith." This
determination can only be made in light of all the surrounding
circumstances," and an award by a court under this exception is
justified as a punitive grant. 5
Second, awards will be granted when an individual's action
creates or preserves a common fund for the benefit of the members of an identifiable class. A fund is created when a defendant
is ordered to transfer into the court assets which have not previously been claimed by class members. A fund is preserved when
a defendant is ordered to transfer into the court assets which have
previously been claimed by class members. In either instance:
a court of equity will require that every member of the class who
seeks to participate in the benefits derived from the exertions of
counsel [for the individual instituting the action] shall contribute
pro rata to the reasonable compensation of counsel for what they
have done in that matter. 7

These awards will be made in situations in which the plaintiff
does not claim to be a class representative, as well as in those in
which he does. 8 The courts justify these awards as grants preventing the unjust enrichment of class members at the expense
of the claimants.
Finally, courts will award counsel fees when the plaintiffs
private suit enforces an important statutory policy. Such suits
render substantial benefits to others in addition to the plaintiff.
'2Id.
"Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); 6J. MOORE. FEIERA.
I'HA(TCE " 54,77 21 (2d ed. 1972).
"Local 149, UAW v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 873 (1962).
"7Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946); City Bank v.
Rivera Davila, 438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971).
"Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in
Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoI.uM. L. REV. 784, 786 (1939).
'"Burroughs v. Taxaway, 185 F. 435, 441 (4th Cir. 1911).
"In Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), the petitioner's action established her claim to the proceeds of a trust fund. The action also established a similar right
of recovery for a class of claimants to 14 other trust funds. Although the petitioner in
Sprague did not suggest that she was acting in a representative capacity, the court found
the benefit derived by all members of the class justified the award of attorney's fees.
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Fees are awarded not because of a contribution to a common
fund, nor for a showing of bad faith, but rather because of the
plaintiff's contribution to the enforcement of congressional policy
and the protection of the rights of others. 9 However, courts do not
have a free hand in awarding attorney's fees as a remedy to enforce all statutes."' For example, in Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co.,2 the Supreme Court held that an award
of attorney's fees under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act would be
inappropriate. The Court briefly dismissed both of the first two
exceptions to the American rule as being inapplicable to the facts
of the case. 21 Consideration was then given to whether an award
of counsel fees would effectuate the congressional intent underlying the Act.
It was decided that because the remedial section was drafted
with intricate detail, a broadening of the remedies of that Act
23
would be contrary to the congressional intent.
Judicial consideration of congressional intent is therefore the
key to determining when the third exception may appropriately
be implemented. A statute need not, however, expressly provide
for an award. There is sufficient authorization if the award effectuates the congressional policy implicit in the language of the
statute.24

Circuit Courts' Interpretationsof Section 102
Six circuit courts ruled on the propriety of a district court's
award of counsel fees under section 102 prior to Hall.215 The Sixth
2
Circuit Court, in McGraw v. United Association of Journeymen,
was the first to decide this issue. It was the only circuit court to
reject the idea that counsel fees are within the ambit of section
102. The court reiterated the contention of the district judge that
because no provision is made for attorney's fees under either secB.

"Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
"Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
2

Id.

11d. at 721.
2:Id.at 719-20.
2

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
2Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 466 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1972); Yablonski v. United
Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972);
Burch v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 454 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1971); Gartner v.
Soloner, 384 F.2d 348 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968); McGraw v.
United Ass'n of Journeymen, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
11341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
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tion 101 or section 102 of27the Act, the court is without jurisdiction
to make such an award.
The Third Circuit Court rejected the McGraw interpretation
in Gartnerv. Soloner.2' The court recognized that Congress made
no move to "limit or prescribe the scope of recovery" under section 102:
It should be emphasized that these words [section 102] are not of
the limiting type found in Fleischmann v. Maier Brewing . . . to
restrict recovery to those remedies which are expressly set forth in
the statute. In contrast, the scope of authority under Section 102
and the flexibility with which that power may be exercised is practically unlimited
in view of the courts [sic] legal and equitable juris29
diction.

Gartner dismissed as inconclusive the fact that other sections of
the LMRDA specifically permit the award of counsel fees.
Rather, because of its broad language, section 102 was found to
allow the awarding of attorney's fees."'
Each of the five circuit court cases which found that an
award of counsel fees was properly within the purview of a district
court :t couched its finding in terms of the discretionary power of
the district court. Not one of these opinions suggested that the
award was one which the district court must make.
With this background, little if any doubt existed that the
Supreme Court ruling in Hall would be consistent with the fiveto-one circuit court score. And a cursory reading of that opinion
might indeed be construed as just that: a mere affirmation of the
five circuit courts. Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of the Hall
opinion, stated in the final sentence of the decision32 that awarding of counsel fees was within the discretion of the district court.
This conclusion would indicate that Hall went no further than the
five circuit courts' decisions. Does it then follow that Congress
intended to empower a district court to pick and choose when it
will award attorney's fees to the successful litigant? An analysis
2

1d. at 710.

"384 F.2d 348 (3rd Cir. 1967).
"'1d. at 354.
:'Id. at :355.
"Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 466 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1972); Yablonski v. United
Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2nd Cir. 1972);
Burch v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 454 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1971); Gartner v.
Soloner, 384 F.2d 348 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968).
:'Hall v. Cole, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 1951 (1973).
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of both the legislative history of Title 1:1 of LMRDA and the logic
employed by the Court in Hall suggests that such awards are not
discretionary, but rather are mandatory.
III.

FEE-SHIFTING-MANDATORY

The legislative history of Title I reveals a congressional desire
to protect union democracy. Protection of these democratic rights
was of public concern because free exercise of these rights was
found to be in the public interest. Senator McClellan, when introducing Title I, stated his belief that "racketeering, corruption,
abuse of power and other improper practices" would never be
prevented until Congress prescribed "minimum standards of
democratic process." 4 "Without such protection," he declared,
"ofher provisions of law may be of little benefit and meaningless.'lt5 During.the course of the debate, he summarized the basfc
policy underlying Title I:
If we want fewer laws-and want to need fewer laws-providirig
regulation in this field, we should start with basic things. We should
give to union members their inherent constitutional rights, and we
should make those rights apply to union membership as well as to
other affairs of life. We should protect the union members in those
.rights. By so doing we will be giving them the tools they can use
themselves."

Although responsibility for enforcement of these rights was
first placed with the Secretary of Labor, section 102 was later
amended to permit the individual union member to bring the
action on his own behalf.37 The rights were no less infused with
public concern, for effective enforcement of these guarantees was
essential to facilitate the congressional policy. Rather, the congressional intent was to avoid "bureaucratic chaos"38 by allowing
individual union members to serve as substitutes for the Secretary of Labor. This change harmonized with the goals of protecting the rights of the individual member and the continued building of a democratic process within a union. The Court in Hall
: Title I of the LMRDA is the so-called civil rights provision of the Act. These rights
are those possessed by rank and file union members and are enumerated in section 101 of
the Act. Section 102 provides for civil enforcement in the event that a person's rights under
Title I have been infringed.
'U.S. I)EP'T OF LAHOH. LEGISLATIVE HISTOHY OF THE IABOR-MANA(OEMENr
AN) ])isi.OSuRE, ACT OF 1959, at 1098 (1960).

:Id.

:"Id.
at 1103.
:"1d. at 1102.
Ild. at 1113, 1114, 1117.
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recognized that to deny counsel fees would be to frustrate the
basic purpose of the Act:
Not to award counsel fees in cases such'as this would be tantamount
to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose. It is
difficult for individual Members of labor unions to stand up and
fight those who are in charge . . . . Congress passed the Act in an
effort to offset the heavy hand of the39 union by giving the union
members the aid of the federal courts.

Moreover, federal courts have an affirmative duty to fashion
effective remedies, remedies which are encompassed within the
purpose of a statute.' Consequently, federal courts must protect
the litigant's right to this remedy. A district court which rejects
a successful plaintiff's plea for counsel fees likewise denies aid
that Congress has sought to insure. "Tools" with which the individual was to have been able to protect his Title I rights are
withdrawn.
The Court in Hall also noted that the union was benefited
by John Cole's action, just as any union is "necessarily" benefited
by a successful section 102 action. Union self-government is
strengthened and the freedoms of all members are articulated
and protected. Cole, by vindicating his right to present a resolution on union policy, opened a forum for debate and insured that
future union decisions would be both more responsible and more
responsive. "And, by vindicating his own right, the successful
litigant dispelled the 'chill' cast upon the rights of others."',
Although damages are available under section 102, in many
cases there is no pecuniary loss, or the damage may be difficult
to prove. John Cole, after pursuing his civil action for 7 years, was
found to have suffered no compensable damage.12 If successful
plaintiffs are forced to bear their own counsel fees, few aggrieved
parties will be both willing and in a position to bring suit. Both
Congress and the Court wanted to avoid this situation.
Finally, the expense that a plaintiff under section 102 incurs
is directly related to benefits which a union "necessarily" receives. But there is no contractual obligation which requires a
union to compensate a member plaintiff. Mandatory fee-shifting
will correct this situation by shifting this obligation to the union.
"Hall v.
"'Leo v.
"Hall v.
'Cole v.

Cole, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 1951 (1973).
Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1971).
Cole, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 1948 (1973).
Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972).
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On the other hand, failure on the part of any court to award legal
fees condones a union's unjust enrichment.
The Court's logic in Hall is clear. A successful section .102
action will always bestow a benefit upon a union and its members. Justice demands that the union bear the cost of this benefit.
While the plaintiff and not the union is contractually bound to
pay -legal expenses, fee-shiffing transfers this expense from the
plaintiff to the union. Legislative history makes it apparent that
congressional policy is bent on protecting Title I rights. It therefore would be a perversion of justice and a mockery of congressional policy to permit the use of union funds to pay litigation
costs incurred in resisting recognition of democratic rights, but to
deny these funds to one seeking to protect these rights. Hall demands that fee-shifting be more than discretionary, that it be
mandatory.
Kenneth B. Siegel

